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
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*Location of Arab Refugee Camps*

(See table, page 298.)



# *The* Middle East *Journal*

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## ARAB REFUGEES: 1948-1952

*Georgiana G. Stevens*

IT HAS BEEN axiomatic in the Middle East since 1948 that there can be no final peace until the Arab refugees are settled. As some 867,000 begin their fifth year of exile from their former homes in Palestine there is every reason to credit the sustained warnings from the scene as to the political danger to peace which they constitute. These warnings come from many unofficial quarters. Mr. Stewart Alsop, writing from Baghdad last winter, summed up his observations: "For the future," he wrote, "the aim must be at all costs to avert another Arab-Israeli war . . . and the first step . . . must surely be to deal quickly and boldly with these ragged hordes of refugees, who now surround Israel with an iron ring of hate."<sup>1</sup> A. T. Steele, writing more recently from Jordan, comments that more than three years of exile have lowered the morale but have not softened the bitter-

<sup>1</sup> *New York Herald Tribune*, Nov. 25, 1951.

♦ GEORGIANA G. STEVENS returned in May from a two-months' visit to the Middle East, devoted chiefly to studying the refugee problem in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Previously, in 1946-47, she lived and travelled extensively in several of the Arab states while engaged in political research.

ness of the former Palestinians. He states flatly: "Every refugee camp is a reservoir of smoldering antagonism against the State of Israel and its Western backers."<sup>2</sup> The statement issued by the World Council of Churches and International Missionary Council following their conference in Beirut in May 1951 stressed the delegates' strong impressions of the "hatred and contempt" for the United States now widely prevalent throughout the Arab world and the low esteem for the United Nations based on the ground that that body "appears to be unwilling to work for a political settlement that will ensure full justice to the refugees."<sup>3</sup> Dorothy Thompson has written of "a million dispossessed people in this emotional Arab society, who have nothing more to lose, and are, therefore, susceptible to every agitation."<sup>4</sup>

By and large these statements come from disinterested observers. All reflect shocked surprise at the continued depth of Arab bitterness and alarm at its implications for East-West relations. Moreover, it is safe to say that these reports, together with a few timely articles in widely-read weeklies during 1951, introduced much of the American public for the first time to the grave realities of the refugee situation — more than three years after it occurred. Previous to that time the missionary press, the documents office of the United Nations, and the files of congressional committees were the chief repositories of one of the most human and portentous news stories of the postwar era.

#### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Now that the Arab refugee has been "discovered," it is important to see the situation in perspective. Beginning late in 1947, but more particularly in 1948, increasing numbers of Arabs began moving out of Palestine into neighboring countries. Their reasons for leaving are still a matter of bitter dispute. Conflicting accounts of both Arabs and Jews on this point each seem to have some validity. The Arabs say that they left to escape the terroristic campaign carried on by Jewish extremists against both British and Arab residents of Palestine all through 1947 and 1948. They point to such attacks as the massacre of the civilian

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 15, 1952.

<sup>3</sup> Press release entitled "Christian Responsibility for Palestinian Refugees," May 25, 1951.

<sup>4</sup> *Portland Oregonian*, Dec. 24, 1950. Despatch from Gaza.

population of Deir Yasin and its total destruction on April 9, 1948 — before the end of the Mandate — as reason enough for leaving. Some admit that they were influenced by Arab Higher Committee propaganda to the effect that they should leave temporarily to make way for the operations of the Arab Army of Liberation. The Israelis, on the other hand, insist that they had no intention of driving the Arabs out; that Deir Yasin and other episodes like it were the work of irresponsible terrorists, and that Arab propaganda was really to blame for the general Arab panic and exodus.

Outside observers on the scene at the time tend to dispute these latter contentions. Kenneth Bilby, in *New Star in the Near East*, refers to a shift in Israel's policy as the war turned in its favor in the interval between the first and second truces in July 1948. When the Jewish immigrant inflow began Arabs were not only permitted to leave, he writes — they were "encouraged."<sup>5</sup> Arthur Koestler, in *Promise and Fulfilment*, confirms the wholesale destruction of Arab villages by the Haganah in punitive actions against Arab guerillas early in 1948. He lays the mass flights to a series of Arab defeats, noting that "the 70,000 Arabs of Haifa abandoned the town after no more than a token fight because they had been completely demoralized by the desertion of their leaders and the psychological warfare waged against them by Haganah."<sup>6</sup> An indication of the official Israeli attitude is reported by James MacDonald, first U.S. Ambassador to Israel, in his book, *My Mission in Israel*. He writes: "Dr. Weizmann, despite his ingrained rationalism, spoke to me emotionally of this 'miraculous simplification of Israel's tasks.'"<sup>7</sup>

A more recent example of the Israelis' tough attitude toward the Arabs on their borders occurred during the Lake Huleh crisis of March-May 1951, when Israeli troops forcibly expelled 785 Arabs from their homes in this demilitarized zone after fighting with Syrian troops had broken out. In attempting to restore these Arabs to their lands and villages in accordance with a Security Council order, the U.N. Truce Supervisor, General William E. Riley, was obliged to report that the returned Arabs

<sup>5</sup> *New Star in the Near East* (New York, 1950), p. 31.

<sup>6</sup> *Promise and Fulfilment* (New York, 1949), pp. 158-62; 207.

<sup>7</sup> *My Mission in Israel* (New York, 1951), p. 176.

"must of necessity be housed in tents until villages destroyed are replaced."

It is relevant to review all this now because it helps to explain the present psychology of the Arab refugees and their political leaders. Both still firmly believe that the Jews pushed them out to make room for the thousands of Jewish immigrants who converged on the Promised Land after May 1948. Therefore they consider the Jews the aggressors rather than the battered Arab "liberation" forces. Believing this, and having obtained implicit affirmation of their views in successive U.N. resolutions on Palestine since 1948, both the refugees and Arab politicians continue tenaciously to cling to these resolutions and to hold the U.N. responsible for carrying them out. This sense of injustice is the primary element which blocks a ready solution to the problem.

#### *THE U.N. AND POLITICS*

The initial victory for the Arabs at the United Nations came in December 1948, shortly after the assassination of the U.N. Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte. After four months of work on the problem on the ground, Count Barnadotte had prepared a report to the Secretary General of the United Nations in which he recommended several revisions of the Partition Resolution of 1947. Believing that the economic union called for in the original resolution was politically impossible, Bernadotte set forth seven basic premises for effectively separating the Israeli and Arab neighbors from each other and clarifying their relations. In the light of subsequent developments it is worth while noting what these premises were: (1) that there should be no more fighting; (2) that Israel exists; (3) that boundaries must be set; (4) that these boundaries must be modified in the interest of homogeneity and integration; (5) that the Arab refugees (then numbering 350,000) should have the right of repatriation and compensation for damage to their property; (6) that Jerusalem should have separate treatment; and (7) that there should be international guarantees of both boundaries and Arab rights. Bernadotte further outlined the dangers to peace in the area if Israel allowed immigration up to a point where the country would have to expand to survive. Finally, he sug-



gested that to reduce friction the Negev desert should go to the Arabs, who largely populated it, and that Galilee should go to the Jews.

The impact of these suggestions in Israel was profound. Having just conquered 677 miles of Arab territory beyond the partition boundaries in the summer of 1948, the Israel Government adopted the position that only the status quo counted and that there could be no adjustments whereby they would give up any of their newly won area — on which new settlements were already rapidly arising. The upshot of the indignant campaign in the Israeli press against Bernadotte was that he and one of his aides were shot by members of the Stern gang in Jerusalem on September 17, just after his report was signed.

Arab representatives were not long in capitalizing on the psychological cloud under which the Israelis then approached the Paris meetings of the United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 194(III) of December 11, 1948, provided for the establishment of a Conciliation Commission to take over the duties of the acting mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche. This Commission was empowered to "facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation," and to maintain close relations with the office of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), which had been set up on November 19 in accordance with a further recommendation of Count Bernadotte. The UNRPR was directed to coordinate and expand the existing emergency relief programs of the Arab governments and the volunteer agencies then caring for the exiles. Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 then stated that:

. . . the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and [that] compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

In achieving this prompt affirmation of the rights of the refugees the Arab representatives at the U.N. could maintain that the international community recognized the validity and justice of their claims as the victims of aggression. They could also insist

that future responsibility for achieving the reality of the U.N. resolution lay with the U.N. rather than with them; hence they need not fight again for their claims but could now become the champions of the U.N. Finally, they realized then what the rest of the U.N. community has only belatedly come to see: namely, that the refugees constituted a powerful bargaining point in their hands.

From this point on the unhappy refugees have been the victims of political forces on many sides. Among the Arabs the late King Abdallah of Transjordan (now the Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan) was quick to recognize the political value of claiming the remnant of Palestine saved from the Israelis by his Arab Legion. After signing an armistice with Israel on March 24, 1949, he took *de facto* control of this territory, including the Arab-held sections of Jerusalem, ruling these areas through friendly Palestinians until he finally annexed them to Jordan in April 1950. Refugees streaming into Jericho, Amman, and Zirqa were welcomed, the country's meagre resources shared with them, and some small irrigation projects were quickly started to provide land for resettlement.

The professional group among the refugees and former civil servants from the Mandate Government were fitted as rapidly as possible into the expanding Jordan government and welfare services. All refugees were offered citizenship. Three were made members of the cabinet. Early in 1950 a law was passed providing for the assignment of state lands to refugees for homes and farms. King Abdallah thus increased his territory and his prestige at the expense of the Palestinian faction led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, which favored independent status for Arab Palestine.

Abdallah's bold and decisive action inevitably created internal problems for a country that had up to 1948 been populated chiefly by half a million nomads and run on a strictly authoritarian basis. Thus Jordan's electorate suddenly increased from 100,000 in 1948 to 304,000 in 1950. And Abdallah became sharply aware for the first time of an active opposition, particularly in the matter of relations with Israel and Britain, by which his conciliatory line was now challenged. His triumph over his long-



time rival, the Mufti, whom he ostentatiously replaced by appointing a successor in Jerusalem, was short lived. In July 1951 an agent of the Mufti's followers shot and killed Abdallah as he entered al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

The remaining Arab states have chosen to use the political leverage of the refugee situation in a less direct way. Thus Egypt, which controls the Gaza strip of Palestine where some 200,000 Arab DP's press on 60,000 residents, has refused either to accept refugees (except in the uninhabited areas of the Sinai peninsula) or to let them move elsewhere. The basic strategy behind this policy, like that of Syria and Lebanon, is that if the refugees are allowed to scatter or resettle they and their host countries will lose their bargaining power vis à vis Israel and the U.N. There is a hard logic about this stand which thus far no agency has been able to shake. Looking back on four years of negotiation and persuasion by U.N. officials and government representatives in Cairo, Beirut, Paris, Geneva, London, and New York, one must conclude that their total failure has been due to the unswerving determination, not only of the governments but of the refugees themselves, to retain this last decisive advantage which their exile and their misery give them. What this has amounted to finally is a general Arab movement of passive resistance, broken only by the late Abdallah, against recognition of Israel as a permanent part of the Middle East complex. A war that was lost on the battlefields of Galilee and Beersheba is now being waged at diplomatic conference tables, along former trade routes, and, above all, over the refugee victims of battle.

#### *THE REFUGEES IN 1952*

The 867,470 Palestinian refugees make up 11% of the total population of the host countries. (See table, page 298.) Of this number on UNRWA<sup>\*</sup> rolls in March 1952, 458,250 are in Jordan; 201,175 in Gaza; 104,641 in Lebanon; 83,694 in Syria; and 19,710 in Israel. By far the largest proportion of these people were small holders who cultivated their own lands in Palestine. In this respect they were well advanced economically by Middle

<sup>\*</sup> United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which took over the Palestine refugee operation in 1950.

East standards. In 1944, for example, Arabs earned \$78 million of the total of \$112 million Palestinian income from agriculture. Arabs had, according to the last cattle census of the Mandate government, nearly 1 million head of cattle on which they paid in 1945-46 animal taxes of some \$744,000. It is Arabs of this class who with their families make up 40% of the refugees presently scattered in camps or drawing food rations from UNRWA.

One half of the total registered refugee population are children under 16 years of age. The birthrate is high, as it was before partition, and the health services furnished to the camp population have lowered the normal rates of infant mortality. Hence the average age of a camp population is very low and each family shelter is surrounded by clusters of barefooted, ragged children, many of whom recall no other existence.

About a third of the refugees are sheltered in barracks or tents in camps run by UNRWA. The population of these camps in their fourth year of operation is up 10% over a year ago. This increase is due in part to the high birthrate, but also to exhaustion of personal savings, the acute unemployment situation in all of the host countries, and to the uncertainties of status of most refugees everywhere but in Jordan. It is apparent on even casual observation that as time goes on with no permanent settlement in view, an increasing number of adults in these camps are becoming professional refugees, without hope or desire to work again. An uncounted number among the older generation are or have become psychotic under the stress of flight from their homes and the shock of personal losses.

The number of employables among the refugees is not known and it has not yet been possible to segregate them from those who must inevitably become permanent public charges. Meanwhile the trend toward the meagre security offered by camp life has so far not been offset by the relatively few opportunities for re-establishment in business which UNRWA has tried to foster by a system of small loans to venturesome individuals. Many who have applied for such loans complain that they are not permitted to use any of their assets registered in Israel as collateral and so are handicapped unnecessarily in trying to become productive again. This issue is rigidly avoided by UNRWA as a question for

the Conciliation Commission to settle, involving, as it does, the touchy matter of compensation due the refugees. All of this underlines the urgency of the compensation problem, with which the Commission is now attempting to deal.

The U.N. definition of a refugee as "a person normally resident in Palestine who has lost his home and his livelihood as a result of the hostilities, and who is in need,"<sup>9</sup> limits the number of displaced Arabs eligible for UNRWA aid. It does not, for example, include those who still live in their own houses but are cut off from their means of livelihood. Some 130,000 Arabs in 80 villages on the present Israeli-Jordan boundary line fall in this category. They are economic and psychological refugees because the boundary line runs through their property in such a way as to incorporate their farmlands into Israeli territory, leaving them only their houses. It is from this group that many of the infiltrators into Israel come, accounting for the continued high rate of border incidents. Private agencies attempt from time to time to help these people with clothing and food. Mothers and children receive some emergency aid from UNICEF, and the Jordan Government has tried to stretch its welfare services to include them. However most of them remain penniless, clinging to their homes in the hope that their lands across the road will eventually be returned to them.

An uncounted number of economic refugees have gathered inevitably in the larger towns of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, adding to the critical unemployment situation in these countries and suffering in Syria and Lebanon from complete loss of citizenship. The trend among the educated members of this group is toward emigration, leaving the less competent behind. This trend, in turn, deprives these swollen communities of the more stable and potentially productive element, making for further economic and social deterioration in many communities surrounding Israel. Other secondary effects of economic displacement are seen in the shrinkage of student bodies in the mission schools, which provide the only higher elementary and secondary schooling in Jordan. Arab families who can muster enough income for bare necessities

<sup>9</sup> Assistance to Palestine Refugees. Report of the Director of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session Supplement No. 16 (A/1905), p. 3.

frequently can no longer afford even the token tuition charges which customarily sustain these schools in the Middle East. The result is a further reduction in the number of trained youths and general lowering of morale.

Finally, to complete a dismal picture, the 65% of the refugees on UNRWA relief rolls who are not in camps present an indescribable spectacle of degradation and misery. It is this group who inhabit, in family groups, one room at best, or outdoor caves at the worst. The cellars and areaways of hundreds of Arab towns are filled with these ragged remnants of families, subsisting on basic rations issued at the rate of \$2 a head per month. The lame, the blind, and the sick receive such ministrations as overburdened UNRWA clinics can furnish. Some supplemental care is provided by church and Arab volunteer agencies, which also attempt to provide clothing and schooling for some of the children outside of camps. The magnitude of the problem of caring for these people on a welfare basis is obvious. Even more complex, as time goes on, is the problem of their absorption in the host countries among resident populations whose standard of living is already minimal.

#### COMMUNIST ACTIVITY

The situation of the Arab refugees, both inside and outside UNRWA camps is, of course, made to order for Communist agitators. In Lebanon, which has long been a center for Soviet propaganda in the Middle East, this is particularly noticeable. But Jordan, too, has had for the first time to deal with Communist agitators. A recent law in Jordan provides for 15-year imprisonment of subversives. Some of the most obvious agitators have been caught and imprisoned. It is now more difficult than it was several years ago for teams of agitators from Damascus and Beirut to visit refugee camps and stir up trouble. But an active and effective underground carries on.

The Communist line has been adapted characteristically to fit the grudges and sentiments of the refugees. Thus Communist propaganda suggests that the Western powers are only trying to resettle them in order to recruit them for military ventures. This line falls on many receptive ears and strengthens the common



resistance to resettlement. So does the reiterated suggestion that the refugees should hold out for a return to 1947 by marching en masse to their former homes. This sort of agitation feeds the hopes of idle, homesick people and compounds the difficulties of any Arab government which approaches the resettlement program even tentatively.

In spite of vigilance by camp officials and local governments a significant number of Communist leaflets are smuggled into refugee centers. All of these ring the changes on a familiar theme: the West is responsible for the refugees' condition; they must insist on return to their homes, full compensation, and an independent Arab state in Palestine — in short, a return to the original Partition Resolution of 1947.

#### *UNRWA GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENT*

Given the background of disaster and demoralization which the Arab refugees' situation represents, it is now possible at this stage in their history to make some appraisal of the efforts of the U.N. to deal with them. In summary, what UNRWA has succeeded in doing during the last two years has been to keep all registered refugees fed on a sustenance basis; to prevent major epidemics; to provide tent shelter or barracks for those in camps; and to provide schooling for 44,000 of the 225,000 children of school age. As a relief operation, therefore, it has succeeded to a creditable degree in the face of many obstacles and hardships endemic to the area, among which lack of water, transportation, and communication facilities rank high. UNRWA has done this by coordinating the services of volunteer and U.N. specialized agencies. Thus, when in 1950 UNRWA took over from its predecessor, UNRPR, it inherited the welfare services of such experienced agencies as the Lutheran World Federation, which has distributed clothing during the last four years to 500,000 refugees in and out of camps. The schools, hospitals, and supplementary feeding stations of the Church Missionary Society, the Pontifical Mission, the Church World Service, and numerous local Arab welfare societies have continued the tasks they assumed in 1948 when the first large waves of refugees appeared. U.N. agencies which continue to operate under UNRWA auspices

are: UNICEF, which since 1948 has aided half a million Arab mothers and children; WHO, which runs the medical program for all refugees, assisted by local agencies; FAO, which supplies technical personnel and advice; and UNESCO, which conducts 117 schools for refugee children. Eighty-four additional government and mission schools operate in cooperation with UNRWA.

Unlike its predecessor, UNRWA has achieved substantial financial support, thanks to the increasing seriousness with which contributing nations have come to regard the refugee problem. UNRWA has now been promised a fund of \$250 million for the years 1952-1954, of which \$50 million is to be allocated to relief and \$200 million to "reintegration" of the refugees in Arab countries. This appropriation of funds was voted by the General Assembly in January 1952 in response to the appeal of UNRWA director John B. Blandford and his Advisory Commission.<sup>10</sup> In presenting their report and recommendations to the General Assembly, these officials stressed several points which reflect the basic difficulties ahead of them. They emphasize that "the new program must be squarely one of economic cooperation which does not intrude into existing political issues between refugees and Israel. Specifically the refugee interests in repatriation and compensation must not be prejudiced by any Agency program. . . . The Agency should not be given assignments involving it with negotiations of issues pending between the Arab States and Israel." At the same time the report advised that every effort should be made by the Agency and the governments concerned to arrange for the transfer of relief administration to the governments not later than July 1, 1952.<sup>11</sup>

This hopeful idea of "reintegration" and of transferring responsibility for relief operations has a familiar sound at U.N. headquarters. It stems from the recommendations of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission which visited the Middle East in the fall of 1949 under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission. The report of this group, led by Gordon Clapp,

<sup>10</sup> Representatives of the U.S., Britain, France, and Turkey serve as advisers to the Director of UNRWA.

<sup>11</sup> Assistance to Palestine Refugees. Special Report of the Director and Advisory Commission of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. General Assembly Records: Sixth Session Supplement No. 16A (A/1905/Add. 1), p. 2.



was based on the theory that the economic distress of the refugees was related directly to the economic weakness of the Arab countries. With the aim of curing their chronic unemployment situation by facilitating their general economic development, the Mission studied the specific plans which each government had considered since the war but shelved for lack of funds. From these it appeared that a number could be accomplished in progressive stages. It proposed, therefore, that as a start each of the host countries undertake an initial pilot project which would at once set a pattern and fit into an expanded development program. By this means and with the aid of U.N. funds, the host countries were to demonstrate some progress toward their own economic goals and at the same time open up employment opportunities for the refugees.

It was these recommendations which led to the transformation of UNRPR into UNRWA in the spring of 1950, with the object of substituting jobs for relief for as many heads of refugee families as possible. The first director of UNRWA, Major General Howard Kennedy of Canada, made valiant efforts to carry out the works program. Road building and reforestation projects were initiated with the cooperation of the local governments, and for a time in 1950 some 14,000 refugees were employed in this way. Unhappily it soon became apparent that this form of assistance cost about five times the amount for direct relief. As reported in November 1950, work was halted when some \$10 million had been spent on the program and when it became clear that instead of costing the \$30 million allotted for it, the works program would call for many times that sum — also when contributions from U.N. members failed to materialize.

It was in the light of this experience that Ambassador Blandford, who succeeded General Kennedy in 1951, revised the estimates of sums needed and the mode of attack. UNRWA has, thanks to this trial by error, overcome the financial handicaps which haunted its first year of operations. It remains to carry out its renewed mandate to resettle the refugees. Here its efforts to dissociate itself from the political aspects of resettlement seem unrealistic. For the refugees can only be resettled with the cooperation of the Arab governments, which, so far, have resisted all rational and economic appeals.

*POLITICAL STALEMATE*

There are three fundamental points on which the Arab governments base their resistance to resettlement of the refugees. These are the boundaries of Israel, which they do not accept as final; the amount of compensation and its manner of distribution; and the legal right of the refugees to return to Palestine. While all political leaders in the Arab states know that the mass of the refugees cannot go back to Palestine, they will not openly admit this, nor act to liquidate the refugee problem until Israel concedes some territorial as well as financial compensation. On the Israeli side, the Government has taken the position that the present armistice boundaries are not subject to revision; that global rather than individual compensation will be made by Israel; and that there can be no appreciable return of refugees.

Faced with these irreconcilable viewpoints the Palestine Conciliation Commission has in the past four years resorted to every imaginable device to bring both parties together for discussion and to get them to modify their positions. Meanwhile a technical staff has been working on an appraisal of abandoned Arab assets. This staff is under the direction of Holger Andersen of Denmark, who was a neutral member of the Mixed Commission set up in 1930 by Greece and Turkey to handle questions involved in the exchange of their minority populations. After many months of work this technical staff in Jerusalem has arrived at a figure of some \$280 million for the cultivable lands and productive realty holdings of the refugee owners. Uncultivated lands have not been taken into account in making this estimate, but an additional valuation of some \$51 million has been put on the movable property assets left by the refugees. The Conciliation Commission has recommended that these sums be considered due from Israel, but suggested that in view of Israel's stringent financial circumstances, the cash be made available from outside sources and paid through a U.N. trustee to individual dispossessed refugees.<sup>12</sup>

At the same time the Commission, in its report to the Secretary General of the U.N. in November 1951, recommended that war

<sup>12</sup> Progress Report of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine covering the period from 23 January to 19 November 1951. General Assembly Official Records: Sixth Session Supplement No. 18 (A/1985), pp. 4-6.

damage claims on both sides be cancelled; that a token number of refugees be repatriated; that blocked balances on both sides be released; that adjustments be made in the present boundary lines, including the demilitarized zones; and that all parties join in creating an international water authority for the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers and Lake Tiberias. Finally, the Commission recommended that economic relations and communications be established between the Arab states and Israel.<sup>13</sup>

These proposals, which the Commission had presented to Israelis and Arabs at a long series of meetings in Paris in the fall of 1951 by way of mediating their dispute, precipitated the characteristically violent debate which followed when the Palestine question came up before the Special Political Committee in Paris in January 1952. There the Arab case was eloquently presented by Charles Helou of Lebanon, who pleaded that Israel had ignored the resolutions of the U.N. for four years; that the Arabs were being asked to recognize a state whose "policy of intense immigration had created an explosive situation in the entire area"; and that the Arabs had no aggressive designs but could not be expected to contribute to the expansion of a neighboring state. Fadil al-Jamali of Iraq accused the Commission of recognizing a *fait accompli* in Palestine to the detriment of the Arabs. He threw out a hint that if the Assembly would carry out its own resolutions regarding territorial adjustments, the refugee problem would largely be solved. Meantime the Arabs would not recognize frontiers "dictated by Israel."

For the Israelis, Abba S. Eban stressed the "obdurate refusal of the Arab representatives to engage in normal processes of direct negotiation." Mr. Eban proposed abolition of the Conciliation Commission and substitution of a Good Offices Committee to be on call. He opposed an international water authority, favoring bilateral agreements. He suggested further that Israel would oppose any proposal that limited the parties to "resolutions which in the past had failed to provide a basis for agreement," thus frankly restating Israel's continued rejection of the 1948 Resolution under which the Arab refugees claim the right to repatriation and compensation.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

## CONCLUSION

It is clear from this most recent exposition of opposing claims that the Conciliation Commission has in fact exhausted the possibilities of openly negotiating a lasting peace between Israel and the Arabs at the present time. Even though the continuation of the Commission was voted (over its objections) by the last General Assembly, it is unrealistic to expect it to function in the present Middle East atmosphere of general distrust of the U.N. The next question for the moment, however, is not how to save the prestige of the U.N. in this area, but rather how to save the Middle East itself from violent revolution — a question made more complicated by the presence of the refugees in the Arab states. The U.N. failure will, at least, have served a historical purpose if it arouses a more general understanding in the West of the social ferment, bordering on revolution, now going on in Arab countries. And it should lead the West to realize that the present ambivalent Arab attitude toward it will endure until the Arab world reexamines and comprehends its own internal conflicts.

These conflicts involve such fundamental differences as those over increased secularization as opposed to religious fundamentalism. There is a further division between those who cling to extreme nationalism and those favoring federation of the fragmented states created by rival interests during the last thirty years. Finally there is the split between the Arab "neutralists" and those who believe they must align themselves with stronger powers in order to survive at all.

In view of their preoccupation with these compelling problems it is not surprising that the Arab governments regard the refugee problem as a completely disruptive and unmanageable intrusion. Nor is it remarkable that this intrusion should have aroused a violent reaction against the countries which assumed political responsibility for the division of Palestine. It is clear to any observer on the scene that the Western powers, and the U.S. in particular, have underrated the depth of Arab resentment about Palestine and so have misjudged the effect that Western efforts to solve the refugee problem would have. It is clear now that some new effort of creative statesmanship will be required

to restore Arab confidence and respect for the West and that further short-range or direct attacks on the problem will continue to be rebuffed.

Meanwhile, it is quite conceivable that only private and oblique efforts will succeed in breaking the stalemate. One approach is now under way — that of encouraging the pace of economic development so that there may be a demand for labor rather than a glut of it. Such a possibility may arise in Iraq if its present schemes of agricultural development succeed. In looking forward to such a happy outcome, however, two things must be remembered. One is that in the Middle East, as elsewhere, engineering alone cannot solve human problems. The other is that such issues are not resolved by people in a hurry but only, as the veterans of UNRWA have come to learn, by patient stages. It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect that the Arab governments will, as of a given date, take over responsibility for the UNRWA program. They do not operate that way and they cannot. Until they become economically and socially stronger and regain their confidence and self respect, which the defeat in Palestine shook so radically, it will be both practically and psychologically impossible for them to liquidate the refugee problem.



## DISTRIBUTION OF ARAB REFUGEES — FEBRUARY 1952

(See map, facing page 281.)

Country and area	No. of camps	In houses	In barracks	In tents	Total
<b>Lebanon</b>					
Beirut .....	1	17,174	215	278	17,667
Mountain .....	5	11,977	965	6,507	19,449
Sidon .....	2	14,421	1,625	8,859	24,905
Tyre .....	2	17,506	3,222	1,435	22,163
Tripoli .....	2	4,964	552	6,019	11,535
Beqa' .....	3	1,694	7,228	—	8,922
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>15</b>	<b>67,736</b>	<b>13,807</b>	<b>23,098</b>	<b>104,641</b>
<b>Syria</b>					
Damascus .....	3	39,556	781	5,750	46,087
North .....	4	4,121	5,149	21	9,291
Homs and Hama.....	2	4,140	2,104	671	6,915
South .....	2	19,175	916	1,310	21,401
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>11</b>	<b>66,992</b>	<b>8,950</b>	<b>7,752</b>	<b>83,694</b>
<b>Jordan</b>					
Amman .....	2	48,440	1,927	9,590	59,957
Irbid .....	1	27,837	—	1,700	29,537
Nablus .....	6	97,466	5,382	17,159	120,007
Jericho and Karameh.....	6	8,041	39,391	20,127	67,559
Bethlehem .....	4	25,640	548	4,729	30,917
Hebron .....	3	50,154	—	11,769	61,923
Ramallah .....	6	44,768	3,005	10,229	58,002
Jerusalem .....	1	25,866	4,482	—	30,348
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>29</b>	<b>328,212</b>	<b>54,735</b>	<b>75,303</b>	<b>458,250</b>
<b>Gaza</b>					
Deir el-Balah .....	2	17,061	4,251	6,002	27,314
Khan Yunis .....	1	14,588	708	10,137	25,433
Nuseirat .....	2	1,731	14,501	8,817	25,049
Rafah .....	1	4,825	2,758	16,289	23,872
Rimal .....	2	15,281	1,476	16,558	33,315
Zaitoun .....	1	30,869	—	3,015	33,884
Khan Yunis bedouins.....	—	—	—	32,308	32,308
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>9</b>	<b>84,355</b>	<b>23,694</b>	<b>93,126</b>	<b>201,175</b>
<b>Israel</b> .....	<b>—</b>	<b>19,710</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>19,710</b>
<b>Grand total</b> .....	<b>64</b>	<b>567,005</b>	<b>101,186</b>	<b>199,279</b>	<b>867,470</b>

Source: Registration Officer, Headquarters, UNRWA.



# COTTON AND THE MIDDLE EAST

*Paul F. Craig-Martin*

**N**O DOUBT each of the countries of the Middle East has its own special problems to many of which it alone can find the solution. At the same time they have many problems in common about which volumes have been written, such as the great disparity of income between the rich and the many poor, land tenure, and illiteracy. Much advice has been advanced about irrigation, soil erosion, methods of cultivation, fertilizers, and the consumption of farmyard manure as fuel, the ubiquitous goat and the shy cattle, agricultural education, research, credit, and the dearth of technicians. All these problems and many others can be dealt with and solved in time but all cannot be fully dealt with at once. A higher standard of living and a fuller social life are not gifts which can be bestowed by one country on another. Neither can they be bought except by the sweat of many brows. But where to begin?

The countries of the Middle East have not been backward in their search for a beginning. A national development program is in operation in Turkey and is in formation in Iran. Surveys have been carried out in Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. In 1945 the Economic and Financial Committee of the League of Arab States was formed and an International Islamic Economic Association was initiated in 1951. A Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States was held in Cairo in 1950 and a Mediterranean Center on Agricultural and Allied Projects in Ankara in 1951. In spite of all this, however, few countries of the Middle East

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have formulated integrated development programs. Taking the region as a whole, agricultural production is growing slowly; industrial production more rapidly. But there are parts of the area whose economy shows almost no change as a result of these governmental efforts.

Meanwhile, private initiative has eagerly grasped the opportunities created by the recent remarkable boom in cotton prices. A wild scramble has developed for land to plant cotton. Traders have advanced large sums to producers in order to stimulate output and assure themselves of supplies. But can private cotton fortunes prove a substitute for wider economic planning? Will high prices for cotton bring about desired social reforms? When the wave of cotton prices has crested will it die on the shore, leaving nothing more than a new high-water mark for the admiration of future generations in the Middle East?

Looking back over the past decades at the wide fluctuations in the area under cotton in the Middle East it is obvious that cotton is a flexible crop (see Table I). During World War II, when the necessity for domestic food production was paramount, the cotton area contracted by about one-third and the area freed was fairly easily planted to food crops. Is, then, the recent and projected expansion of cotton production intended by governments and farmers to be permanent or merely the means of cashing in on very favorable prices and an easy marketing situation? All the cotton-producing countries of the Middle East have had in the past acreages under cotton higher than in the 1951/52 season with the exception of Turkey, Syria, and the Sudan. The

Table I: MIDDLE EAST COTTON AREA

(In thousand hectares)

	Largest Recorded Area 1930/1940	Season 1945/46	Season 1951/52
Pakistan .....	1540	1264	1238
Egypt .....	875	509	830
Turkey .....	330(a)	247	640
Sudan .....	190	136	227
Iran .....	260	80	150
Syria .....	40	20	182
Iraq .....	60	9	50

(a) 1941.

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the International Institute for Agriculture and FAO Monthly Statistical Bulletins.

easy switch of land from other crops to cotton would seem to have approached its limit for most of these countries. For example, the remarkable increase in the cotton area in Syria in 1951 was not only at the expense of cereals but also of livestock products, both essential to the country's food supply. If the advances of the last five years are to be preserved and new plans are to be made for cotton, then the crop should be considered as a stepping stone in development. Such an attitude would require that the governments of the comparatively new cotton countries establish a cotton development policy to the furtherance of which time, men, materials, and money must be dedicated. The establishment of a sound cotton policy could provide a medium for the practical application of solutions to many of the problems which plague the development of the Middle East. But much more has to be done than just to make land and credit available to producers.

#### *WHAT DOES THE COTTON MARKET REQUIRE?*

Broadly there are two types of cotton that come on the world market: the Egyptian type and the American type. Except within very narrow limits they are not interchangeable in use. The Egyptian type goes into finer yarns of counts above 50's for very high quality goods and such very specialized uses as industrial thread. The American type provides the run-of-the-mill cotton goods; over 90% of world production can be classed as this type. However, cotton is a generic term covering literally thousands of different varieties of qualities and characteristics, even within the American type. The cotton from no two countries is exactly alike. Since machinery is set up to handle cotton within narrow limits there is a strong tendency toward specialization among processors. This in turn implies a limited range of cottons suitable to meet the specifications of customers for finished products. Consequently, the first requirement of the cotton market is for a continuous assured supply of cotton with particular qualities and characteristics. Thus there is a strong concentration of demand for American-type cotton of a staple length between 15/16" and 1 1/8", which accounted for half of United States exports in 1949/50. The very volume of the United States supply — 35%

to 45% of world exports — helps to satisfy spinners' requirements and explains why buyers continually revert to United States cotton.

In addition to an assured supply of cotton of specific quality and characteristics, the market has to make purchases at a fairly stable and competitive price. The dollar shortage has brought this requirement very much to the fore. Prices have been anything but stable and the margin between dollar and non-dollar cotton has been periodically very wide. In May, the price of Egyptian Ashmouni, good, stood each year for the past six years, as follows:

In May	Egyptian, Ashmouni, good (U.S. cents per lb.)
1947	33.17
1948	67.35
1949	39.18
1950	74.59
1951	68.20
1952	39.18

Spinners were at times selling goods the raw materials of which cost one spinner double the cost to another. Before the war United States Middling 15/16" and Brazilian São Paulo, Type 5, sold for almost the same price; in November 1951 United States Middling 15/16" was 41.46 cents per lb., while São Paulo, Type 5, was 63.82 cents per lb., or enjoying a premium of nearly 55%. At that date comparable Turkish cotton was selling at a premium of around 75% over American. This also has put the spinners of various countries in very different competitive positions, depending on their ability to buy dollar cotton.

Those that can buy dollar cotton thus enjoy an enormous competitive advantage over all others. These others naturally include the spinners and textile manufacturers who are so painfully establishing or attempting to expand their industries in underdeveloped countries, including the Middle East, for these industries are based on American-type cotton from their increasing domestic acreage. It is not surprising that some of these industries have been more anxious to trade in cotton than manufacture

cotton goods. The old non-dollar manufacturers have turned to the Egyptian-type cotton, where the supply is essentially non-dollar and, consequently, sales of finished products are more easily competitive. But with high prices for Egyptian cotton many are being driven to synthetic fibers by this situation and old cotton industries are rapidly becoming "textile" industries with less dependence on the cotton fiber, although in this respect shortages of sulphur and coal are limiting factors. In a sellers' market for both raw cotton and finished goods it is possible for spinners to get along. However, although a sellers' market has persisted in non-dollar raw cotton the development of a buyers' market for finished products has been in progress for some time.

#### *BACK TO THE PRODUCER*

Bearing in mind the assumed desire of Middle East countries to get a better and more permanent place in the world cotton market, the importance to the grower of the efficiency of his national marketing structure is fundamental. But the grower must play his part and produce cotton of sound quality and adequate staple length.

As has already been mentioned, practically all the "new" cotton production of the Middle East is based on American-type cotton and in fact United States varieties. However, cotton plants are extremely sensitive to climatic changes and a variety moved from one region or country to another rarely produces well at first. All too often in the past attempts to introduce American varieties from the United States have met with failure because they have been allowed to become mixed or because they have not been given a chance to get acclimatized. Selections must be made and new strains developed. Yields of lint and oil and length and uniformity of staple vary in relationship to each other between different varieties, and no small farmer can hope to do this job alone. Anticipation of a rapid development of cotton production in Iraq immediately following World War I was disappointed because of the difficulty of discovering a suitable strain. American varieties were introduced into Turkey and Iran fully 20 years ago. To find suitable seed for Syrian conditions may take a decade.



The surest way for the farmer to decide what he should grow is to conduct a variety test. He can then breed his own but is unlikely to succeed as this is the work of a specialist. Or else he can buy the variety he requires from an experimental station. Such stations have been established in all Middle East countries. But even where suitable varieties have been established there are often no means by which the farmer can get seed. However, in Turkey great progress has been made through provision of seed from state farms, and seed growing by private farmers under contract is making headway. In Iran a small quantity of good seed is distributed by the Iranian Cotton Company. In the Punjab 80% of the cotton crop is sown with improved seed produced by the Department of Agriculture, assisted by private growers. In Egypt there are 12 farms covering 6,400 hectares for the multiplication of improved seed.

Seed of a good variety should yield 20% or more cotton than mixed seed in the Middle East. But even if successful in obtaining good seed, the individual farmer is at the mercy of his neighbors because of cross-pollination in the fields. A one-variety community eliminates the danger of degeneration and also mixing of seed in the gin; it allows the lint to be marketed more advantageously because of greater uniformity and makes cooperative marketing easier. Egypt, since 1920, through its Ministry of Agriculture, has established the most rigid system of seed controls, one-variety communities, and non-mixing of varieties at the gin, and as a result exports one of the most dependable cottons in the world.

Granted that the farmer knows what to produce and how to do it, he still requires the means to do it. Since an adequate and controlled supply of water is essential for cotton growers, the bulk of cotton area must be under irrigation in the Middle East. But too much as well as too little water can be injurious, for within certain limits there seems to be a close relationship between the water supply and the length and strength of cotton fibers. It is estimated that loss of water by transpiration in Egypt is around 50 tons per acre per day, which is more than is supplied to the land by irrigation. On the other hand a rise in the water table in Egypt has at times done severe damage to the crop.



Water logging and salting affect 1 million hectares in Pakistan and about 3,000 hectares annually are being rendered useless by improper drainage. Many new Middle East irrigation schemes are long-term undertakings requiring up to a generation for full preparation and completion. Of more immediate consequence is the better use and control of available water supplies. There is also a considerable volume of cotton in the Middle East now grown without irrigation which could be greatly benefited by conserving run-off waters and using diversions from small streams. Such small schemes are not spectacular but have surprisingly important results.

A turbulent history has done much to destroy irrigation works throughout the region, but plain lack of proper maintenance has done as much: Nebuchadnezzar's canal system is a witness to this. An absentee landlord's neglect and the cupidity of a pump owner are no basis for cotton cultivation. Some of the proceeds from recent high cotton prices have been reinvested in pumps in Syria and also in Iran, where during the past six years around 1,000 new pumps have been installed. However, indiscriminate use of ground water supplies without adequate checks on the effect on the water table may have disastrous consequences.

The rate of use of artificial fertilizer at 33 kgs. per hectare in Egypt is one of the highest in the world, but the rate for the whole of the rest of the Middle East is not 1% of the Egyptian. In Pakistan it is little more than 1 kg. per hectare. The bulk of fertilizer supplies in the area goes to cotton, but it is imported and expensive. Cotton is so sensitive to fertilizer that it is used as a test plant in soil fertility. But here again there are important decisions to be made because too little and too much are equally harmful. Proper fertilization of poor soils gives a longer and stronger staple. Fertilization of rich soils leads to larger seeds, smaller lint yield, and shorter staple. The individual farmer can and should experiment, but for best results for himself and his community he needs the help of the experimental station. Reliance on fertilizer and neglect of proper rotations will cause the soil to become excessively low in organic matter. Manuring techniques suited to local conditions must be developed; experience in Cyprus should be valuable to the rest of the region.

Environmental conditions for cotton growing are rarely perfect and their shortcomings differ in each region. In consequence, there are many roads to improved production. In some cases good and proper cultivation can result merely from the acquisition of knowledge of techniques by the farmer, but in many cases financial support in the form of farm credit is needed. Present reliance on the local shopkeeper, pawnbroker, or even the branch of a commercial bank is not enough. Buying on time from the local shopkeeper at around 25% higher prices or at very short term from moneylenders stifles development; nor do commercial banks, whose business is not agricultural, have the knowledge or appropriate funds to back the farmer. Practically all the countries of the region established agricultural banks during the thirties but they have not been very effective. Current financing is all of the boom variety: high cotton prices, providing opportunities for big profits, have induced cooperative credit banks in Pakistan to indulge in trading activities and to neglect the financing of farmers. Money is being lent at high interest for the opening of new land to cotton. Premiums are being paid for tractors to expand the cotton area in Turkey. Landlord, tenant, and merchant are pooling financial resources on a sharecropping basis in Syria. This does not provide a solid base for development: in the long run farmers' cooperative marketing societies might do more for the cotton grower, not only in advancing credit and giving advice on cultivation techniques, but also in breaking the hold of landlord and merchant over the small farmer.

Put very simply, if the cotton grower is to play his part in laying a solid foundation for Middle East cotton in world markets, he needs to be fully equipped. That is, he needs all those requisites and services advocated for the development of agriculture generally in underdeveloped countries. What more striking example of the effects of neglecting the basic needs of sound cotton cultivation can be found than in Syria in 1951? Although the area under cotton doubled in comparison with 1950 the crop was only about one-third larger. When drought hit, faulty techniques of inexperienced growers without government services to guide them brought their inevitable result; the loss between the actual yields and those of the preceding year must have

amounted to the equivalent of about \$33 million, which would have gone a long way toward paying for the needed advice and services. Similarly the current crop in Iraq is from yields one-quarter of "normal."

All the problems of general agricultural development are present in the case of cotton: water supply and control, agricultural education, research, experimental stations, processing facilities, quality inducements, storage and transport — but all within a more limited compass. On the other hand the application of the solutions to these innumerable problems should be directed toward the cotton grower, not the cotton. The small farmer should, if his operations are to be economic, concentrate his land and resources first on the needs of his farm and family and second on the cultivation of cotton. Thus land, water, research, experiment, and marketing facilities must be directed to the full round of the cotton growers' problems. Unless this is done the farmer will neglect his cotton in times of low prices and neglect his other activities in times of high cotton prices. Cotton must be more than a cash crop; it must be a commercial crop.

The Sudan has pioneered the road for this approach. There cotton provides the means for development, but the small farmers' basic need for food is satisfied first, with enough leeway in most cases to provide a surplus for sale — dura and cotton, not cotton and dura. As the foundations of scientific and economic cotton growing were laid in the Sudan, research, experiment, and services widened the scope of their activities. Today, twenty-five years after the Gezira Scheme was started and in the midst of a cotton boom, time, materials, and money are being used in increasing proportion on the development of alternative crops and livestock. However, it is because of cotton that this is possible and shows signs of rapid success. Some Middle East countries have a running start compared to the Sudan of a quarter of a century ago and may advance faster, others may hold a slower pace. Development is a slow process and must be paid for. If the farmer is to pull himself up by his bootstraps, his boots must have straps.

#### *IS THERE TIME?*

Will the conditions which have been so favorable for cotton production in the Middle East during postwar years continue

sufficiently long to allow consolidation of the gains made? Is there time to lay the foundations for a further advance?

The bubble has burst. Countries which have endeavored to preserve their price advantage in soft currency supplies to countries that cannot afford to buy in hard currency markets have had a rude awakening. Buyers of cotton textiles have for some time been haggling over prices and in many countries with hot climates the demand for cheap plain cloths has been transferred in part to spun rayon goods. In Egypt a serious situation has developed as a result of attempts to maintain the high non-dollar premium. Prices have declined 30% to 35% since the beginning of the year. The daily press<sup>1</sup> reports that about half the employees of Alexandria cotton trading concerns have been laid off and for the first time in the history of the Exchange one of the biggest houses officially refused payment, with a number of other houses ready to follow suit. This may mark the end of the opportunity for acquiring quick cotton fortunes; but does it necessarily mean that the opportunity for cotton development in the Middle East has passed?

Turning back the years a number of clearly defined long-term trends are discernible in the world of cotton. Production of raw cotton has increased roughly at the same rate as world population. The United States proportion of world production is still around 50%, although it has been decreasing over the long term. A decline in the volume of world trade in cotton and cotton goods has occurred as underdeveloped cotton-producing countries have increased their mill capacity for domestic consumption. Lastly, competition from rayon and other synthetic fibers has been growing although this has been offset to some extent by increases in the variety of uses for cotton.

Looking forward there does not seem to be any special likelihood of a reversal of any of these trends. World consumption of cotton in recent years has failed to keep pace with the growth of world population and stocks have tended to rise, but this would not seem to presage any permanent falling off in cotton consumption, as much latent demand is unsatisfied on account of unsettled conditions in the Far East and the shortage of dollar exchange.

<sup>1</sup> *New York Times*, May 23, 1952.



Valiant attempts are being made to reach these Far Eastern consumers. Under the peace treaty Japan's textile industry is at liberty to expand, and the production of Indian mills is providing an increasing export surplus. In Hongkong, where in 1947 there was not a single spindle, a cotton industry has sprung up with 200,000 spindles. Further, even a slight improvement in living standards in underdeveloped countries should begin to bring out a vast hidden demand which many believe to exist. Already there is a discernible change in trade from the loin-cloth of the peasant farmer to the shirt, pillowcase, or curtain. It is true that synthetic fibers have made considerable inroads into cotton's market; rayon has partly supplanted cotton in the automobile tire, hosiery, and many industrial trades. The easiest substitutions, however, seem to have already occurred and no immediate further major inroads into the province of cotton are foreseen. Price differentials between synthetics and cotton, the dollar shortage, and the insufficiency of non-dollar cotton are certainly dangerous elements. Since, however, world per capita consumption of textile materials as a whole has not reached pre-war levels in any areas of the world, economic progress and rising populations should be accompanied by an increasing world demand for cotton.

The question then becomes whether the dominance of the United States as the world's supplier of cotton can be challenged, and, if so, to what extent? In May 1950, the Report of the Standing Committee to the International Cotton Advisory Committee stated that "the possibilities of expanding cotton production on an economic basis in non-dollar cotton-producing countries are limited."<sup>2</sup> This seems to mean that relatively small new areas of the earth's surface are ideally suited to cotton production. Limitations are imposed on old as well as new areas in the form of climate, labor, transport, and the competition from other crops, especially food. Thus, only a number of small areas in various parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia can be easily brought under cotton cultivation. The contribution to the world's production of cotton by the Middle East is estimated for 1951/52

<sup>2</sup> *The Developing World Cotton Situation, Part B*, prepared by the Standing Committee in accordance with Resolution X of the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee, Washington, May 1950.



to amount to no more than 12% ; and if Egypt and Pakistan are excluded, to but 4%. There seems to be no known rival for the leading part and not even many gifted applicants for a role in the supporting cast. The spotlight stays on the United States.

Since the middle thirties United States cotton policy has been dominated by a desire to support prices to producers. Prices are maintained in any one season by the establishment of a "loan rate," or a price at which the Commodity Credit Corporation, a government agency, will loan money to cotton producers on the security of their cotton stored in the possession of the Corporation. If the market price tends to fall below the "loan rate," planters will place their cotton in Corporation storage rather than on the market. If world prices fall below the "loan rate," the United States supply for export should disappear into the government stockpile, thus automatically restricting the world exportable supply and causing cotton prices to rise until the "loan rate" is again reached or exceeded. In years of plentiful supply the United States price is the world price and, in theory at least, other producers can dispose of their entire crop by shading minimum United States export prices. But at present non-dollar cotton enjoys a substantial premium.

Thus, the United States is practically guaranteeing minimum prices for the world market, unless some export subsidy is introduced. In practice, the United States has machinery for the restriction of production by means of acreage and marketing controls. In 1949/50, when world production exceeded world consumption and the "loan rate" operated, importing countries were willing to purchase all the available non-dollar cotton they could obtain but failed to make maximum possible purchases of United States cotton because of the dollar shortage. The action taken on that occasion by the United States was to impose acreage restriction.

#### *CAN THE MIDDLE EAST DELIVER THE GOODS?*

The forced use of non-dollar cotton by spinners has given them the incentive to discover virtues in comparatively new cottons from such countries as Turkey and Syria. That some special virtues have been discovered in this way can be chalked up as a

gain to Middle East exporters. However, there have been many complaints, two of which stand out for their influence on long-term prospects for marketing Middle East cotton.

First, there is a lack of uniformity in staple length in the bale. This causes the spinner considerable trouble in his operations and materially increases the volume of waste cotton because machines must be set for fixed lengths. British spinners found this a serious fault of most Middle East cotton, and even Lebanon, in the immediate postwar years, turned from Syrian cotton because of irregular staple and insufficient classification. Egyptian cotton is, of course, an exception, as is that of the Sudan, and both are examples of what can and should be done.

Secondly, contracts have sometimes not been honored in a rapidly advancing price situation. Such action completely disrupts the program of the spinner as regards both continuity of supply and costs. Turkish sellers who had sold cottons in 1950 for future delivery defaulted when prices went up, and thus created a difficult situation with the German and French buyers. In some instances legal or arbitration cases are still being argued. There is nothing surprising, perhaps, in these events when a comparatively new expanding cotton supply is being marketed under present circumstances. For the longer term, however, they undermine marketing prospects and point up the lack of a sound cotton marketing structure in the Middle East.

A multitude of trade routes are used in the marketing of cotton but a large share of what happens depends on operations in the local spot cotton markets, which concentrate cotton from a fairly clearly defined area. The world's cotton business centers around these markets and the merchants whose business makes them. The effectiveness of the whole marketing system depends largely on the knowledge, judgment, and integrity of cotton merchants. They provide bales of cotton in even-running lots, together with many services, to the spinners of the world. From an operational view the spot market is the sum of purchases and sales privately transacted in individual merchants' offices. From an organizational view the market is the local spot exchange which assures that transactions are conducted according to its rules and provides members with essential information. Sales by merchants to

spinners are under formal contract and sometimes such sales are made for cotton before it has been harvested or even planted. Only a small number of merchants' sales are at fixed prices, most being at buyers' call, *i.e.*, the price is fixed at the time of sale only as a relationship to a future price on a futures market, such as New York or Alexandria. The efficiency of the spot market is therefore of primary importance to spinners and all the good efforts of producers can be negated by inefficient or unreliable operations of merchants in the spot market. It is interesting to note that at the annual Cotton Congress at Ankara in 1951, Turkish producers were seeking means to regulate and improve trading in cotton; government help is now being sought on standardization of qualities, regulation, and enforcement of sales for immediate or future delivery, and the improvement of baling methods.

The normal movement of cotton is from the farmer to the local buyer and from there to the cotton merchant. Unorganized markets will probably exist in every village of a cotton area. The local buyers may be the gin, brokers, buyers, stores, cooperatives, or the government. In any case the volume handled in village markets is small and monopolistic possibilities exist. Dispersed throughout the Izmir and Adana areas of Turkey there are some 2,500 roller gins and about 40 saw gins; in Iran there are some 2,500 hand-operated gins; in Syria there are over 1,200 gins. But farmers rarely go around seeking the best price obtainable. Often the cotton is bought in the seed. Little opportunity is, therefore, given to the farmer to get either the best price for his cotton or a premium for quality and consequently his chief interest is in volume production. This position cannot be improved except by providing the farmer with information as to how his cotton grades. Without such knowledge and inducement the farmer can have little concern for quality and staple length. Government services, similar to the Smith-Doxey classing service of the United States Department of Agriculture, can provide the farmer with this information a few days after his cotton has been ginned. Few Middle East countries could readily establish such a service but much could be done by some system of avoidance of mixing varieties before ginning and at the gin. One Middle East

country, Egypt, has led the world in this matter with legislation rigidly enforced. Competent blending at the gin is important and suitable warehousing space where lots can be made up by merchants will also help the farmer seek and get a price for quality. Any system of grading must be based on spinning quality and not merely on the presence of foreign substances; all too often Middle East cotton has drawn the spinners' rebuke "insufficiently classified."

#### *THE REWARDS*

Favorable occasions for the development of Middle East cotton have occurred in the past, but on each occasion the advances made were not maintained. Except for Egypt, the Sudan, and possibly Pakistan no Middle East country has a firm grip on the world's cotton market. Never has such a favorable occasion for Middle East cotton been presented as in the past few years and never have national governments been so interested in small-farmer development. Machinery for international cooperation exists. Means and opportunity are there.

The governments of Middle East countries have made great efforts to extend the land under cultivation and provide it with irrigation. Egypt has completed the Edfina Barrage and is participating in the construction of the Owen Falls reservoir in Uganda. In Iraq the Wadi Tharthar project will provide flood control and the Habbaniya irrigation scheme is well advanced, while operations have been begun on a dam on the Lesser Zab river. In Syria the Khabur river and the Homs-Hama projects are in course of execution. In Pakistan progress is being made with the Lower Sind Barrage and the Thal project. Unfortunately these magnificent works are not all accompanied by provisions that the land and water will be properly used. Are they to support prosperous farming communities or are the tillers of the soil, through ignorance, to deliver them to the fate of Nebuchadnezzar's canals?

An established place in the world's cotton markets will have direct benefits for the Middle East. Small farmers in underdeveloped countries would be linked to developed countries through the highly organized machinery of a complex international marketing structure. Indirectly through it valuable les-



sons can be learned by governments and the results applied to development in other fields. Prospects for newly developed cotton-processing industries in the Middle East do not concern us here, but a point in passing might be made: these domestic industries will have to be as exacting in regard to their raw material as foreign industries are today, if they are to compete successfully. A clearly defined cotton policy with an integrated program of development designed to satisfy the requirements of domestic and foreign markets would remove much uncertainty from the minds of producers. Instability of purpose, other than in generalities, among governments has been one of the chief deterrents to economic progress.

Cotton development can only be accomplished by teamwork between the farmer, processor, merchant, and government. Here is an opportunity for government to get acquainted with the small farmer whom it has so long neglected. Here too is an opportunity for the subsistence farmer to climb to a better economic level of existence. In resolving some of the problems of cotton rich and poor, government and private enterprise working together might reasonably unravel some of the tangled skein of social conditions throughout the Middle East. Many agricultural programs intended to improve the situation of farmers have allowed the social aspects to dominate the economic. The result has often been that the farmer has been saddled with social costs beyond his ability to pay. It would be false to assume that in all countries cotton alone will provide the means to pay for schools, hospitals, and other social services, as it has so largely done in the Sudan. Cotton can, however, contribute substantially in many countries, though in varying degree.

At any rate men and governments learn by experience, by action. Mistakes there will be, but here in cotton there is a limited field in which the cooperation of producer, processor, merchant, and government is absolutely necessary and should hold profit for all.



## FROM DEBORAH TO KURT: THE STORY OF HEBREW IN ISRAEL

*M. Z. Frank*

WHEN I WAS five and a half years old, in my native small town in White Russia, I was taken to a new-fangled type of Hebrew school which my elders called "de metode" — the method. The most important aspect of "the method" was the language. Instead of Yiddish, which was our mother tongue, our teachers addressed us in Hebrew. We were taught reading by the phonetic method and used illustrated primers. Not until we had a sufficient vocabulary did we begin on the Bible. Then, instead of translating each word into its equivalent Yiddish, as our parents and grandparents had done for centuries, we had to explain the Biblical words and sentences in simple, familiar Hebrew. After a few days at school I noticed that the boys of the older classes played and quarrelled in Hebrew during recess. It took an act of kindness, so rare among children, for an older boy to address a novice in Yiddish. Naturally it became our ambition to emulate the older boys.

About a month or two after I started school, as I walked home with a little classmate, I noticed a large dog, and exclaimed in Yiddish;

"Look! What a big dog!"

My small companion glared up at me sternly and queried in Hebrew, "Mah?" ("What?")

"Kelev," I replied meekly. From then on I spoke Hebrew. I have been speaking it ever since.

My teacher, Mr. Lapitzky, was once beaten up by a group of

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religious fanatics for "turning Jewish children into goyim." In the end, however, his work was destroyed by anti-religious zealots. Sometime in 1920 or 1921, when in Canada, I received a letter from him which closed with the following words: "What is the fate of the revival of Hebrew on your American continent? Here it has been given an everlasting burial."

That among the grave-diggers were some of Mr. Lapitzky's pupils gone Bolshevik, I well knew. But his own son, at least, was not one of them. In October 1950 I attended the ceremony of the crowning of the prize cow Stavith, one of the world's champion milk-yielders, in Kfar Gileadi, a well-established old kibbutz in Northern Galilee. There I met Eliezer Lapitzky, one of the founders and leaders of the most prosperous kibbutz in the Jordan valley. Lapitzky-*fils* had come to Palestine with other fugitives from Bolshevik rule when escape was still possible, at about the same time that I had received the letter from Lapitzky-*père*. To the father's ardent love for Hebrew and Zion, the son added a belief in a socialist society, of which the father, to the best of my recollection, was extremely sceptical.

A revolutionary departure from traditional ghetto practice established for centuries, such as the "method" introduced by my teachers, naturally aroused a variety of reactions in the community. Two types stand out from my childhood memories. One was Avremil Avrutes, a poor manual laborer who worked for my father carrying logs and planks. He was a scholar who spent his leisure time in reading medieval philosophic books in Hebrew. Avremil would examine me in halting Hebrew on the progress of my studies, and admire the fluency of my speech in the Holy Tongue. Despite a knowledge of the literature which I probably could not match even today, he had difficulty in forming a simple sentence. There were many others like him.

His daughter Zirel, good-looking but entirely illiterate, for a time was a servant in our house. Her reaction was the opposite of her father's. Whenever she heard me converse in Hebrew with my schoolmates, she would flare up and exclaim: "There they are jabbering that gypsy language again!" Zirel's reaction was probably an instinctive resentment against a suspected attitude

of superiority. The suspicion was not unfounded. At the age of about eight I told my mother that her prayers for the recuperation of my dying little sister would be without effect because they were in Yiddish, and undertook to address the Almighty in His own language — or, rather, in the language common to the two of us. Zirel's purely instinctive resentment was shared by many of her type. The Bolshevik ideologists who so brutally stamped out Hebrew in Russia fed on it.

We were taught to love Hebrew. Yiddish, we were told, was the language of exile, an ugly jargon picked up from German, to be discarded as quickly as possible. Hebrew was the language of our glorious past and of our future in Zion. This indoctrination was quite effective. With many of us it persisted throughout life.

Not all those who built Israel or who cultivated Hebrew in the Diaspora were the products of such schools as I attended. Mr. Lapitzky himself had an ordinary old-fashioned ghetto schooling. But there was something in the culture he imbibed which, with some people at certain periods, led to a desire for the rebirth of Hebrew as a living tongue. Usually that desire went with the movement to rebuild or reconquer Palestine as a Jewish Homeland.

Such is the background of the entrenchment of the Hebrew language in Israel today. The remarkable thing is that today a majority is rapidly adopting the language of a minority, not so much out of historic sentiment, as did the founding fathers, but out of sheer necessity. I have met many educated newcomers attending the intensive rapid courses for Hebrew who wished Israel had adopted an easier and more widely used language. But they have no choice. Only a substantial minority of Israel's population speaks Hebrew with real fluency and only a portion of that minority knows the language well. Yet it is the language of the country, with no serious rival on the horizon. Its hegemony was firmly established before the State of Israel came into existence.

## II

A brief survey of the development of the language is necessary for an understanding of the subject at hand, even if only to eliminate some current misconceptions. Unlike the Qur'an in Arabic, the Bible does not form the only literary standard for Hebrew. The Mishna, the first post-Biblical code, differs from it in style and construction and vocabulary, and bears strong Aramaic and Greek influences. The Talmud, which consists of discussions on the Mishna, is written in an Aramaic dialect mixed with Hebrew. Its peculiar style affected all subsequent legalistic and religious works, practically all of which were written in Hebrew. The innovations of the Mishna and the Talmud entered the main stream of the language, now disappearing from usage, now recovering, now modifying their meaning — as happens in any language which retains its vitality. In later centuries the two main periods when Hebrew was greatly enriched were: (a) the centuries of Arab influence (roughly from the 8th to the 13th centuries); and (b) the century of the flowering of modern Hebrew literature in East European Jewry before its decline and ultimate physical destruction by the Nazis. Secular literature, with emphasis on the cultivation of the esthetic, grew up at various periods in various countries — in Morocco, in Spain, in Southern France, in Italy, in Holland, in Germany, and finally in Eastern Europe. It usually developed where the influence of the surrounding civilization fostered such inclinations. It was sometimes the most convenient medium for transmitting ideas to Jews (whose literary language was always Hebrew) and sometimes a deliberate means for cultivating the cherished tongue. The development of religious, legalistic, ethical, and mystical literature in Hebrew was practically never interrupted. All this development took place before the emergence of the State, even before the Jewish community in Palestine adopted Hebrew as its speech.

The parallel between the case of Hebrew and that of Latin is perhaps apropos. Both medieval Latin and medieval Hebrew continued to develop as literary media after ceasing to be spoken languages. But the knowledge of Hebrew among the Jews was

so much more widespread than the knowledge of Latin among the Christians that the difference in quantity amounts to one in essence; the use of Hebrew by Jews was accompanied by a national sentiment, by a consciousness that this was an expression of national identity. Therefore, while the use of Latin disappeared with the emergence of the national languages of Europe, Hebrew persisted in living and developing until the emergence of the State. Within my own memory, in Eastern Europe, and for centuries before through most of the Jewish Diaspora, the average Jew kept his books and conducted his business correspondence in Hebrew, although he spoke it but on rare occasions. Gifted Jewish writers in Spain, as far back as a thousand years ago, wrote Hebrew out of sheer love and loyalty to the national tongue, although they had a greater mastery of the language of the country. The only serious rival to Hebrew, the only Jewish vernacular which developed into an important literary vehicle, is Yiddish. The situation of Yiddish vis-à-vis Hebrew corresponds to that of French or Italian vis-à-vis Latin; in fact there has raged a bitter contest between the Hebraists and the Yiddishists. In the end, however, the situation of Yiddish weakened, while Hebrew became the language of Israel. Outside of Israel, no vernacular used by the Jews has reached to the stature attained by Yiddish in Eastern Europe and in the United States (where it is rapidly declining).

Popular propaganda, which has a tendency to oversimplification, attributes the revival of Hebrew as a spoken everyday language to one man, Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, who also compiled the largest Hebrew Lexicon. The legend is simple and touching: A certain Russianized Jew who lived in Paris, suddenly inspired by the national struggles of the Italians and the Balkan Slavs, decided to settle in Palestine and speak Hebrew (which he once knew in his boyhood). He began with his wife, who knew not a single word. When he found that the language was short of words for modern usage, he started to compile a lexicon, inventing new words as he went along. He changed his name from Lazar Perlman to Eliezer Ben-Yehuda. He became "the father of the rebirth."



All these facts are true, but they give only a partial story. Ben-Yehuda was only one of the many who became a Zionist under the influence of European events. When he came to Jerusalem, he found that the use of Hebrew for conversation was quite widespread as a medium of communication among members of various Jewish communities who had no other language in common. It was an age-long practice, but nowhere else in the world was there so much rubbing of shoulders between the Yiddish-speaking Jew from Eastern Europe, the Tartar-speaking Jew from Central Asia, the Spanish-speaking Jew from Greece or Turkey, or the Arabic-speaking Jew from Morocco. Ben-Yehuda noticed that the tendency was for the European Jew to adopt the Hebrew pronunciation of the Sephardim rather than vice versa. (The Sephardic pronunciation is more euphonious, more uniform, and the Sephardic communities in Palestine were at that time the stronger and more numerous.) Ben-Yehuda then adopted the Sephardic pronunciation of Hebrew as the standard, much to the disgust of some grammarians. As modified — or, if you like, corrupted — by the phonetic habits of the Ashkenazi Jews, it is still the standard in Israel. Ben-Yehuda was not the only man who spoke Hebrew in his house. A whole group, including the country's leading educationists, joined the movement. Their greatest contribution was that they introduced the use of Hebrew conversation in the schools, first for Jewish subjects only and subsequently for general subjects as well.

At that time the few score thousands of Jews in Palestine constituted culturally a colony of Eastern European Jewry, just as in early American history, London was the cultural metropolis of New England and Maryland. Under those conditions, the success of the movement in Palestine would perhaps be unthinkable without the powerful support given it by the large hinterland in Eastern Europe to which the movement spread. In time, notably after World War I, in the newly established states of Central and Eastern Europe where Jews were granted national minority rights, Hebrew elementary and secondary schools were formed, closely modeled on the Palestine pattern.

The period in which the fate of Hebrew was settled coin-

cided with that of the greatest flowering of Hebrew literature since the Golden Age in Spain. Influenced mainly by German and Russian models, Hebrew literature became far more variegated and many-sided than it had ever been in the past. With the growth of a literature covering many fields of human interests, there was a corresponding development of words, styles, and terminology. The growth was organic. It was not merely the work of Ben-Yehuda or the Vaad Halashon (Language Academy) in Jerusalem.

While the growth has been organic, its weaknesses are obvious. In some fields there have been gaps which had to be filled by concentrated effort, sometimes in a great hurry. Modern scientific terminology in Hebrew, as yet inadequate as it is, began to be created with the growth of secondary and higher schools, laboriously by self-sacrificing teachers, lesson by lesson and year by year as classes were added. But the organization of the State, with its civil and military forces, with its ranks, titles, and all such paraphernalia, suddenly released upon the Israel public a veritable deluge of new Hebrew words and expressions.

However, even this development is not as unique as may appear at first sight. Languages which never ceased to be spoken also have had their periods of rapid adjustment to current needs by sudden additions of vocabulary. There was a time when English had to catch up with Italian. The Encyclopedists in France, and Lomonosov and Karamzin in the Russia of Peter and Catherine, did for their languages what Ben-Yehuda, by his Lexicon, did for Hebrew. When Lithuania became a state after World War I, there was a wider gap to be filled in the language than Hebrew had at any time.

On the surface it seems strange that Hebrew succeeded where Erse, so far, has failed. A closer examination may help to explain the reason. To be sure, there was a burst of literary activity in Ireland during its national struggle. To be sure, also, Ireland's leading literary figures are at least of as great a stature as Bialik, Chernikhovsky, and Achad-Haam. But Ireland's authors did not write in the Erse language. It was easier for Hebrew to prevail over Yiddish than for Erse to prevail over English, if for

no other reason than the greater literary vitality of Hebrew as compared to Erse and the vast richness of English as over against Yiddish.

There were other reasons for the success of Hebrew. Palestine, when Hebrew began to be revived, was for all practical purposes a cultural wilderness. The newcomers brought with them, for the most part, a substantial knowledge of Hebrew to begin with. In later years the most determined section of the immigrants, those who shaped the country's destiny, brought with them a speaking knowledge of the language as well. Finally, the need for one language for all Jews who spoke so many vernaculars that not one of them belonged to the majority is as strong today as it was in Ben-Yehuda's time. It may be added that the benevolent attitude of the British authorities was quite a help. They recognized Hebrew as one of the three official languages of the country in the early days of the Mandate when the position of the language was still weak. The emergence of the State and its insistence on the use of Hebrew makes its knowledge still more compelling.

After one has enumerated all the objective external conditions without which the revival of Hebrew in Israel would probably not have been possible, one must still emphasize the historic sentiment and the strong will emanating from that sentiment as the primary factor. Yehuda al-Harizi, who lived in Spain and in the Provence some nine centuries ago, wrote the first novel in Hebrew merely, as he says in the introduction, to prove that what can be done in Arabic can better be done in Hebrew. When he found that Tibbon's Hebrew translation of Maimonides' Arabic work *Guide to the Perplexed* had too many Arabic influences, he undertook to make his own translation in a better Hebrew. (It was, but Tibbon's was more accurate and became the standard.) Maimonides himself wrote his *Second Code* in a Hebrew so exquisite, so polished, that it could not be so done without a great love for the language. A passion for Hebrew breathes from the pages of their great poetic contemporaries, Gabirol and Halevi. The same passion breathes from the pages of their successors in other countries, in Italy, in Holland, in Germany. "I am the bondsman of Hebrew for life," said Gordon, the greatest

Hebrew poet of the 19th century. Chernikhovsky, who, with Bialik, is considered one of the two greatest Hebrew poets of the 20th century, knew his mother tongue, Russian, better than Hebrew, and could have made an enviable career as a Russian writer. But he chose Hebrew and died a poor man in Tel-Aviv a few years before the establishment of the State of Israel. Ben-Yehuda, the first man to insist on Hebrew speech in his home at all times, under all circumstances, was a sick man in his youth, whom the physicians warned against the suicide of settling in Palestine. But he did, and lived to well over sixty, sustained by his fanatical determination to see Hebrew reborn. "Speak Hebrew and thou shalt be healed," was his motto. Ben-Gurion and his contemporaries of the "Second Aliyah" used to bring their Hebrew Bibles along with them to their meetings with their interminable discussions on the creation of a socialist society in their future dreamland. The Bible was constantly referred to for the correct root. These few hundred idealists who migrated to Palestine during the decade preceding World War I in order to become manual laborers and farmhands, by their stubborn persistence probably decided the fate of the Hebrew language. Those of them who lacked fluency in Hebrew and used Yiddish or Russian among themselves observed the rule more strictly when addressing their animals.

The late David Remez, Minister of Transport and later Minister of Education, contributed many new terms of his own coining to modern Hebrew usage and never missed a chance to offer his own correction of style in a proposed document. Sharett, a distinguished linguist, has an extraordinary knowledge of the language and an unusually fine style. Ben-Gurion's ideas on style and grammar are sometimes controversial. He occasionally strikes a grand note in the Biblical manner of which he is an ardent devotee. The Prime Minister knows the language well and loves it at least as passionately as the rest. He has a strong affection for Uri Zvi Greenberg, a bitter political opponent and a member of the Herut party, because Greenberg is a distinguished Hebrew poet and the author of the *Hymn to Jerusalem*. The "Third Aliyah," or immigration wave after World War



I, consisted mainly of idealists who followed in the footsteps of the "Second Aliyah," but it was wider in scope and better organized. Throughout the whole Jewish world, special training farms (*hakhsharot*) prepared the future settlers by teaching them farming, communal life, and the use of the Hebrew language, along with ideological doctrines.

Among the opponents of the Labor party, the love of Hebrew was no less pronounced. The Revisionist party, out of which grew the terrorist groups, and, still later, the Herut and Lehi parties, was founded by Odessa-born Vladimir Jabotinsky, who gave up a brilliant career as a leading Russian poet, journalist, and orator to devote himself to Zionist work. At the age of twenty-four he began to study Hebrew and soon translated Bialik into Russian and Dante's *Inferno* into Hebrew. The name of one of his gifted followers, Uri Zvi Greenberg, has already been mentioned. Menachem Beigin, Israel Scheib (leader of the splinter Sternist group), and many other dissidents are excellent Hebrew scholars and are possessed of a passionate love of the language.

### III

Hebrew was reborn in love. But not all who speak it love it. The determination of the first pioneers, exerting powerful social pressure and assisted by favorable objective conditions, imposed the language upon the whole community. During my first visit to Palestine, before the proclamation of the State, I met a group of Czech and German Jews in a collective settlement in the Beisan valley by the Jordan who scrupulously insisted on speaking Hebrew, but admitted in private conversation that they found no charm in the language and considered it inadequate for modern use. Although they spoke Hebrew fluently, their knowledge of its literary sources, ancient and modern, was extremely scant. It is difficult for a young man brought up on Goethe and Heine in German to find beauty in the Hebrew of the party jargon and the street, if he has not even heard of the Book of Job, Yehuda Halevi, or Bialik. In my early immigrant days in Canada, I came across people brought up on Pushkin and Lermontov who found no poetic beauty in the English they



learned hastily. I was one of them myself. To be sure, no one has come forward, as at least one commentator on Hebrew has done, to make generalizations about the English language on the basis of a knowledge of pidgin English and sources of information consisting of immigrants unfamiliar with the language and its literature. On the other hand, there is a vast difference between the condition of modern English and that of modern Hebrew and between the proportion of immigrants who learned the one language late in life as against the other.

My friends in the Beisan valley, being Central Europeans, observed the rule to speak Hebrew, which they hardly knew and hardly liked, much more strictly than the East Europeans of other kibbutzim, many of whom were steeped in Hebrew culture. "Na zdar," I jokingly addressed in Czech an honor graduate of the Prague University, who specialized in Czech literature. She looked at me sternly and answered in Hebrew, "Boker tov" ("Good morning"). But the same people read more books in German and in Czech than in Hebrew during their leisure hours. To them the use of Hebrew was a tenet in their pioneering life.

I have found many more like them with as little appreciation of the qualities of the Hebrew language, but with less of the pioneer spirit. The large unselective immigration since the State was established increased the number of such unwilling converts. But whether they like Hebrew or not, whether they speak it or not, both under the State or under the Jewish Agency before the State they have had to accept it. The clearest indication of the strength of the Hebrew language is to be found in the way other languages are spoken in the country, not only today, but even before the State. Those who habitually speak Yiddish employ roughly the same Hebrew words in their Yiddish as the English words used in American Yiddish. Just as the German-Americans speaking "die schoenste Language" employ many English words in their conversation, so the many German-speaking Jews in Palestine used many Hebrew words. You will hardly ever hear in a German conversation such words as "Mein Herr," or "Frau," or "Guten Tag," but "Adoni," "Geveret," "Shalom." Even be-

fore the State, the word in any language spoken by the Jews in Palestine was "shofet" for judge, "shoter" for policeman, "beit-sefer" for school, etc. The numerous institutions created by the Jews in Palestine before the State, which exerted such a strong influence on the country's daily life, were naturally known in every language by their Hebrew names. As already intimated, the State, when it came, in this respect added quantity and pervasiveness.

Culturally, Israel may be said to be a colonial outpost of Europe, with now increasing American influences, seasoned by peculiarly Jewish elements. The language of that culture is Hebrew. Art and music, of course, are least dependent on language, and there are many artists and musicians in Israel whose Hebrew is less than indifferent. The press is more intimately connected with the language. Newspapers and periodicals in other languages do appear, but even the widely read English-language *Jerusalem Post* does not have as much influence on the public as any newspaper in Hebrew. Literature and the theater are almost entirely in Hebrew.

This is not the place to go into even a brief discussion of Hebrew literature in Israel. But some basic facts may be noted. The native and more integrated writer, as compared with the immigrant writer, shows a greater leaning first toward the Bible and secondly toward current foreign trends. The same is true of the reading public. A Hebrew translation of John Steinbeck or a native emulation of Ernest Hemingway commands a wider appeal than the classics produced in Eastern Europe in the recent past or a current book dealing with Jewish life and problems outside of Israel. Israeli writers show a distinct preference for the style of the Bible, which is studied with gusto in the Israel schools.

The leaning toward the Bible may be explained by many circumstances, including the parallel between the formative stage of modern Israel and that of ancient Israel. On the other hand, the cultivation of Bible study has had its effect on the mentality of the native *sabra*. An extreme example is the existence of the handful of "Canaanites," who advocate the severance of all ties

with world Jewry and the eventual creation of a large State extending from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates and taking in all inhabitants in the ancient "Land of the Euphrates." Immigrants would be allowed only according to the country's needs and absorptive capacity—as in the United States or Canada. The language of the Land of Euphrates would be Hebrew, which in ancient times was the language of Baal, Tammuz, and Anath as well as of Jehovah. Incidentally, their magazine, *Aleph*, is written in excellent and lively Hebrew, in contrast to the dull, pompous, and cliché-laden style of some of the official publications. In more diluted form, many ideas propounded by this handful of brilliant young eccentrics are to be found fairly wide-spread among the *sabras*. Whatever other reasons may account for them besides the influence of the Bible (as taught by non-religious teachers), one could not envisage the possibility of similar reactions gaining ground among any section of Israel's population were its language Yiddish, which originated in Central Europe.

Hebrew was brought back to life by scholars, but it is now spoken by many who are illiterate. It is also used by many who know other languages well but are completely unfamiliar with the elementary literary sources of the Hebrew language. Mr. Lewin, who travels from Haifa to his factory near Acre, crossing the Kishon several times a day, never heard of the Prophetess Deborah who made that brook famous in her Song. But he speaks a Hebrew which is good enough to discuss the engineering problems of his factory. Magdeburg-born Kurt Ruppín, in charge of the Kishon Project, can make himself well understood in Hebrew, which he speaks with a pronounced Saxon accent. I doubt if Deborah could have made it out. Her pronunciation was probably closer to that of the Yemenite Jews than to any other. Besides, there is a difference in their vocabularies: the Song of Deborah, the oldest extant literary document in the Hebrew language, contains some words which have puzzled many a scholar. And for her part, Deborah never could have figured out what the word "dahpur" (dredging machine) meant, even though she herself used other words with the same roots.

"Daphur" may be an artificially coined word. But to people working at it, it is something very real and alive. To a Hebrew grammarian in New York the word "margema" (machine gun) is of interest chiefly because of its formation from the root "ragam" — "pelting with stones." But to a boy in the army it is something to hurt and to get hurt with. It is very real.

Theodor Herzl did not think Hebrew could be used to serve the needs of a modern community. There are people today who think it was a mistake to have adopted Hebrew for Israel. But by now it is too late. Hebrew in Israel is a fact to be accepted, like its climate and its geographic position.

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## DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

NONE OF THE various problems of the Middle East had been solved by July 1; nevertheless, the acrid debates and violence of 1951 and early 1952 had been superseded by a few weeks of relative quiet.

The Egyptian elections, originally scheduled for late in May, were postponed to allow for a revision of the electoral lists and possibly the electoral law. An election in May would almost certainly have returned the Wafd to power, an outcome the Palace was anxious to prevent. There was still no indication of what direction an electoral reform might take beyond a refusal, announced on June 11, to extend the franchise to women. This decision, taken in the face of a militant feminist movement headed by the Bint al-Nil (Daughters of the Nile) society, followed the line laid down by a May 2 fatwa of the Grand Mufti of Egypt and an opinion rendered in June by a committee of al-Azhar ulema. Echoing the general conservative sentiment in Egypt, it was also a move by the Government against losing support among Muslim-dominated groups. Elections were now tentatively scheduled for October. In the meantime, Egypt continued to be administered under martial law and without a parliament.

Nor could any progress be reported from Iran toward bringing its oil industry back into production. Attempts to work out a plan of operation through the intermediary of the International Bank broke down in the middle of March for the same reasons that previous negotiations with the AIOC had broken down: failure to agree on the degree of the Bank's authority, on its freedom to hire British technicians, and on the price at which the oil was to be sold. On June 9 Prime Minister Mosaddeq appeared before the International Court of Justice at The Hague to open Iran's case against the Court's jurisdiction in its dispute with the AIOC. Dr. Mosaddeq spoke in gen-

eral terms of Britain's alleged injustices to Iran; in the following sessions the more legal aspects of Iran's case were ably presented by the Belgian advocate, Henri Rolin. His argument hinged on whether Iran was bound to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in disputes involving treaties and conventions signed prior to 1932 (the year in which Iran so agreed to submit), and on whether in fact Iran's concessionary agreement of 1933 with the AIOC was either a treaty or convention: his answer to both was in the negative. One further point made by M. Rolin was that the AIOC and British governmental negotiators had agreed, in numerous statements, to the principle of nationalization, and had therefore denied Britain's own case since the Court could not have jurisdiction in such essentially national matters. This argument elicited the response that Britain's recognition of the principle of nationalization had been conditional upon a negotiated settlement — possibly very much as Britain's recognition of Egypt's and Iraq's political independence had been conditional upon their willingness to sign restrictive treaties. In general, the British argument was based on the plea that the question of jurisdiction could not be decided on purely legalistic grounds; it was inseparable from the merits of this particular dispute, and these were heavily on Britain's side. Further, the 1933 agreement could be considered a treaty because it settled a matter which had been an international dispute before the League of Nations. No decision could be expected until well into the summer.

Israel and the surrounding countries were each concerned with domestic troubles of their own. In Israel it was the chronic financial and economic problem, which the Government attempted to meet through two drastic measures. On February 13 it introduced two additional exchange rates. Essential foodstuffs could still be bought at the former rate of \$2.80 to the



Israeli pound. The general basis for prices, however, was now set at \$1.40 to the Israeli pound, while for investors the exchange rate was put at \$1 to the pound. At the same time, the free market rate hovered in the neighborhood of \$.40 to the pound.

The immediate effect of the devaluation was a rise in basic food prices of almost 15% in one month, and in individual imported items of as much as 50% in the same period. In due course exporters were able partially to offset these rises through increased sales abroad, but the net result was nevertheless a lower standard of living for the general public.

A second move, with similar effect, came on June 8. The Government then announced a compulsory loan of 10% on all bank deposits and currency in circulation. This was to be effected by the withdrawal of all old currency notes and the substitution of an appropriate number of new. The Government expected by this means to realize £1 25 million from domestic sources and an unknown amount from Israeli currency abroad, of which no notes of a denomination larger than £1 1 would be honored. A further measure in prospect was a compulsory loan or tax on property.

In Jordan attention was centered on the mental health of King Talal. On May 18 he left again for France and Switzerland for possible treatment; on June 4 the Cabinet named a Regency Council which the King was reported to have accepted on June 13. Although the Jordan Constitution states that no person shall ascend the throne unless he is sane, it makes no provision for the removal of a ruling monarch nor any specific mention of abdication. King Talal's eldest son, Prince Husayn, will reach his majority in July 1953.

While Syria continued to be governed by decrees — totalitarian in nature, but their true import still to be put to the test by interpretation — Lebanon was engaged in a legal dispute which was the direct outcome of its communal organization. In 1951 legislation had been passed transferring back to the various Christian religious courts jurisdiction over such matters of personal status as marriage, divorce, and inheritance — jurisdiction which had been retained by the Muslim courts but had been

surrendered to civil courts by the Christian communities in the interest of Christian Lebanese nationalism. Lawyers were bitterly opposed to this reassertion of the prerogatives of the religious communities since it greatly restricted their freedom of practice, and they eventually refused to handle cases involved in the new law. When the Lebanese Parliament considered a revision, however, both the Christian and Muslim clergy raised violent protest on the other side. It still remained for the Parliament to work out an acceptable compromise.

The struggle of the Tunisian nationalists reached its climax on April 14, when the U.N. Security Council voted against putting their case on its agenda. The United States, lining behind it both Greece and Turkey, abstained from voting and was thereby instrumental in defeating the motion, which had been introduced by twelve Arab and Asian countries. It was evident that the United States' decision was dictated by its negotiations with France over military plans for Western Europe. (France bluntly warned that a U.S. vote in support of the motion would bring the breakdown of these negotiations and France's withdrawal from active participation in the United Nations.) Nevertheless, the Arab countries of the Middle East interpreted U.S. policy as willing connivance with Western imperialism.

The tacit backing which the U.S. gave France was conditioned upon a positive effort, by France, to introduce reforms in Tunisia. The French Government stated, however, that it could go no further than the proposals put forward for discussion in March<sup>1</sup> and hope to survive a vote of confidence. Since the Franco-Tunisian commission originally scheduled to convene in April had never been able to meet because of the non-cooperation of Tunisian nationalist leaders, the French Government now decided to proceed directly to the implementation of its proposals. Foreign Minister Schumann presented his program to the French Parliament on June 19, but because of opposition from both right and left (the one saying that the reforms went too far, the other that they did not go far enough), he could not secure a vote. The French Govern-

<sup>1</sup> See the *Middle East Journal*, vol. 6 (Spring, 1952), pp. 208-9.

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ment was faced, therefore, with the necessity of proceeding without a parliamentary mandate. In the meantime, on June 20, thirteen Arab and Asian states again approached the United Nations, this time with a request for a

special session of the General Assembly to take up the question of Tunisia. A week later their request had received the support of 17 countries (including the Soviet Union) out of the 31 required for favorable action.

## Chronology<sup>1</sup>

MARCH 1 — MAY 31, 1952

### General

1952

*Mar. 3:* An Arab Feminist Congress was convened in Baghdad to consider such questions as the granting of the franchise to women, restrictions on divorce, the stimulation of rural life, and the raising of social and moral standards throughout the Arab world. (*Arab News Agency [ANA]*, Mar. 8.)

*Apr. 5:* Spanish Foreign Minister Don Alberto Martin Artajo arrived in Beirut to begin a goodwill tour of Arab countries.

*Apr. 6:* A Posts and Telegraphs Conference at which most Arab countries were represented, was opened at Damascus. The conference considered three main questions: the adoption of a unified policy at the International Postal Union Conference; the introduction of a uniform postal tariff among Arab countries; and the development of speedier communications between Egypt and the other Arab countries. (*ANA*, Apr. 12.)

*May 7:* A conference on desert research, sponsored by UNESCO, was opened at Jerusalem, Israel.

### Algeria

1952

*Apr. 25:* Messali Hadj, nationalist leader, was placed under house arrest after a clash between nationalists and the police.

*May 14:* A demonstration at Orleansville resulted in the death of 2 nationalists.

### Arab League

1952

*Mar. 29:* The 16th session of the Council opened in Cairo, member countries being represented by heads of diplomatic missions. The session was adjourned the same day but remained "open" so that delegates could reassemble with a minimum of delay.

<sup>1</sup> In general, items in the Chronology are drawn from the *New York Times* unless otherwise indicated.

### Egypt

1952

*Mar. 1:* Prime Minister Ali Mahir Pasha resigned. King Faruq requested Ahmad Nagib al-Hilali Pasha to form a Cabinet.

*Mar. 2:* Prime Minister Nagib al-Hilali Pasha announced a new Cabinet as follows:

Nagib al-Hilali Pasha — Prime Minister  
Salib Sami Pasha — Commerce, Industry, Supply

Muhammad Kamil Mursi Pasha — Justice  
Taha al-Siba'i — Municipalities, Rural Affairs

Muhammad al-Mufti al-Gaza'irli Pasha — Welfare

'Abd al-Khaliq Hassunah Pasha — Foreign Affairs

Muhammad Zaki 'Abd al-Muta'al Bey — Finance, National Economy

Murtada al-Maraghi Bey — Interior, War, Navy

Muhammad Rif'at Pasha — Education

Muhammad Farid Za'luq — Propaganda

Tarraf Ali Pasha — Communications

Nagib Ibrahim Pasha — Agriculture

Radi Abu Sayf Radi Bey — Social Affairs

The Government suspended Parliament for 30 days.

*Mar. 11:* The Wafd party announced its opposition to the Government of Prime Minister al-Hilali Pasha.

*Mar. 12:* A special military tribunal sentenced 6 persons to prison for participation in the riots of Jan. 26.

*Mar. 16:* Eight persons, found guilty of arson and the destruction of property on Jan. 26, were sentenced to prison by a military tribunal.

*Mar. 17:* Ahmad Husayn, leader of the Egyptian Socialist party, was sentenced to 18 months in prison for insulting and inciting hatred for the Crown in articles in his newspapers.

*Mar. 18:* Fu'ad Sirag al-Din Pasha, former Wafd Minister of the Interior, and 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan Pasha, former Wafd Minister of Social Affairs, were placed under house arrest for disturbing public order surpassing "the limit which the Government responsible for maintenance of public order could ignore."

✓ *Mar. 22:* Conversations with British officials regarding the future of the Suez Canal Zone and the Sudan were resumed.

✓ *Mar. 23:* The Government announced that the existing Chamber of Deputies would be dissolved and that elections would be held May 18.

✓ *Mar. 27, 29:* Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Khaliq Has-sunah Pasha met with British Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson to discuss the Suez Canal and Sudan questions.

*Mar. 29:* Under the sponsorship of the "Daughters of the Nile," four women were nominated for election to Parliament. The nominations, however, were rejected by the Ministry of the Interior. (*ANA*, Apr. 5.)

*Mar. 31:* The Cabinet passed a decree demoting several thousand directors of Government offices. It also passed a decree providing heavy prison sentences for cotton speculators.

*Apr. 12:* The Government announced the postponement of elections and suspension of electoral activities pending revision of the electoral lists.

*Apr. 20:* The Cabinet issued a decree establishing a committee which would investigate corruption in the Government.

*Apr. 24:* Spanish Foreign Minister Don Alberto Martin Artajo arrived in Cairo on an official visit. (*ANA*, Apr. 26.)

*Apr. 26:* Minister of Finance Muhammad Zaki 'Abd al-Muta'al Bey announced the formation of two investigation commissions. One would seek out and demand punishment for those responsible for speculation on the cotton market. The other would investigate illegal appropriations of the state fund.

✓ *Apr. 28:* A trade mission from West Germany arrived to negotiate a new commercial agreement with the Government. (*ANA*, May 3.)

*May 6:* King Faruq issued an official announcement proclaiming his direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. The king's ancestry was traced to the Prophet by al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Biblawi, president of "The Society of the Prophet's Descendants."

*May 11:* The Government charged Ahmad Husayn, leader of the Socialist party, and 5 other persons with having instigated the riots of Jan. 26.

*May 20:* The Government rejected British proposals to recognize King Faruq as King of the Sudan only if the Sudanese also agreed.

✓ *May 21:* The Cabinet approved a decree providing for 3-year residence visas, renewable automatically, to be granted to foreigners who were born in the country, to foreigners resident in the country for 20 years, and to scholars and industrialists whose services are of value to Egypt. (*ANA*, May 24.)

*May 28:* An economic agreement was signed with Western Germany which provided, among other things, that the German Government would issue import permits for Egyptian cotton to a total value of £E 25 million. A clause was inserted

excluding all barter arrangements between the two countries. (*ANA*, May 31.)

## Eritrea

1952

*Mar. 25:* Voting began to elect a 68-member assembly to approve a new constitution federating Eritrea with Ethiopia.

## India

1952

*Mar. 5:* K. M. Munshi, Minister for Food and Agriculture, announced in Parliament that the Ford Foundation had agreed to assist in establishing 15 pilot agricultural extension projects with a contribution of about \$1,200,000.

*Mar. 12:* A Japanese industrial mission sponsored by the Japanese Government arrived in New Delhi to survey the possibilities of establishing industrial enterprises jointly with the Indian Government.

The Kamioka Mining Company of Japan signed a 2-year technical aid contract with the Metal Corporation of India to develop the Zawar lead and zinc mine in Udaipur.

*May 6:* Dr. Rajendra Prasad was reelected President of India for a 5-year term.

*May 7:* A general strike was called in Calcutta to protest a governmental order regrouping the railway system so as to eliminate Calcutta as the headquarters of the East Indian Railway.

A conference of state planning and development officials and representatives of the U.S. Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) was opened in New Delhi.

*May 13:* President Rajendra Prasad reappointed Jawaharlal Nehru as Prime Minister. The latter announced a new Cabinet as follows:

Jawaharlal Nehru — Prime Minister  
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad — Education,  
Natural Resources, Scientific Research  
N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar — Defense  
Rajkumari Amrit Kaur — Health  
Dr. Kailas Nath Katju — Home Affairs,  
States  
Rafi Ahmad Kidwai — Food and Agriculture  
Chintaman D. Deshmukh — Finance  
Jagjivan Ram — Communications  
Gulzarilal Nanda — Planning and River  
Valley Projects  
T. T. Krishnamachari — Commerce and Industry  
C. C. Biswas — Law, Minority Affairs  
Lal Bahadur Shastri — Railways and Transport  
Sardar Swaran Singh — Works, Housing,  
Supply  
V. V. Giri — Labor  
K. C. Reddy — Production  
Ajit Prasad Jain — Rehabilitation  
Satya Narayan Sinha — Parliamentary Affairs

Mahavir Tyagi—Minister of State for Finance

B. V. Keskar—Information and Broadcasting

May 14: President Rajendra Prasad announced the following new gubernatorial appointments: Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai—Bombay  
R. R. Diwakar—Bihar  
K. M. Munshi—Uttar Pradesh  
Fazl Ali—Orissa

## Iran

1952

Mar. 4: A representative of the International Bank arrived at Tehran to resume discussions with Prime Minister Mosaddeq regarding the oil question.

Mar. 16: It was announced that the mission of the International Bank had been unsuccessful in solving the oil dispute. A representative of the Government said that the Government and the Bank's mission had failed to agree on the use of British technicians, the Bank's position in operating the industry, and the price for the oil.

Mar. 20: The U.S. Department of State announced that a request for a \$120-million loan to Iran had been refused because the Iranian Government had the opportunity to get "adequate revenues" from its oil resources.

Mar. 28: About 5 persons were killed and 200 injured in a clash between a parading Communist group and anti-Communists.

Mar. 31: The Government concluded an agreement whereby the U.S. would supply Iran with about 34 thousand metric tons of sugar valued at \$5 million. Iran would sell the sugar in commercial channels and deposit the equivalent of \$5 million in rials in a Point IV account available to the program director in Iran for meeting local expenses.

Apr. 1: An agreement with the U.S. was signed in Tehran whereby the U.S. Government would contribute \$11 million for technical assistance to agricultural, public health, and education projects.

Apr. 18: The police arrested 45 Communists in a raid on a secret meeting of the outlawed Tudeh party.

Apr. 20: The Government announced that it had resumed production of motor oil at the refinery at Abadan.

Apr. 25: The U.S. agreed to resume military aid to Iran.

May 12: The Government announced that a bill would be drafted which would provide for the sale of government lands to peasants on a 20-year installment plan.

May 24: The Soviet Union protested to the Government that U.S. military aid to Iran violated the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 and was not compatible with good relations between the two countries.

May 28: Prime Minister Mosaddeq arrived at The Hague to represent the Government at the International Court of Justice hearing on the oil dispute. (ANA, May 31.)

## Iraq

1952

Mar. 27: The Senate ratified the collective security and economic cooperation pact of the Arab League.

Apr. 20: Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id Pasha left for an official visit to England. (ANA, Apr. 28.)

May 8: Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id Pasha and the Regent, Prince 'Abd al-Ilah, arrived in Madrid for an official visit.

## Israel

1952

Mar. 21: Meetings opened at The Hague between representatives of the Government and officials of the West German Government regarding Jewish claims against the latter.

Apr. 1: The Government presented its budget to the Knesset. Estimates for the fiscal year were £1 168,450,000, including an appropriation of £1 45 million for defense.

Apr. 7: Negotiations with the West German Government were suspended because of a "totally unsatisfactory" proposal made by the latter to settle Jewish claims.

Apr. 24: Several thousand industrial building employees, port workers, and new immigrants marched through Tel Aviv protesting against the Government's economic policy.

Apr. 25: Government officials seized telephone equipment from the Swedish cargo ship *Britta*. It was alleged that the equipment was intended for the Syrian army.

## Jordan

1952

Mar. 19: Colonel Fawzi Silu, Syrian Chief of State, and Colonel Adib Shishakli, Chief of Staff, began official talks with representatives of the Government. (ANA, Mar. 22.)

Mar. 25: King Talal signed the collective security pact of the Arab League. (ANA, Apr. 5.)

Apr. 13: Spanish Foreign Minister Don Alberto Martin Artajo arrived in Amman on an official visit to King Talal. (ANA, Apr. 19.)

Apr. 16: A Spanish Cultural Center was opened in Amman. (ANA, Apr. 19.)

Apr. 21: The Chamber of Deputies approved a new budget. The anticipated total income was estimated at JD 11,280,840; expenditure for the coming fiscal year at JD 12,216,148. Expenditure for security and defense would amount to JD 7,160,503. (ANA, Apr. 26.)

Apr. 30: Al-Sayyid Khulusi al-Khayri was appointed Minister of Health and Social Affairs



and al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Tarwana became Minister of Agriculture. (ANA, May 3.)

**May 27:** Conversations began with Syrian officials at Damascus for the purpose of concluding an economic agreement between the two countries. Among the subjects discussed were projects for the regulation of the waters of the Yarmuk River and the building of a dam at Wadi al-Dalil. (ANA, May 31.)

## Kashmir Problem

1952

**Mar. 14:** Pakistan accused India of 594 breaches of the cease-fire agreement.

**Apr. 25:** U.N. Mediator Frank P. Graham submitted a report on the situation to the U.N. Security Council which indicated that little, if any, progress had been made toward achieving a settlement of the dispute.

## Lebanon

(See also General.)

1952

**Apr. 3:** A strike of both Christian and Muslim businessmen was held in Beirut to protest against proposed legislation which would revise existing legislation in such a way that certain personal status matters would come before civil courts.

**Apr. 5:** Because the Government was scheduled to revise existing personal status legislation, the strike of Beirut's lawyers was ended. (ANA, Apr. 5.)

**May 15:** Prime Minister Sami al-Sulh Bey signed a new agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company under which the Government's annual income from oil transit would be increased by LL 3 million. (ANA, May 17.)

**May 17:** It was reported that the Government concluded an agreement with the Tapline Company which would increase the yearly revenue from oil transit from LL 1,500,000 to an estimated LL 4 million.

## Libya

1952

**Mar. 14:** The 24 members of the Senate were appointed by the King.

**Mar. 25:** The new Parliament held its opening session at Benghazi.

## Morocco

1952

**Mar. 20:** Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef presented a written request to French President Auriol for revision of the Treaty of Fez which would provide for the establishment of a government responsible to the Sultan, and for negotiations to achieve these ends.

## Pakistan

(See also Kashmir Problem.)

1952

**Mar. 16:** A new budget was presented to Parliament. A gross revenue of Rs. 1,747,300,000 and a gross expenditure of Rs. 1,668,900,000 were estimated. Rs. 950 million was allocated for national defense.

**Mar. 27:** The International Bank announced that a loan of \$27,200,000 would be made to Pakistan for the rehabilitation, improvement, and modernization of the railroad system.

**Apr. 28:** The Government signed an agreement with the United Nations which provided that \$1,500,000 would be allocated for technical assistance to Pakistan.

**May 19:** A crowd of more than 2,000 persons tried to break up the annual meeting of the Karachi Ahmadiya Association.

## Spanish Morocco

1952

**Mar. 12:** The Spanish Government announced that it had authorized the formation of political parties in Spanish Morocco.

**Apr. 8:** The Spanish Government announced that it would loan 260 million pesetas (\$6,500,000) to the caliphs of Spanish Morocco to finance a 5-year public works program.

## Sudan

1952

**Mar. 23:** A general strike called by the Sudan Workers' Federation went into effect. (ANA, Mar. 29.)

**Apr. 23:** The Assembly asked for an amendment to the British-sponsored draft constitution which would allow the Sudan to determine for itself whether to be independent or linked either with Britain or Egypt.

**Apr. 26:** The budget for 1952-53 was presented to the Legislative Assembly. The estimated revenue was £28,500,000 and expenditure was £24,500,000. (ANA, May 3.)

## Syria

(See also Jordan.)

1952

**Mar. 28:** A bomb explosion damaged the United States Information Service building in Damascus, killing an Arab radio operator.

**Apr. 3:** The Government issued a decree curtailing the distribution of information bulletins issued by foreign governments and news agencies.

**Apr. 6:** The Government, by decree, dissolved all political parties and organizations.

**Apr. 8:** Colonel Adib Shishakli left the country for an official visit to King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. (ANA, Apr. 12)

**Apr. 16:** Spanish Foreign Minister Don Alberto



Martin Artajo arrived in Damascus on an official visit. (*ANA*, Apr. 19.)

*Apr. 18:* A friendship and cultural agreement was signed with Spain.

## Tangier

1952

*Mar. 30:* The 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Fez was marked by a strike and riots in which several people were killed and hundreds were wounded.

*Apr. 3:* Token forces were sent from French and Spanish Morocco to Tangier at the request of the Committee of Control to ensure order.

*Apr. 7:* Spain formally demanded control of the police forces in the international zone of Tangier. It was alleged that the existing security system was inadequate to maintain order. Spain also requested revision of the international statute of Tangier.

## Tunisia

1952

*Mar. 11:* French Resident General de Hauteclouque ordered a night curfew for the Arab section of Tunis because of "a long series of terrorist acts that have compromised order and public security."

*Mar. 25:* It was reported that French Resident General de Hauteclouque had informed the Bey of Tunis, Sidi Mohammed el-Amin, that negotiations for home rule reforms could begin as soon as the Ministry of Prime Minister Chenik was replaced. The Bey was reported to have protested to French President Vincent Auriol demanding an end "to procedures of intimidation."

*Mar. 26:* The French Resident General ordered the seizure and arrest of Prime Minister Chenik and 3 members of his Cabinet. Martial law was proclaimed.

*Mar. 27:* French President Vincent Auriol sent 2 representatives to confer with the Bey of Tunis.

*Mar. 28:* The Bey of Tunis, Sidi Mohammed el-Amin, appointed a pro-French Prime Minister, Salaheddine Baccouche, and called on his subjects to work in harmony with France for the future of Tunisia. It was reported that the Bey had been forced to yield to French pressure.

*Apr. 2:* Twelve requests from Middle Eastern and Asian countries were filed with the U.N. Security

Council calling upon it to consider the "deteriorating situation" in Tunisia on the ground that it was a threat to international peace and security.

*Apr. 12:* Prime Minister Salaheddine Baccouche announced the formation of a new Cabinet as follows:

Salaheddine Baccouche — Prime Minister  
Taieb Balkiria — State  
Sadok Djaziri — Justice  
Dr. Ahmed Ben Rais — Commerce  
Dr. Mohammed Ghachem — Health  
Mohammed Dinguizli — Labor  
Abdel-Aziz Menchari — Agriculture

*Apr. 14:* The U.N. Security Council voted against placing the Tunisian question on its agenda. The Soviet Union, China, Brazil, Chile, and Pakistan voted in favor of its inclusion; France and Great Britain voted against it; and the United States, Greece, the Netherlands, and Turkey abstained.

*May 6:* Former Prime Minister Mohammed Chenik and three of his Ministers were released from house arrest.

*May 12:* The curfew in Tunis was advanced to 8:30 P. M. instead of midnight.

*May 14:* Former Prime Minister Mohammed Chenik and three of his former Cabinet Ministers were placed under armed guard and held incommunicado.

*May 15:* The Bey of Tunis, Sidi Mohammed el-Amin, in a radio broadcast, denounced recent terroristic acts and appealed to his people to end such violence.

*May 22:* The dusk-to-dawn curfew was lifted by the French Government and 450 nationalists were released.

## Turkey

1952

*May 8:* The Government signed an agreement with the U.N. Technical Assistance Administration which would provide for the establishment of an institute of public administration.

*May 11:* Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, deputy Atlantic Pact Commander, arrived in Ankara for consultations concerning Turkey's role in and contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

# ECONOMIC REVIEW

## International Bank Report on Turkey

Ömer Celâl Sarc

THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT has in the past repeatedly sought the advice of foreign specialists on its economic problems. However, the recommendations of these specialists have as a rule not been carried out. This was due partly to the shortcomings of some of the reports; moreover, the suggestions of the experts often did not agree with the lines of economic policy to which the Government had strongly committed itself and to some principles it had adopted. The proposed measures encountered, therefore, not only the resistance of vested interests, but also opposition of a political nature which ultimately led to their being shelved.

The situation has now greatly changed. Increasing economic difficulties have aroused doubt concerning the soundness of some features of the Government's line of action in the last two decades. The necessity for a reorientation of economic policy with a thoroughly realistic attitude and unprejudiced by rigid formulae and doctrines is now generally felt. At the same time, closer economic cooperation with other nations in the last few years and the procurement of financial aid from abroad call for a rational development program. Moreover, a political party which has sharply criticized the economic policy hitherto pursued is now in power. In short, the field is, at present, very fertile for proper economic advice.

At this favorable moment comes a new survey of the Turkish economy. The Report of the Barker Mission<sup>1</sup> — sponsored by the

International Bank in collaboration with the Turkish Government — is based on a study made in 1950 with a view to analyzing Turkey's economic problems, needs, and resources and to outlining a broad development program. Since present circumstances strongly promise that suitable recommendations will be effective, the Report merits particular attention.

The unsatisfactory aspects of the economy constitute the point of departure of this, as of all other, reports aimed at recommending measures for development. In the view of the Mission, the principal ailments of the Turkish economy are: (1) the economic imbalance arising from past overemphasis on industrial development at the expense of agriculture; (2) the problems created by the policy of étatism in the past two decades, which placed immense burdens on the Government but discouraged private enterprise; (3) the severe shortage of specialized and skilled personnel; (4) the unsatisfactory state of public administration and of the state enterprises; (5) the absence of adequate mechanism to coordinate investment; and (6) the situation caused by the inflation in World War II, which obstructed the free circulation and growth of purchasing power. It is to the joint action of all these, as well as of lesser circumstances, that the Report ascribes the fact that the welfare of the population has not perceptibly increased despite appreciable progress in certain sectors of the economy. Although the report ignores neither the achievements which past policy has to its credit nor the part played by other factors in bringing about the present situation, it attributes the present weaknesses of the economy — explicitly or implicitly — in the main to mistakes in economic policy.

<sup>1</sup> *The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendations for Development Program: Report of the Mission sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Turkey* (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1951).

The authors have in general correctly recognized and very ably described the major ailments of the Turkish economy. Although many of the defects which they point out had already been called to attention by other investigators, the findings of the Mission by no means lack originality. Certain traits of the economy which hitherto had not been sufficiently underlined are brought into prominence in the Report. Thus, the Mission shrewdly portrays the role played by inappropriate agencies in investment decisions. Similarly it shows clearly why, despite centralization, there is no coordination in Turkish public administration. The fact that centralization does not ensure, but rather hinders, coordination is brilliantly exposed. However, not all major economic problems of Turkey have been pointed out. Some readers will miss in particular a special treatment of the question of high costs, which seriously hamper production. But such reports can never be exhaustive.

Like the ills themselves, the circumstances which gave rise to them also have in general been rightly detected. However, the responsibility of errors in economic policy for present ailments appears sometimes to have been somewhat overrated, and the share of structural factors and political events, on the other hand, underrated. In particular, the causes of inflation in World War II seem not to have been quite exactly assessed. Some of the statements on fiscal policy imply that excessive investment expenditures of the Government are regarded as the prime mover of the inflation. But the role of these expenditures in generating inflation has certainly been minor as compared to the part played by such other factors as the enormous increase of military expenditure and the fact that Turkey's economic structure and the inadequacy of its public administration made it impossible to put through rationing and to introduce taxes capable of high yields, which would at the same time mop up surplus purchasing power.

Unfortunately, lack of space prevents a description of the Mission's recommendations of measures to eliminate or correct these major impediments to economic development and of means of coordinating such measures within the framework of a development plan.

Nor is it possible here to describe the investment program outlined by the Mission for the next five years. We must record, however, that a great part of the proposed measures are sound and adequate, the more so as many of them do not require additional outlays of capital, but rather changes in attitude and organization, more efficient action, and sharper thinking. Some surveys on the economy of Turkey hitherto made suffered from the doctrinal views of their authors. The peculiarities of the country were not sufficiently taken into account. Consequently the surveys sometimes prescribed remedies which were bound to be ineffective or could not be carried out. To have adopted a realistic approach and avoided doctrinairism constitutes a great merit of the Bank's Mission. In putting forward its recommendations the Mission pays proper attention to the economic and psychological singularities of the environment. Particularly, it gives due consideration to the qualifications of the Turkish entrepreneur. The Mission is also fully aware that not all that has been done in the economic field can be undone. This realistic attitude is reflected in the fact that the authors, though in principle strong supporters of the system of private enterprise, do not advocate immediate withdrawal of the Government from production by offhand sale of its undertakings. Indeed, under present circumstances such an attempt would be fruitless.

In general, we wish to subscribe to the suggestions of the Mission concerned with the elimination of the impediments to economic development, such as the coordination of investments, the encouragement of private enterprise, the reorganization of the state undertakings, and the greater emphasis on agriculture. But they include also some suggestions which do not seem very helpful or which give rise to doubt as to their effectiveness or applicability.

Certain recommendations, for instance, are too broad and refer principally to the goals of the policy to be pursued and do not indicate how these goals can be attained. Yet advice of the latter kind particularly is needed in those fields where appropriate goals have more or less been perceived, but where the problem is to find practical solutions. This is to some extent true, for example, of the suggestions

relating to public education, which, though raising several important points, consist in the main of broad principles. It applies also to the recommendation that the tax burden — now mainly born by salary and wage earners — should be distributed more equitably. The authors propose that the income tax should be extended to farmers enjoying substantial monetary income and that the numerous exemptions from the tax on buildings should be abolished. More detailed advice would have been expedient, the more so as recent studies have shown that the first of the proposed measures would encounter great practical difficulties. But it must be conceded that the Mission could not enter into the technical details of every question it examined and that many of its broader recommendations, too, are interesting and to a certain degree useful.

As an example of the recommendations which do not promise to be very effective we may cite the proposal to abolish the tax exemptions now granted to new buildings. In our view the authors expect too much from this measure. It could not, as hoped, diminish appreciably luxury residential construction, because the income of the groups which use the luxury buildings is high enough to bear also the proposed taxes. It seems to us that a decrease of luxury residential construction can be expected not so much from raising the building taxes as from the saturation of the demand for such dwellings which is bound to occur after a certain increase in their supply.

We find also an omission in the recommendations. The authors have stressed the serious decline in the standard of living of salary earners to which inflation in World War II has led, and yet make no recommendation to improve the situation of this hard-pressed group. The authors advocate more equitable distribution of the tax burden, not by lowering the taxes of salary earners but by raising those of the other groups. Salary increases are proposed only for agricultural and health personnel. Yet a remedy to the lot of all members of this group is not only demanded by social justice, but constitutes also a prerequisite for carrying out the reform of the public administration which the authors so strongly recommended.

In its forecasts of resources available for investment, the Mission has tried to make up for the scarcity of data by a high degree of prudence. The yearly average of estimated total resources in 1952-56 which can be used for investments is expected to amount, if circumstances develop favorably, to only 11.75% more than in 1949, and if circumstances develop unfavorably, not even to the 1949 level. Therefore apprehension as to an inflationary effect of the development plan seems not to be warranted.

Particularly cautious, not to say pessimistic, has been the authors' evaluation of foreign resources. They anticipate a substantial decrease of these resources in the next years. It is this assumption which has led the Mission to adopt, in establishing priorities for investments, the principle of giving preference to projects involving a high percentage of domestic capital over those which require a high percentage of foreign capital. Evidently, in most cases this principle would be wrong and would hardly provide an adequate criterion for the selection of appropriate investment projects, especially in countries where domestic capital is scarce. Could, for example, the petroleum resources of various countries have been developed if investments had been determined according to this principle? Its adoption by the authors is only attributable to their belief that in the period 1952-56 foreign capital will not be available beyond a certain narrow limit.

Since resources will not be ample, the development plan turns out to be somewhat disappointing. It does not provide for the additional expenditure which the recommended reform of the public administration will entail. The reform may lead to a decrease in the number of employees. Yet the effect of this saving is likely to be more than offset by the inevitable substantial increase in salaries. The Government is already losing a great number of its capable officers to the private sector. Moreover, there is no provision in the plan for developing tourism, which, if promoted, promises to become an appreciable source of foreign exchange.

The plan, furthermore, provides for a reduction of public investments in various fields.

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The proposed curtailment of investments in shipping and the slowing down of railway construction may not be of great weight. However, since the roads built in the last years have had most beneficial cultural and economic effects and have led to a considerable decrease in transportation costs, the slackening of road construction can be expected to be of more consequence. It might impair also the inner balance of the well coordinated highway program. The reduced allocations for public works seem hardly sufficient for improving to any appreciable extent municipal services, which, at present, are very inadequate.

The proposed reduction of funds to be devoted to industry and mining is in principle justified since, in order to promote private enterprise, the activity of the Government in these fields must be restricted. Yet the effects of this reduction will most probably be a decrease in over-all (private and public) investment in mining and industry during the period of the plan. It is problematic if, when, and to what extent private expansion will be able to fill the gap left by the Government in these fields. This will depend on several uncertain factors, especially on the effectiveness of the measures aimed at promoting private enterprise, on the amount of foreign capital flowing into the private sector, and on the magnitude of the sums released by the restriction of luxury residential construction. As regards the last point, as has already been pointed out, the Report in our view takes too much for granted. Decrease in this kind of construction is in our opinion also strongly desirable and will take place even without raising drastically the tax on buildings. It is doubtful, however, if the sums released will suffice to finance significant investments in industry and mining since a part of them will probably be devoted to the construction of non-luxury dwellings, which must continue and even increase.

True, the Report provides that if private enterprise does not expand in industry and mining (and under some other circumstances), the Government will have to resume investments by using funds allocated in the plan to other fields. Yet there is hardly any field in which allocations are so high as to allow a reduction without jeopardy.

The appropriations for agriculture, to which the Mission gives top priority, on the other hand, have been considerably increased in the plan. The investments which the Mission proposes consist, however, in great part of outlays which, though necessary and most important, are likely to develop agricultural production and employment only in the long run. It takes time to form a competent staff of research and extension personnel. The methods which the authors propose for increasing crop production and improving livestock must first be tried out. After experiments have proved the applicability of these methods, years will elapse before an appreciable part of the peasants will have been induced to adopt them. Yet several factors call for a rapid increase of agricultural production and employment. The population is growing quickly. "More than 200,000 people will soon be entering the labor market annually," says the Report. Industry is incapable of absorbing the additional population, and as indicated above, will probably be less so in the next years if the plan of the Mission is carried out. The same is true of railway and road construction, since the report proposes to slow them down. Moreover, the tractor has begun to displace peasants in certain regions.

In view of these circumstances it would have been most useful to incorporate into the plan large-scale irrigation and flood control schemes — at least the Seyhan River project, which promises to bring great help to the most important agricultural region of Turkey: the Adana district. Such projects are likely to have substantial, direct effects on production. Besides making irrigation possible, they would add considerable fertile areas to those now under cultivation and would check floods which regularly cause enormous damage.<sup>2</sup>

The Mission has excluded this project from the development plan for several reasons. It states that the peasants in the region involved are not yet ready for the changes in production methods which irrigation necessitates. It argues further that the capacity of the power plant which the multipurpose scheme includes will for some years be in excess of demand.

<sup>2</sup> An International Bank loan to Turkey of \$25,200,000 for the Seyhan River project was signed on June 18, 1952. [Ed.]



Yet it is not possible to ensure that a project yields maximum benefit right from the beginning. To prepare the peasant for irrigation before there is a possibility to irrigate is feasible only to a limited extent, and, moreover, there is time for some preparation since the project could only be completed in several years. Excess capacity could partly be avoided by building the power plant in stages. The main reason for rejecting the project is, however, the deficiency of resources, especially of foreign resources.

To sum up, we can say that the plan drawn up by the authors seems not to have provided sufficiently for directly productive investments, i.e., for those which result in the production of usable goods, nor for investments capable of increasing production and employment in the shorter run. It has given perhaps too much weight to investments which will show favorable effects only in the longer run. The investments proposed by the authors are surely of the greatest importance, the more so as they have been rather neglected in Turkey in recent years. Still, in view of the rapid growth of the active population, there is also an urgent need for investments of the other kind.

It must be said, however, that the inadequacies of the plan result less from an inexpedient distribution of the resources than from the small amount of the resources on which the plan is based. Given the presumed quantity of resources, only minor changes are

desirable and possible in the allocations proposed by the authors. The difficulties arise from the anticipated decrease of inflowing foreign capital. Indeed, although it is clear that the economic development of Turkey will primarily depend on its own efforts, it is also evident that under present circumstances it cannot solve its problems if foreign resources decline sharply. While the population grows quickly, investments are severely limited by the low level of income. To this is added the burden of the large military expenditures which the country has had to bear for more than a decade and which amount yearly to about 50% of estimated over-all (gross) investment. Therefore, if foreign resources dwindle substantially, even the most judicious distribution of domestic resources will not suffice to ensure effectively development, though in this case also, such a distribution would be beneficial in so far as it would provide for the most productive use of the available limited means. Yet there is a criticism which can be made of the authors in this connection: they should have given more consideration to the fact that foreign resources also are flexible. In particular, they could have included the Seyhan project in the plan, with the provision that it be carried out if additional resources materialize.

All this, however, does not imply a denial of the great merits of the Report. As has been repeatedly pointed out, it contains a multitude of excellent recommendations and as a draft the plan also will be of great help.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### Postwar Books on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

Grant V. McClanahan

AT THE END of World War II the Sudan was, to most appearances, the same vast, underdeveloped, yet efficiently administered territory that it had been for a generation. Its political affairs and problems, its social divisions, and the poverty of most of its inhabitants were of little concern outside very limited official and political circles even in Egypt, Britain, and perhaps the Sudan itself. However, the grinding frictions of postwar Anglo-Egyptian relations, in which the Sudan is so large an issue, have jolted the old, unsettled Sudan question more into U.S. and world attention than at any time since the reconquest of 1898. During the same period, and particularly since 1948, the forced acceleration of the Sudan's internal political institutions, and the changed political climate of the world — a climate which seems to be a perpetual spring for blossoming Asian and African nationalisms and a continuous frosty autumn for traditional European imperialism — have provided further grounds for a quickening of interest in a land known all too frequently only as the scene of Gordon's stubborn heroism and a biggish place to hunt elephants and hippos.

Books on all aspects of the modern Sudan published in European languages since 1945 continue to be largely of British authorship, and many of them are official, directly or indirectly. The general quality of the output has been high, a few titles of the past seven years even being in a class with such still indispensable older works as C.G. and B.Z. Seligman, *Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan* (London, 1932), or R. L. Hill, *A Bibliography of the*

*Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (London, 1939). A selection of old and new significant background materials on the Sudan, with brief notes on each title, was made by Helen F. Conover for a chapter in the Library of Congress, *Introduction to Africa* (Washington, 1952). This chapter, together with its companion on Egypt, has been issued for convenience as a pamphlet, *Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Washington, 1952), and makes a good starting point for the general reader who wishes to probe beneath and beyond the current press and magazine coverage of the Sudan problem.

Unfortunately there is no adequate postwar general survey of the political, social, and economic situation in the Sudan, though this need can be partially met by consulting a number of separate works. Annual reports by the Governor-General are available for the postwar period through 1949. Naturally these tend to be silent or tersely official on controversial topics and give only an opaque impression of the nature of the country and its peoples. But for such subjects as finance, trade, and all types of administrative statistics they are a steady and often interesting chronicle. A summary of the various achievements of the Sudan administration was compiled by the Sudan Government shortly before the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was taken up by the Security Council: *The Sudan: A record of Progress, 1898-1947* (Khartum, 1947). It opens with quotations from Kitchener and Cromer, including the latter's 1908 opinion: "What the Sudanese now most of all require is not national government but good government . . ." With selected facts, tables, and statistics, the anonymous British authors,

\* GRANT V. McCLANAHAN, a research officer in the Department of State, contributed "Recent Books on Contemporary Egypt" to the Winter 1951 issue of the *Middle East Journal*. He has lived for many years in Egypt and spent the summer of 1951 touring the Arab states.

the "good and faithful servants" of the Sudan administration, then proceed to award themselves a "well done." Theirs is indeed a proud record, particularly by Kitchener's and Cromer's standards. A more detached and interesting survey is *The Sudan: The Road Ahead* (Fabiian Publications, Research Series No. 99, London 1945). Pleasantly written and ably edited, with fresh thinking applied to all the major issues, this pamphlet, even seven years later, stands out as probably the best single discussion of the postwar Sudan for the general reader. It is a loyal British approach, one tinged with the cautious idealism which British Socialism often brings to imperial problems. Yet its breadth of view and nearly always consistent fairness to Sudanese and even Egyptian interests are in refreshing contrast to many of the Sudan Government's own appreciations. The little *Sudan Almanac 1951* published by the Public Relations Office (Khartum, 1951) is an excellent handbook of facts for residents and travelers or for anyone needing exact practical details on regulations, services, and facilities to be found in the territory.

R. A. Hodgkin, *Sudan Geography* (London, 1951), is a charming, informative little work on the human geography of the country, described in terms of regions and communities. It was prepared for secondary school use in the Sudan, a fact which may explain its tendency to put a smooth, noncontroversial face on what are actually some profound Sudanese problems, such as the future of the Nile River development ("... there need never be any serious quarrel between the two countries because if the river is properly controlled by dams and other means there is plenty of water for all possible needs of both countries"), and present differences between the character and outlook of the Northern and Southern Sudanese. The beautifully clear maps and illustrations, many of the latter being clever little sketches, are choice adornments to a text as clear and fresh as a Nile morning at Khartum.

The Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the status and future of the Sudan has steadily sharpened since the war. It is an old and bitter conflict which seems too deep for diplomatic adjustment and too tangled and elusive for the Security Council to reduce to a formula. Yet for

all the rancor and mistrust which has been vented, there is still a good chance that specific fears of the Sudanese, Egyptians, and British can be kept from excluding the eventual possibility of mutual confidence, so that out of the present tension of crisis may come an imaginative and generous settlement which will banish the spectre of indefinitely prolonged bad relations between Khartum and Cairo.

Among the sources to which we may turn to gain an understanding of the postwar phase of this prolonged dispute, Mekki Abbas, *The Sudan Question* (London, 1952), deserves a prominent place. This book, which according to its editor, Miss Margery Perham, is probably the first to be published in English by a Sudanese, is written from the standpoint of an Oxford-trained North Sudani who has held and still holds high office (he is one of three Sudanese members of the Gezira Board) under the present Sudan administration. Abbas' tone is moderate, yet his approach is that of a patriotic scholar deeply concerned with the political and economic future of the Sudanese people. On the major issues of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Sudan he plainly sides with the British, so that particularly on historical points no objective and informed reader is likely to agree with Miss Perham when she states in her preface that Abbas presents Egyptian claims "in their full strength and legal validity." Having surveyed the question of the Sudan since 1881, Mekki Abbas puts forward as a suggested settlement the full text of the British Government's proposals to Egypt on the Sudan as delivered by the British Ambassador in Cairo on October 13, 1952. His exploration of the Sudan problem is more original and far more illuminating when he describes the emergence of the Sudanese as a party in the dispute over their own territory, and when he deplores the internal political repercussions which that dispute still produces among communities and groups in his country. He is also a representative and able spokesman for the North Sudan when he expresses regret and resentment over the Administration's traditional "Southern Policy," i.e. the administrative separation and protection of the South from Northern and Islamic penetration. It is ironic but understandable that the arguments

he advances in favor of a fuller integration of North and South run remarkably close to the Egyptian arguments for the unity of Egypt and the Sudan, which he has previously largely dismissed, and seem to cover if anything a less convincing order of social, ethnic, historical linguistic, and geographic "facts."

The first postwar phase of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute — the Bevin-Sidqi negotiations and Nuqrashi Pasha's appeal to the Security Council in August 1947 — attracted much world attention and raised hopes of a lasting and popular settlement on several occasions, particularly in the days of the Bevin-Sidqi formula for rapid evacuation of Suez and an agreed common policy and framework for the Sudan. In this phase the Egyptian position, particularly in its legal and historical aspects, was crystallized and formulated more systematically than ever before by a Committee of Experts under the presidency of the Council of Ministers. Their reasoned and documented findings were published in *Status of the Sudan* (Cairo, 1947), *The Unity of Egypt and the Sudan: The Legal Aspects of the Case* (Cairo, 1947), and *Egypte-Soudan: Recueil des Documents* (Cairo, 1947). Similar pamphlets and short books prepared by individual Egyptian scholars include Abdel-Moncim Omar, *The Sudan Question Based on British Documents* (Cairo, 1947), and M. Sabry, *Le Soudan Egyptien (1821-1898)* (Cairo, 1947).

The British Government's position on the Sudan, which tends to rest primarily on the existence of a controlling British element in the Sudan administration and on unilateral declarations and undertakings by Ministers in London and Governors-General in Khartum, has purposely not been reduced to anything resembling the symmetry and logic of a legal brief. However, one can conveniently pick up a good impression of its main outlines from the British Information Services pamphlet, *The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (I.D. 730, revised June 1951), and a previous edition of the same title, revised as of March 1949, as well as from the speeches delivered by Sir Alexander Cadogan before the Security Council on this question in August 1947.

Both Egypt and the U.K. have published official papers on the round of fruitless dis-

cussions undertaken by the Wafdist Government soon after it came into power in 1950, much of which revolved about the Sudan. The British Government's *Anglo-Egyptian Conversations on the Defence of the Suez Canal and on the Sudan, December 1950-November 1951* (Cmd. 8419, London, 1951) is briefer, less inclusive, more discreet, and much less interesting than the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' *Records of Conversations, Notes and Papers Exchanged between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom Government (March 1950-November 1951)* (Cairo, 1951). By using each as complementary to the other, a remarkably full picture of the two national positions is available. Much of the record consists of stubborn, skilful, wide-ranging, occasionally heated arguments, and it throws more light than has ever before appeared on such important but elusive factors as the respective relationships of the British and Egyptian Governments to the Sudan Government, the attitude of both toward the degree of connection between the Sudan and the Suez issues, and the differing psychological approach of Egyptian and British statesmen and negotiators to the Sudan question.

Political, social, economic, and cultural conditions in the Sudan are known in the West almost entirely through the devoted but unavoidably often biased efforts of British officials and students. In the postwar period additional fruits of scholarship have ripened and been picked from the exotic but vigorous tree of British leadership and learning in Sudanese Africa.

Two recent historical works are pertinent to the political problems of 1952. In *The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899* (London, 1951), A. B. Theobald of Gordon College in Khartum goes far toward filling the need for a volume devoted exclusively to a period in modern Sudanese history which has assumed new significance with the postwar development of Sudanese public opinion and British policy. In the search for roots of a distinctively Sudanese nationalism, the age of Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi, and his successor, the Khalifah Abd Allahi, is being viewed by many North Su-



danese as an heroic and colorful time when the Sudan found its own way toward unity and organization guided only by its own indigenous leaders. Unfortunately Theobald dwells too much on military history, stressing particularly the already profusely described British-led campaigns for the relief (1884) and reconquest (1896-98) of Khartum. He devotes only three of his thirteen chapters to the internal developments in the Sudan from 1884-98, the real heart of the Mahdist era. Even then most of his material is a recapitulation of the much more fresh and exciting narratives of such men as Ohrwalder, Slatin, Neufeld, and Wingate. Theobald is too preoccupied with the British role in the whole period and does scant justice to the initiative displayed by Sudanese and Egyptians. Nevertheless, he has produced a handy little history, which is much easier to use, though less rewarding, than the older, more leisurely, and more detailed volumes of the great contemporary men of action.

A more substantial book, one which is bound to become an indispensable tool for future students, is R. L. Hill, *A Biographical Dictionary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (Oxford, 1951). Great labor, learning, and love have gone into this vast accumulation of tiny facts, a patiently accumulated storehouse on which every future historian of the Sudan can draw. The 1,900 personalities whose careers and contributions to the Sudan entitle them to notices by Hill include many solid military careerists, as well as many adventurers, brilliant minds, and heroic imperialists, patriots, and missionaries. Both outsiders and Sudanese display a high incidence of energy, restlessness, endurance, bizarre loyalties, and violent deaths. Yet many lived long and produced numerous progeny. A surprising number of key personalities survived, with a variety of cunning adaptations, the violent storms of the Mahdiyya, a period whose disorders and disease probably reduced the general population from about 5 million to 2 million. It is a pity that space prevented citations of sources, and doubtless students of many nationalities other than British will feel occasionally that their nations have been slighted.

The economy of the Sudan is almost entirely

agricultural and seems likely to continue so for many decades. It is therefore extremely fortunate for our understanding of the economic character of the country that J. D. Tothill, then Director of the Sudan Department of Agriculture and Forests, was encouraged in 1941 by the Sudan Government to organize a thorough handbook on the practice of agriculture in the Sudan. The resulting volume, *Agriculture in the Sudan* (London, 1948), is a treasure house of agricultural information on every part of the Sudan, beautifully illustrated with over 40 pictures and many good maps. In addition to agriculture proper, as the layman generally conceives that subject, there are chapters on climate, transportation, nutrition, and land tenure. The book's easy style keeps the nontechnical reader's interest awake, while its rich substance will delight the specialist in either agriculture or Sudan affairs. Problems of agricultural policy are developed in full and the social implications of agricultural progress and reform are carefully weighed.

For a brief single source on Sudanese trade and commercial conditions, the British Board of Trade, *Sudan Review of Commercial Conditions* (London, 1950), is adequate. A similarly compact printed report for business guidance is the U.S. Office of International Trade, *Anglo-Egyptian Sudan: Summary of Current Economic Information* (Washington, 1949).

To gain some idea of the nature of thinking and feeling among the ordinary people of a country such as the Sudan is an endeavor more difficult than the study of its history, economy, and central political institutions. The ideal exponent of such matters might be an authentic man of the country, trained in sociology and anthropology, but endowed with a journalistic flair for apt and vivid language. None such is likely to appear in the Sudan for some time. The task of social description has, however, been done in the postwar period ably and sympathetically by a number of British residents of the Sudan. J. S. Trimingham, *Islam in the Sudan* (London, 1949), explores the religious aspect of the life of individuals and communities in the North Sudan. Trimingham is the Anglican Church Missionary Society secretary in Khartum and naturally has a missionary's interest in the country. But this



does not intrude into his cool, scientific, subtly shaded picture of Sudanese Islam. He has selected his material only in the interests of clarity, economy, and organization and is not out to "prove" anything except some qualified generalizations and hypotheses which are as sound as social science methods will yield. The core of his work, a description of popular Islamic practices and the religious orders of the Sudan, should be read and pondered by anyone who is interested in the real nature, strength, and problems of Sudanese society.

The same author's views on the most constructive lines of Christian missionary activity in the North Sudan are set out in *The Christian Approach to Islam in the Sudan* (London, 1948), an acute strategic estimate preceded in the same booklet by a quick history and survey of the Catholic, United Presbyterian, and Anglican Church Missionary Society work in the whole country in modern times. Trimmingham's practical contributions to Western understanding and effective work in the Sudan also include the extensive 1946 revision of his first-rate *Sudan Colloquial Arabic* (London, 1946), laid out along the proven pattern developed by Gairdner for the study of Egyptian colloquial Arabic.

The Sudan Government has a wise policy of encouraging anthropological studies of the major communities of the country. Two excellent works which have resulted since the war are S. F. Nadel, *The Nuba: An Anthropological Study of the Hill Tribes in Kordofan* (London, 1947), and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Kinship and Marriage among the Nuer*, (London, 1951). The latter, based on studies made in the Upper Nile from 1930-1936, is a rather technical, thorough treatment of the many complex customs (nearly always involving a payment of cattle) which govern the family life of a quarter-million-strong community of tall negroes in the South Sudan. The mood of good sense and the happy stability with which these Nilotes approach the universal problems of sex and the family will bring a sigh to any reader of Dr. Kinsey's famous report.

In 1948 the Sudan Government invited A. H. Marshall, the City Treasurer of Coventry, to present recommendations on local

government in the Sudan. The resulting *Report on Local Government in the Sudan* (Khartum, 1949) is an expert and concise description of the transitional situation he found and his very extensive recommendations for new directions of reform. It is interesting to note that in making his practical points Dr. Marshall refers dozens of times to the experience and institutions of Britain, and once or twice to the U.S. and Germany, but he does not refer to Egypt at all. In fact, his only reference to any part of the Middle East outside the Sudan is an incidental mention that while District Commissioners could profitably spend a month studying an English local authority, one district commissioner had suggested to him that "these visits might well be supplemented by visits to nearer countries such as Syria or Iraq." The substance of his recommendations was the gradual replacement of the District Commissioners, for fifty years a vital instrument in the application of Central Government policy to the tribes and localities of the Sudan, by locally elected Councils and Executives. Marshall's report and the Sudan Government's responsive *Comments on Dr. Marshall's Report on Local Government* (Khartum, 1949) are key documents in the administrative history of the Sudan.

Travelers and officials in the Sudan have often been inspired by the country's romantic roughness and its fascinating combination of Arab and African, of northern desert and southern swamps. Since the war several of them have contributed personal records and memoirs. One of the most professionally literary of these is M. Langley, *No Woman's Country: Travels in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* (London, 1950). His sprightly, evocative prose makes places like drowsy, ancient Suakin, the Governor's Palace at Khartum (where dinner was sometimes announced down the cool hallways by the rolling thud of an old Dervish war drum), and the monotonous, prosperous, plain of the Gezira live before one's eyes. C. E. G. Beveridge, *Allah Laughed* (Melbourne, 1950), contains the anecdotes and observations collected by an Australian medical officer in 25 years of Sudan Government service covering most of the provinces of the Sudan, North and South. It is not

a profound book and completely lacks polish, but the fascinating experiences which a doctor inevitably encounters in a land as strange as the Sudan and the real affection which Beveridge displays for his friends and patients there add much relish to his tale.

Although a number of the Governor-Generals of the Sudan have been men of scholarly and literary inclination (notably Wingate and MacMichael), only one (Sir Stewart Symes) has written an autobiography. Unfortunately his *Tour of Duty* (London, 1946) tells very little about either his years (1906-1916) in the Sudan political services or his Governorship (1934-1940). He has given us, in his terms, a "patchwork of reminiscence and opinions" which might be of interest to Empire public servants. The book's slim contribution to our knowledge of the history of the Sudan amounts to little more than a few anecdotes and some very sketchy impressions of such noted figures as Wingate, Slatin, and Kitchener. In Sudan affairs the Governor-General occupies the role of a benign and busy master of practically all the major business of the territory. Successive personalities in this office have exercised a profound personal influence, so that it is a great pity that Sir Stewart is completely reticent about the methods, theories, feelings, and strategy involved, and devotes only 21 pages to his six years in this absorbing and historically significant position.

One turns from the steadily expanding shelf of postwar books on the Sudan with a feeling that competent British writers are bringing the territory in which Britain has assumed major administrative responsibility for a half century more ably and fully into the light of Western knowledge than their self-confident predecessors of 25 years ago would have thought necessary. The production of Western books on a Middle Eastern area is necessarily responsive to practical and even commercial considerations, and in terms of economic and strategic interest it is natural that Britain should have taken a role of preponderance in Sudan studies. Nevertheless, there is a great need, if the problems of the Sudan are to be faithfully presented to the world, for more books written from the viewpoints of other nations, and there would doubtless be a peculiar interest attending any thorough study which might be prepared under U.N. auspices. The Sudan seems destined to be brought eventually into the politics of the Arab world, and it is time that it ceased to be overlooked or scanted by authors devoting themselves to the interpretation of Arab affairs. The Sudan in the coming generation deserves to be viewed from many angles, including not least the distinctive ones of its own responsible leaders. Up to the present the massive, mellow, frame of mature, enlightened British Imperialism is the only one within which the portrait of the young Sudan has been adequately presented.

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## GENERAL

*Caravan: The Story of the Middle East*, by Carleton S. Coon. New York: Henry Holt, 1951. viii+376 pages, map, photographs. \$5.00.

*Reviewed by W. F. Albright*

This is a remarkable book. Carleton Coon is a distinguished anthropologist who at 48 has specialized in all important branches of his field except linguistics, and who is easily the foremost living authority on the general ethnology of the Muslim world. Through continuous exploration and research in Morocco, Arabia, and Iran, with a personal knowledge of life in virtually all remaining Muslim countries, he has gained an astonishingly broad perspective. Contrary to the practice of an earlier vintage of American anthropologists, he does not attempt to get along without knowing the languages of the Old World but has made himself a very respectable practical linguist. Even more unusual among American anthropologists, he is equally interested in the historical and the contemporary aspects of society, recognizing the necessity of a four-dimensional view of man.

The present book is a mature production, showing that the author has broadened and deepened his approach enormously since his studies of a decade ago. He has checked his text with such eminent specialists as E. E. Calverley, H. A. R. Gibb, George Cameron, George F. Hourani, Samuel N. Kramer, and many others.

The reviewer has no quarrel with the author's general approach and attitude toward the Muslim peoples. Quite the contrary. Coon shows very great sympathy for them and respect for their past achievements and their future potential. He refrains from arbitrary attacks on individual groups and criticism of religious or political tenets. He shows equal interest in the picturesque life of today, vividly portrayed on page after page, and in fundamental problems of the meaning and function of institutions.

Of course, the book also has weaknesses, most of which, however, are quite superficial and can easily be corrected in the next edition. The author covers an enormous field in time

and space: it must be remembered that he has also written on entirely different subjects and has carried on research in quite different fields. Even the care of his many scholarly critics has not eliminated all slips and typographical errors. For instance, the spelling *badāwi* for a single "Bedouin" recurs scores of times instead of the correct *bādāwī*.

There are naturally many points on which opinions may differ. Some of the author's observations on the history of sea traffic and related subjects (pp. 49 ff.) are decidedly questionable. Even with the footnote on page 51, the revival of Herodotus' notion that the Phoenicians were immigrants from the Erythraean Sea (which includes the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as well as the Persian Gulf) is scarcely acceptable. There is now ample archeological and epigraphic evidence that the Phoenicians were simply late Canaanites, and they are known to have called themselves "Canaanites" down to about the Christian era in Phoenicia and several centuries later in North Africa. Incidentally, Coon is quite right in accepting the equation of cuneiform "Dilmun" with modern Bahrain; E. F. Weidner has just provided a clinching argument from the inscriptions of Esarhaddon. "Malukhkha" (read "Melukhkha") was not a port but a country, like Magan; since it was applied as early as the 14th century B.C. to Nubia, it must have lain beyond the Persian Gulf. There is, incidentally, no evidence for the supposed transshipment of goods in Sumerian times, discussed on page 50. Goods came to Babylonia from remote regions, but the Gudea inscriptions imply roundtrip voyages of as much as three years (i.e., parts of three years).

There are many more interesting matters which one might discuss, but we have exhausted our space. We congratulate the author again.

♦ W. F. ALBRIGHT, Professor of Semitic Languages at Johns Hopkins, has spent almost twenty years as an orientalist in Arab countries.

*Men against the Desert*, by Ritchie Calder. London: Allen and Unwin, 1951. 168 pages, illustrated. 12s. 6d.

*Reviewed by W. Armstrong Price*

The reclamation of desert margin regions and the expansion of oases is both desirable

and important. Insofar as this can be achieved, it would be possible to convert nomads living on a bare subsistence level to agriculture, to redistribute some overcrowded populations, and export foodstuffs to others. UNESCO's survey of desert research at a string of laboratories and other centers from Algiers to Cairo, Jerusalem, and Tehran is interestingly but non-quantitatively told by Ritchie Calder in this fascinating book, whose purpose is to publicize the existing projects and thus attract more people to work on these problems.

It seems that there can be no master plan. Each country and area presents its own problems — physical, biological, and especially human — since tribal and nationalistic customs and taboos stand in the way of changes in land use and occupations at every turn, although cooperation is achieved in some communities and signs of it appear in others. As UNESCO's plan includes long-term financing where needed, it also has had to counter charges of imperialism leveled against it — charges based upon unfounded but very real fears of the natives.

From Calder's account we understand that many remedial measures can be accomplished. However, because of lack of cheap power — like that of the slave labor used by the ancients — great, but deep-lying resources of sweet groundwater have been utilized, so far, in only a few favored areas. Without means to raise the groundwater of fully arid areas from its normally deep position, the margins of deserts may be nibbled at, but not substantially pushed back. How broad and deep the individual nibbles may be awaits a more quantitative accounting.

In his zeal to sell the UNESCO schemes, Calder manages to de-emphasize the widely accepted theory of historic migrations of climatic belts, alternately energizing and depressing peoples and playing a definitive part in the rise and fall of civilizations in the present desert regions of the Middle East and Mediterranean. Man has so abused the soil and the forests that he has confused the record of the underlying climatic events. Full realization of the trend of the present climatic fluctuation, evidenced in the pronounced warming of

the arctic, and its broad historic implications must be taken into account in UNESCO's long-range planning. Occasional intensification of desert conditions with the coming of one-to-three-decade droughts could make necessary the return of paternalistic aid after nomad communities had become settled on stabilized sand dunes.

Many clever and interesting methods and devices for reclamation are being used or developed and doubtless much will be accomplished here and there, but the great reclamation project — as Calder realizes — seems to await the development of an efficient solar engine, the use of atomic fuel, or the discovery of some as yet unsuspected source of cheap power.

♦ W. ARMSTRONG PRICE is Professor of Geological Oceanography at the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas.

*Beyond Euphrates: Autobiography 1928-33*, by Freya Stark. London: John Murray, 1951. 341 pages. 25s.

*Reviewed by Elizabeth Monroe*

One's father's atlas, which ought to be kept as a milestone, contains maps with blanks marked "undiscovered territory." In the 19th century it was therefore possible for younger sons to set off armed with money and either a concession in draft or a Bible to seek their fortune in this world or the next. They were explorers and exploring was a profession. But by 1928 the blanks, except in uninviting polar regions, were eaten into by roads and railways and would soon be plied by airlines. For a woman who was not only in her thirties, but diminutive, delicate, and impecunious, to embark on an explorer's career was difficult and odd. Yet Miss Freya Stark set about the job. She possessed none of the smart connections that had paved the way for Gertrude Bell. Not the least of her troubles was "people the very extreme of niceness but all finding it very peculiar that I am here at all . . . this is what I find so tiring." Today, when she is well known and deservedly sought after, it is difficult to think back to the problems of her start. This book helps to do so.

The author describes journeys first to Canada, where in the grip of winter she suffered



a "crisis of frustration," and then to her chosen field in the Middle East — Damascus ("It is not all joy living with a native family"), Baghdad, Mosul, Hamadan, Luristan, the Elburz, Jordan, the Jebel Druze, and Petra. Parts of the Persian journeys, during which she surveyed unknown ground on behalf of the Royal Geographical Society, are already familiar to her friends from her earlier travel book, *The Valley of the Assassins*.

This present book has charm as well as excellence. Part of this is due to her capacity for conveying beauty or truth in simple words. Only quotation can do justice to her art: "slow clear rivers under bridges bent like bows" (Persia); "turbaned heads askew among the irises" (a cemetery in Turkey); "the clouds have space enough to throw lovely patterns" (Jordan). Part, also, lies in her feeling for people, whether for Iraqis who "don't care so frightfully much for being well governed," or for "unexpected people" perpetrating sudden remarks "and the little involuntary gestures that move, as a leaf moves, and reveals what is so much greater than themselves." Part of the attraction lies, undoubtedly, in her scale of values. She can dismiss material cares when need be. Who, for instance, could enjoy Petra after the theft of all his or her money (in her case £3.10s), or would contemplate "making north east from Kasvin with only about £2 to start with?" Yet she is not one of those tiresome people with a soul above everything worldly. A new Paris evening dress gives her "a feeling of happiness, small but compact"; so does an orange bow for her hat. Part, lastly, lies in her humility which matches her capacity to measure the greatness of mankind. "I think I am on the track of quite good work, only all far in the future." Crowning these qualities is the virtue of a person who writes for pleasure, not business: "I think of the public as a friend who may like me for myself alone, and not as a Cerberus to whom cakes must be given to soothe it from biting. If I had to work for my living altogether I would be not a writer but a cook — and would write for my own pleasure after the dinner was served."

The arrangement of the book is singular and good. Events are chronologically told, but

each chapter starts with a passage which, written in Libya in 1950, is the observation of maturity, and ends with a collection of the eager letters of twenty-five years ago. In the old days, it was fashionable to endow biographies with the pleasant subtitle of "Life and Letters." Here is the 20th century model. It comes from the civilized pen of a great artist who is never bound by convention but who is yet at the same time a child of European civilization.

♦ ELIZABETH MONROE, Middle East staff correspondent for the London *Economist*, is the author of *The Mediterranean in Politics*.

*Blood, Oil and Sand*, by Ray Brock. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952. 256 pages. \$3.50.

*Reviewed by Charles Issawi*

Upon the patient American public has been inflicted yet another book on the Middle East written by a journalist in a hurry. According to Mr. Brock, the Middle East, defined as the area between Gibraltar and Pakistan, is the arena of a conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers which will almost inevitably lead to a third world war. The oil resources of the Middle East make it of vital importance to the West, but whereas the Soviets are pursuing a skillful and aggressive policy in the region, Western thought is confused and its defenses are weak.

This picture, which is accurate enough in its broad outlines, has been embellished by a good deal of misinformation and prejudice. As to misinformation, a few of the more amusing examples will suffice. The Iranian leader Kashani becomes "Kashanix." Is it because he is enigmatic like the Sphinx or because, like the phoenix, he has a disconcerting habit of rising from his ashes? King Abdallah's murder is attributed to the "Jehad Mukabess" — literally "pickled struggle." The ruler of Kuwait, correctly identified on page 185, is on page 25 called "Mosullah Bey." One cannot help conjecturing that Mr. Brock was the victim of an Arab who, wishing to ward off the evil eye from the riches of Kuwait, uttered the customary *mashallah*, to which the author added the courtesy title of Bey. On page 83, the linguistic talents of the Mufti ("a snob-



bish intellectual") are greatly exaggerated, while on the three following pages he is credited with all the troubles that have taken place in the Middle East in the last fifteen years, including the rousing of the Iranian tribes in 1941, the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the abortive coup d'état in Pakistan, the border incidents between that country and Afghanistan, and the assassination of Razmara, not to mention the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As for the sympathy and understanding with which Mr. Brock describes the Middle Eastern peoples and the Western statesmen: the Egyptian national movement consists of "howling, hashished street mobs." The "Arab has a childlike mind"; for him "the word is the deed. The statement of a desired condition makes it fact" (page 90). Arabs are "unready and unfit for statehood." Mr. Brock seems genuinely surprised that the question of "Palestine and the Arab refugees looms horrifying large to these deeply emotional and fanatical peoples" and is completely amazed at "the utter and obviously genuine indifference on the part of the Egyptians, and most Arabs, toward the democratic West and the Communist East" (page 92). The idea that books like his will not render the West more attractive does not seem to occur to him.

The Iranians fare no better than the Arabs. Israel receives much praise but is then suddenly described as "a weird artificial microcosm existing on the intoxicating flames of racism and newborn nationalism which would be snuffed out in a twinkling without financial oxygen from the United States" (page 128), and is declared to be the ripest soil for Communism in the region. Turkey alone receives unqualified eulogy. If the rest of the region was overrun, it "could possibly stand as a lonely craggy promontory," a notion which all competent military men would dismiss as absurd. This reviewer knows little about the Balkans, which Mr. Brock also covers, but enough to point out that the statement that "Greece cannot make up its collective mind" is an unwarranted sneer at a heroic and tragic people, and that Mr. Brock's account of Mihailovitch's activities does not tally with those of Churchill and Fitzroy Maclean.

Western statesmen are also pulled to pieces. The Sahib mentality of the British is repeatedly ridiculed. As for the Americans, they are the victims of an organized conspiracy of "otherwise respected and able financiers, scholars-cum-advisers in government, insular up-from-the-ranks politicians, Communist or pro-Communist fellow travellers" who are selling out the Middle East.

The style of the book may be gathered from its title. Altogether, this is *not* a book to be recommended to those who wish to understand the grave problems confronting Western statesmanship in the tormented Middle East. Nor is it likely to promote that better understanding between the United States and the Middle East which is so necessary today.

◆ CHARLES ISSAWI is a Middle Eastern specialist with the United Nations Secretariat.

## AFGHANISTAN

*Afghanistan: Grocevia dell'Asia*, by E. Caspani and E. Cagnacci. Milan: Antonio Vallardi, 1951. xv+275 pages. 2000 lira.

*Reviewed by George Weller*

Fifteen years of thinking about Afghanistan and rugged roaming across its highlands have been poured into this able, intelligent work by two Italians. For knowledge of mountain-locked Afghanistan, with its bold, Texan independence that overrides parliamentary cliques and import rackets, it seems that we no longer need to rely on deskbound diplomats and hasty journalists.

Westerners think of Afghanistan politically and are prone to forget its autocratic physical frame. The Oxus, the Hindu Kush, the Khyber Pass, and the forbidding wall of Baluchistan cutting off the sea — all these outrageous impediments keep Afghanistan at worst a horseback-country, at best a jeep-power, hard to subvert by east or west with armies or dollars, proud and a little parochial. Here a diplomatic courier and an Italian legation chaplain — the only non-Muslim foreign clergyman permitted in Afghanistan — have broken out of the little red plush fortress of Kabul and gone north to the Oxus at the rim of Turkestan, west to the Iranian border and

the corridor of possible Soviet invasion, and south to the rivers now being harnessed by American aid and engineers.

They have brought back knapsacks of information and laid it out in a way less subjective, better organized, and friendlier than most British and American travelers. Their chronologies of the Sophoclean feuds between the Afghan dynasties are as full as need be, though some gore has been wiped away. And they know, as few do even in Kabul, that in the steppe country shepherds crop the ears of their flocks so that wolves cannot pull them down.

The tender questions — the relations with Russia, the role of the Muslim pietists in holding back the Muslim progressives — are treated with remarkable restraint for two authors who are Catholic, anti-Communist, and Western. The self-respecting neutrality of Afghanistan's attitude toward the Kremlin, neither sycophantic like Kashmir nor defiant like Turkey, comes across decently and clearly, with no effort to create a Russian ogre where none, to the Afghan, yet exists. The strength of the mullahs in a country where battered buses still stop five times daily for prayer is treated as a natural, respectable phenomenon. The authors are firm at times too: "The Afghan press does not reflect the thought of the people, not yet mature enough for that, but it is an instrument used by the Government for the cultural advancement of its subjects."

The interval since firsthand observation ended in 1947 leaves missing the pages that now would need to be devoted to the Pakhtunistan issue. Afghanistan, encouraged by India, wants to see an "independent" Chile of Pathans created on the western shore of the Indus. Pakistan has reacted in lively style, once or twice with punitive air strikes, against this pretension to its valuable western watershed, its rising dams and power plants, and its thin waistline between Lahore and Peshawar.

The enigmatic role of the pro-Afghan Fakir of Ipi, an unsuccessful Bolivar locked in his bomb-bitten private enclave on the Pakistan-Afghan border, likewise is missing; so also are the business controls and the struggle between young and old Afghan generations over the

commercial monopolies. Yet these shortcomings are nearly all excused by the factor of time. The abundant photographs, pleasantly casual but shrewdly chosen, enrich this lively, scholarly treatment of Asia's would-be Switzerland.

♦ GEORGE WELLER, a foreign correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*, has frequently reported from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

## ARAB WORLD

*Independent Iraq*, by Majid Khadduri. London: Oxford University Press, 1951. ix + 291 pages. Index, map. 21s.

*Reviewed by E. A. Speiser*

As the first Arab state to be admitted to the League of Nations, Iraq has enjoyed also an early start in studies of its political development. Philip W. Ireland's *'Iraq* (New York, 1938) traced the country's political career from its modern beginnings in World War I until the termination of the British mandate in 1932, with a brief reference to the Bakr (Ireland miswrites this as Baqir) Sidqi *coup d'état* in 1936. Professor Khadduri begins his account with the formal termination of foreign tutelage in 1932 and brings the story down to 1950. The two books together present a combined political picture which is superior to anything yet available for other Arab states. As between the two, Khadduri's contribution goes well beyond Ireland's not only in time but also in quality.

This is not intended to disparage Ireland's competent work, which did full justice to the political surface. Yet a political analysis that operates almost exclusively on the surface level will often fail to reach down to the forces which ultimately determine political events. Happily, Khadduri cannot be charged with such an omission. He is well aware of the fact that the political health of a country depends first and foremost on the wholesomeness of its society. A country that is weak internally is that much more vulnerable externally. Consequently Khadduri pays much attention to social conditions in the Arab world in general and in Iraq in particular, with the result that his exposition gains appreciably in

depth and cogency. His training in juridical and administrative fundamentals, his scrupulous objectivity, and his thorough knowledge of the sources as well as of the principal actors — frequently checked through personal interviews — further enhance the value of the study before us.

The Bakr Sidqi *coup* may be viewed in more ways than one as the political touchstone of independent Iraq. Khadduri has made its importance abundantly clear and has analyzed it exhaustively. In his effort to be fair he has perhaps painted the responsible General in a more favorable light than his record would seem to warrant. Bakr Sidqi's handling of the Assyrian affair, with the whole Iraqi army behind him and a handful of villagers against him, is scarcely proof of great courage, and his ruthless murder of Ja'far al-Askari strikes one, on the contrary, as evidence of essential cowardice. But the personalities in the case are not really important. What is significant is the real cause of the military uprising in which the General functioned as the trigger man. Repeated government assurances that social reforms would be instituted had failed to materialize. It had become all too clear that the group in power was bent only on safeguarding its own interests. With each passing year the social and economic imbalance had grown progressively worse. The stock scapegoat of foreign interference could not possibly be dragged out at the moment. The liberal elements in the country were fed up with promises and slogans. They wanted action, but the only group strong enough to act and sufficiently free from political corruption was the Army. Accordingly it was the Army that was called upon to upset the existing order. It could be persuaded to do so with relative ease because the root of the trouble was apparent enough to everybody except the politicians.

This particular *coup*, the forerunner of many others, made two things very plain. One is that the mere seizure of power is not enough. Before long the real reasons for the revolution were forgotten in the scramble for power among the former rebels. The group which appreciated the need for far-reaching reforms was itself too weak and disorganized

to carry them out when it had the mandate and the opportunity to do so. The process cannot be accomplished, it would appear, from the top, requiring the sort of cultivation at the roots which takes a long time to bear fruit. It is a problem which Iraq shares with all its sister states.

The other fact which the Bakr Sidqi *coup* brought out in bold relief is particularly relevant to the present times. Since the forces which the rebels sought to unseat were of the more or less extreme right, their opponents were recruited in the main from the left. Prominent among them were some outright Communists. It so happened that their success was short-lived. But the danger of the situation which made even a brief success possible should not be lost on the diplomats and planners in the Middle East and in the West. It certainly is not lost on the author, for he concludes his book with these words: "If the national Government cannot acquire enough strength through conceding certain of the popular demands and through seeking the co-operation of the liberal groups, its position will be greatly weakened by continual popular upheavals or by the intervention, or the threat of intervention, of another foreign Power. . . . If the Iraqi Government fails to introduce reforms or to achieve certain national objectives, popular discontent and unrest may be difficult to control."

♦ E. A. SPEISER, author of *The United States and the Near East*, is Professor of Semitics and Chairman of the Department of Oriental Studies of the University of Pennsylvania.

*Arabian Highlands*, by H. St. J. B. Philby. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (The Middle East Institute), 1952. 752 pages. \$8.50.

*Reviewed by R. B. Serjeant*

Philby has once more added a major work to the annals of Arabian exploration. *Arabian Highlands* is an enormous volume containing his hitherto unpublished travels and discoveries between the years 1932 and 1937. Into this series must be fitted the already classical *Sheba's Daughters* (London, 1939) covering his South Arabian journey of 1936. The territories which he now makes known to us

comprise the Nadjrān area, Wādī Ḥabaunā, the Tihāmah Highlands (i.e. Wādī Baish, Sabyā, and the Sa'ūdi-Yemenite frontier), and the Tihāmah Lowlands. His appendices include a list of the boundary pillars on the Sa'ūdi-Yemenite frontier, a list of villages in 'Asīr, and a series of distances on car tracks.

The purpose of the journeys was chiefly geographical and scientific, and his text in the main probably represents the observations made in his diaries day by day. As a result, when compared with popular travel books, there is often relatively little about local personalities and a minimum of contemporary incident, but a vast quantity of topographical data, which has the ring of ancient Arabian verse in that part of the *qaṣidah* where the poet speaks of his journeyings. There is a certain amount of history, a good deal about finds of inscriptions or graffiti, and much of natural history.

To the orientalist the description and plan of the Nadjrān valley is an outstanding addition to our knowledge of Arabia, and one can only hope that the tentative identification of the site of its Ka'bah (p. 222) may be confirmed by Philby's recent tour with Ryckmans in the region. The emigration of the Jewish community from Nadjrān to Palestine after, perhaps, two millennia may be regretted in that it ended all hope of studying these people in detail in their native land. A pleasant revelation of hitherto unknown Arabia is the description of Wādī Ḥabaunā to which I suppose the ancient lines of al-Samharī must refer:

Despair not of God's mercy-rain,  
but ask only

That the North Wind blow in the  
Wādī Ḥabaunā.

The investigation into the Elephant Road (Darb al-Fil) along which local tradition says Abrahah brought his elephant from Ṣan'a' to attack Mecca, shows that this story has long been popularly believed in that region; though this story still seems full of difficulties, tradition may not lightly be dismissed in Arabia. An even stranger local tradition reported by Philby (p. 342) concerns ruins in Wādī Ḥabaunā, said to belong to the period

of a certain Dakyanus, which immediately recalls to mind the Latin name Decianus. From whatever tongue, however, this foreign name be derived, it seems to me a very remote possibility that it should have come into popular mythology from the early Arabic literary sources such as, for example, Ibn Hishām's *Kitāb al-Tiǧān*. The survival of the name in popular memory for some sixteen centuries seems to me quite credible in Arabia for I have chanced on similar memories from the pre-Islamic period in the South. Local tradition seems to abound also in recollections of the Banī Hilāl, as in Hadramawt. The Nisiyin (cf. Philby, p. 245) in the latter territory claim to be the portion of the Banī Hilāl left behind at the time of the main migration, though I have not attempted to discover whether this latter tradition is consistent with the ancestry given them by Philby's informant. These genealogies cannot be neglected by the historian of Arabia, for at the very least they convey the notions of its inhabitants about their ancestry, and may very well contain important factual material.

The most significant contribution to more recent Arabian history is the information on the Makramis and Isma'ilis, about whom little has been known hitherto, reinforced by an appendix on the genealogy of the Makrami Dā'is of the Nadjrān. Previously what little was known was probably only to be gleaned from such sources as Ahmad Zainī Dahlān's *Khulāṣat al-Kalām*.

Philby's description of the 'Asīr region makes it clear that culturally, probably also linguistically, it belongs to the type of Arabian civilization considered characteristic of the south, just as geographically it is really Yemenite. Many things which impressed Philby on his journey from the north as novel would be common enough in, for instance, the West Aden Protectorate. In the Tihāmah Highlands he remarks on a final *u* in such a name as *Rudumu*, which may well be identical with a termination employed as in the Ṣubaiḥi tribal area where they say, for instance, *sairu*, a leather thong. Termite heaps such as he describes in Nadjrān (p. 448) can be seen on the 'Awdhali Plateau though Philby has never seen them in North Arabia.



Though he had heard of the hospitable custom of providing women for the guest (p. 241), said to have been current in the Nadj-rān area at one time, Philby found no evidence of this practice at the present time. Ibn al-Mudjāwir's *Tārīkh al-Mustabsir*, recently published by Oscar Löfgren (Leiden, 1951), gives accounts of such usages amongst certain Yemenite tribes with circumstantial detail which leaves no doubt as to the genuineness of his evidence. From Ibn Mudjāwir's statements it seems that the extent to which the guest might avail himself of such favors varied considerably from tribe to tribe.

This is obviously not a book for the general reader, to whom it may even prove tedious; but as a record and as the basis of a guidebook for future exploration and research it is invaluable.

© R. B. SERJEANT, author of *Prose and Poetry from Hadramawt*, was editor of the *Arabic Listener* and *al-Adab wa'l-fann* during World War II, and a Colonial Research Fellow in Hadramawt in 1947-48.

*Arabian Adventurer: The Story of Haji Williamson*, by W. E. Stanton-Hope. London: Robert Hale, 1951. 335 pages, 23 photographs. 16s.

*Reviewed by William Eddy*

Still living in retirement near Basrah, Haji Williamson is one of the line of British adventurers who have embraced Islam and Arab culture. He did not lead armies like Lawrence, enlarge our scientific knowledge like Philby, nor write immortal apologies for Islam and fascinating accounts of travel like Richard Burton. His story suffers from being told at second hand, making it sometimes difficult to distinguish opinions of Williamson, the Haji, from those of Hope, the narrator, just as readers may not know where Omar Khayyam stops and Fitzgerald begins.

In retrospect over the remote years, Williamson's memory fades and his chronology of events is obscure. Even the excellent photographs are by no means all contemporaneous with the descriptions of the same places in the text. On the other hand, the reader finds intense interest in the very personal experiences of a courageous Englishman turned Arab—

the interest one finds in the *Diary* of Samuel Pepys, where public affairs are dwarfed and forgotten in the fidelity and candor with which out-of-the-way places of the world, and of the soul, are laid open. *Arabian Adventurer* is exciting reading, and it is faithful to the features of the desert Arab whom Williamson loved enough to leave all else to follow.

Born in Bristol in 1872, William Richard Williamson ran away from home, jumped ship in California, worked as cowboy, gold-miner, sailor, whaler, and policeman in Aden, only to revolt against Western ways to become a Muslim and live for the rest of his life as an Arab nomad earning his living by dealing in horses, camels, pearls, raids, and tribal wars. Purely as an adventure story, the book excels all the "Yankee Pashas" which have flowed from the presses in recent years. He is polygamist, slave-owner, spy, and hardy traveller by camel for incredible distances over desert stretches which today intimidate a well-organized motorized patrol. The general reader of "escape" literature will not be disappointed.

For the student of the Middle East, the rewards are in the nooks and crannies of Arab life slighted by more scholarly travellers: the chapter on the jinn, including the wondrous talismans of the sorceress who, failing to persuade the sick Williamson to drink a deep draught of her sovereign specific, camel's urine, cured him with a dose of her potion acquired from an Indian fakir which bore the label "Fruit Salts — Enos;" the adulation he acquired by riding in full robes the first bicycle ever seen in Basra, at the sight of which bearded *shaytan* on wheels, daggers were drawn and exorcisms muttered in panic "unequalled since Elijah appeared in his chariot of fire"; the prestige he acquired by playing a phonograph with its circular records, from within which the trapped jinn, or little men, chanted their mischievous plots. Or, more seriously, the fascinating glimpses into the mysterious town of Hail and the life of the Rashids, of whom we hear little since they were subdued by Ibn Saud, and the account of the hinterland of Muscat, which the Sultan thought he ruled although the unruly natives



there did not share his opinion! Additional interest derives from the fact that Williamson's travels show us Arabia long before it was crisscrossed by travellers equipped with modern equipment to find their way and to record their observations, and before Saudi Arabia was unified and developed by its present great king.

Much in the book has been previously and better told, such as the pilgrimage to Mecca, banquets with sheep's eyes (to which a chapter is needlessly devoted), pearl fishing, and travel by dhow. Williamson supports with a wealth of convincing detail the thesis of Colonel Dickson that the Bedouin obey tribal customs older and more binding than the law of Islam. Family customs, and the belief that it is right to raid caravans of the Faithful en route to Mecca, are based on a more universal creed of the Bedouin that "from every man that hath shall be taken. . . ." In fact, this reader wonders whether Williamson himself donned more than the cloak of Islam. Despite his three devout pilgrimages (over a space of more than forty years), and his meticulous observance of Muslim devotions whenever he was with Arabs, there is other evidence that his conversion was partly a rebound from his strict Seventh Day Adventist relatives and from the stuffiness of certain colonial officials who tried to prevent his intimacy with the Arabs. His romantic adventures with the two lovely daughters of a devout desert shaykh, from which he emerged with impunity, surprise the reader who knows the stern Bedouin discipline of the harim.

Williamson played no decisive part in the world events of his time in spite of hints to the contrary by his biographer. Although it is claimed for him that, before oil was discovered there, an Arab in Somaliland "told him that there were indications of oil in the Bahrein Islands," he discovered no oil and he was never more than an interpreter for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company officials negotiating with the shaykhs of the Trucial Coast, Bahrein, or Kuwait. His lack of influence on the prospectors is attributed to the jealousy of Messrs. Holmes and Chisholm, who ignored his potentially valuable advice. Similarly, it is suggested that the British would

have done better to use him instead of Lawrence to rouse the Arabs against the Turks. All these intimations, however, remain in the field of conjecture. Williamson was, no doubt, an invaluable interpreter and mediator with Arabs met along the way; but apart from helping the British Overseas Airways to locate landing strips along the Trucial Coast, and serving usefully as one of many British agents during World War II, he was off the stage of history. He lives on in Iraq, as in these pages, a fearless, fascinating, freedom-loving Arab nomad in times when his breed, unfortunately, is being settled and tamed by Social Security, whose womb-to-tomb insurance encourages men to remain rooted to the same job in the same spot.

♦ WILLIAM EDDY, the son of American missionaries in Lebanon, has served in the Middle East as teacher, as first U.S. Minister to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and is now a consultant with the Tapline and Arabian American Oil Companies.

## INDIA AND PAKISTAN

*Economic Consequences of Divided India*, by C. N. Vakil. Bombay: Vora, 1950 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations). 555 pages. \$5.50.

*Reviewed by William M. Gilmartin*

The scope of this ambitious volume extends well beyond the economic consequences of the sudden division of the Indian subcontinent into the separate and independent nations of India and Pakistan in 1947. As the subtitle, "A Study of the Economy of India and Pakistan," suggests, one of the aims of the author and his associates is to offer a broad economic survey of both countries. The book includes chapters on the area and population of India and Pakistan, on their agriculture, minerals, electricity, industries, transport and communications, foreign trade, public finance and currency, banking, and insurance. It also covers the industrial policies of each country and discusses particular problems of industry and industrial development. Each of these subjects is considered with particular emphasis on the far-reaching consequences of partition, which are traced convincingly into almost

every cranny of the economic structures of the two countries.

Professor Vakil has performed an excellent and useful service in the collection and organization of a vast amount of economic information on India and Pakistan. If the discussion of India is much more comprehensive than that of Pakistan, this is understandable in view of the great differences in availability of data on the two countries. Somewhat less understandable is the space and attention devoted to different sectors of the economies and to different periods in the sequence of economic events. The very important field of agriculture is given comparatively brief treatment; so also, the critical question of India's ability to meet a larger share of its food requirements from domestic production is inadequately analyzed and left generally in the air. The author devotes what seems unwarranted attention to detailed accounts, essentially descriptive, of events in the year preceding the completion of the book. As a result, much of the material now seems quite dated in the light of more recent developments. Nevertheless, the book remains a most valuable source of economic information which elsewhere is available only in scattered sources.

The disturbances created by imposing political boundaries across an economic entity that "had evolved over a period of centuries" is the absorbing interest of Professor Vakil. This is the theme which moves through the entire book and if it is sometimes lost in the accumulation of detail, the author has conveniently summarized its major elements in a long introductory chapter.

It may be convenient to divide the "consequences" or dislocations attributed to partition into three categories. First are those arising from the sudden, arbitrary, and violent nature of the partition event itself, especially the vast problems and burdens thrown up by the tragic and unprecedented migrations between the two countries in the first months of independence. Second are the implications of the location of resources and economic installations on opposite sides of the new borders and of the inevitable intrusions of national interest into long-established com-

plementary relationships among these resources and installations. Third are the consequences of sovereign interference in established economic relationships which extend beyond the bounds of inevitability and justifiable national interest.

If the book has a special message it is to deplore bitterly this third category of consequences. "Politics based on communal hatred and suspicion is systematically undoing the work of generations by defying the facts of economic geography and the laws of economic science." One may certainly agree that there has been real justification for Professor Vakil's indignation. Yet it is not always easy to find a clear distinction in the book between legitimate and unwarranted political distortions of pre-partition economic patterns. It is recognized that these patterns are placed in quite a different light by the transformation of trade between the areas of India and Pakistan from an internal to an international transaction. It is accepted in the nature of things that Pakistan should establish industries to process its own raw materials, such as jute and cotton, and that India should make efforts to increase its own production of the raw materials for which it depends on Pakistan. Customs barriers for protective as well as revenue purposes are conceded to be legitimate techniques of national policy. Other similar trends toward a greater degree of economic independence of the two countries are granted as inevitable. Where, then, is the point beyond which these trends can no longer be considered justifiable? It seems not unfair to say that Professor Vakil's analysis falls short of designating such a point except in quite vague generalities.

Nevertheless, the serious concern of the author has certainly a very real basis which is well recognized by responsible circles in both countries. Serious political and economic frictions remain between India and Pakistan and Professor Vakil's plea that these not be permitted to submerge the mutual economic interests of the two countries deserves repetition.

♦ WILLIAM M. GILMARTIN is an economist in the Far Eastern Section of the Economic Department of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

*International Aspects of Indian Economic Development*, by D. T. Lakdawala. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. 181 pages. Rs. 8.

*Reviewed by William Fraser*

Dr. Lakdawala has written a very useful book. His clear and concise exposition of the problems of acquiring foreign capital should be of great interest to any businessman contemplating investment in India. Whether such a businessman would be encouraged by reading the book is doubtful, but he certainly would obtain a greater understanding, from the Indian point of view, of some of the problems involved. Since the book was published the first substantial direct foreign investment by Americans has been attracted to India in the form of oil refineries to be financed by U.S. oil companies. As this may improve the climate for private foreign investment in India, perhaps the efforts of the author in clarifying the issues of foreign capital to his countrymen have not been wasted.

The minimum amount of foreign loan capital, presumably including grants, required during the next two decades is estimated by the author at Rs. 18,000 million (the equivalent of \$3,780 million), and of direct foreign investment at Rs. 12,000 million (\$2,520 million). The requirement during the first 5-year period is placed at Rs. 4,000 million, the second 5-year period at Rs. 6,000 million, the third at Rs. 9,000 million, and the fourth at Rs. 11,000 million. However, even after the employment of these large amounts India would remain an underdeveloped country with one of the lowest amounts of foreign capital *per capita*.

So far as the first 5-year period is concerned, it is interesting to compare the author's estimates with those contained in the official Five-Year Plan of the Government of India, a draft outline of which was published in July 1951. The requirements of external assistance for the period of the plan are given as Rs. 6,720 million, or about 37% of the total cost of the plan. Most of the foreign assistance would be in the form of loan and grant capital; it is stated to amount to no more than 1% or 2% of the national income.

By striving to utilize the country's own internal resources to the maximum advantage, the Government believes that it should be possible with this amount of external aid to execute the Plan without undue strain. It would therefore appear that the official estimate of the amount of external aid required during the first 5-year period of development is much larger than the author's estimate.

In the chapter devoted to the availability of foreign capital reference is made to the various institutions for development. In describing one of these institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the author has said: "Its main aim has been to lend and guarantee for risky and long term projects of great importance for which private capital would not be forthcoming on reasonable terms." This statement is not completely true. The IBRD has not lent for risky projects *per se*. Generally the projects that have been financed by the Bank have been soundly conceived and chosen for the favorable impact they would have on the economy of the borrowing country. The element of risk so far as the Bank is concerned arises chiefly in the borrowing country's prospective ability to repay a foreign currency loan. Many of the Bank-financed projects, if located in a more stable economy, would undoubtedly attract private capital. Failure in choosing sound projects for financing would greatly affect the borrowing capacity of the Bank in the capital markets of the world. It is perhaps regrettable that the author has not described the purposes of the IBRD in greater detail, for it is one of the most promising sources of foreign loan capital available to undeveloped countries at the present time.

♦ WILLIAM FRASER is an Assistant Loan Officer at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

*Search After Sunrise*, by Vera Brittain. New York: Macmillan, 1952. 271 pages. \$3.00.

*Reviewed by Santha Rama Rau*

Vera Brittain's *Search After Sunrise*, the latest addition to an already impressive list of her books, is a combination of objective reporting on India and personal impressions of her travels there. Miss Brittain, with all her

enviable equipment as a writer and as an intelligent and useful member of society, has saved her readers a lot of time and headaches, for this detailed account of her stay in India provides all kinds of shortcuts to an understanding of the country, its people and personalities, as well as an admirable example of how to travel wisely.

The project that finally got Miss Brittain a visa to India (her previous attempts had failed because she advocated Indian freedom under a conservative government) was a Gandhi Memorial Conference held in December 1949. For this a variety of delegates ranging from a Negro college president through clergymen to a Finnish ex-minister of defense arrived from all over the world and represented interests and temperaments as different as their nationalities. Most of them had never been in India before but all were united by an ardent belief in Gandhi and the effectiveness of his methods of nonviolent resistance. Their specific purpose in attending this conference in India was to meet Gandhi's fellow workers and to study his famous Constructive Program. They could not, of course, meet Gandhi himself as his assassination preceded the final organization of the Conference.

Coming in the name of the Mahatma, the delegates were the honored guests of India. Everywhere adherents of Gandhi greeted them with open arms and often open houses. The President of the Indian Republic opened the Conference. Nehru entertained the delegates. The first half of *Search After Sunrise* is the story, told in great sincerity, simplicity, and sometimes alarming frankness, of this Conference.

Throughout this section of the book Miss Brittain never loses sight of her fundamental conviction that Gandhi's methods are the only valid solution to the tangle of present-day world affairs. Her description of the Conference and its inspiration appears early in the book. "The strange gathering nevertheless reflected the vast diversity of mankind, and illustrated its power to find unity in a simple, compelling idea. Outside India, which alone gave publicity to the meeting in national newspapers, its members were either ignored

or regarded as fanatics. Persons who come to uncomfortable conclusions through thinking are usually looked upon as idiots by non-thinkers. Eminent statesmen dismissed Mahatma Gandhi as a half-crazy fakir until, to the astonishment of 'realists' everywhere, his methods succeeded. Those who follow him will doubtless be similarly discredited until their policy is found to work; the rest of the world will then maintain that it agreed with them all along."

All the same, she is very much aware of the confusions and well-intentioned but often ineffectual searchings of the delegates and of their discussions. "What would Gandhi have done?" as a magic formula for the solution of problems is not, she clearly indicates, one that most of us can use. The formula is a more complicated and much more frightening one because it places the responsibility for a decision squarely on the individual. In fact the speaker at the Conference who most affected Miss Brittain was Acharya Kripalani, who briskly told the delegates, "Gandhi was a genius. It is dangerous to copy a genius, or try to think what he would have done in particular situations. He was always changing his methods. Sometimes he was impatient and sometimes very patient; he could go underground for years. Genius is self-regulating and often breaks its own laws. You cannot imitate him; you must learn to deal with your situations in your own way."

Because the first session of the Conference was held at Shantiniketan, the school near Calcutta founded by Tagore, Miss Brittain has occasion to deal at length with two of India's most revered names: Tagore as well as Gandhi. As she threshes out the ideological differences and agreements or the clashes of personality and the deep affection between them, remarkably clear and unsentimental portraits of the two men appear. The aristocratic poet with his vanities and uncertainties, who wanted a creed that would "sing" to him — nonviolence "shouted to him, it did not sing" — is as convincing a figure as the ascetic "embodiment of the Indian peasant" who said bluntly on one occasion, "The hungry millions ask for one poem, invigorating food." Gradually one of the most important mes-



sages of the book emerges — that the tough, humorous, little man, the spiritual leader and the implacable realist, was quite a long way from the idealistic vision of most of the delegates and even many of his followers.

This Conference with its many doubts and unresolved questions is only a springboard for the major part of *Search After Sunrise*, which concerns Miss Brittain's extensive travels in India in an attempt to find a living memorial to that more convincing Gandhi whom she had first sensed at Shantiniketan. She recounts with humor and sharp personal observation her interviews and meetings with many of India's leaders, her more intimate contacts with a number of the simpler, dedicated people of India who represent perhaps more typically the aspirations and hopes of the majority of Indians, and descriptions of the main cities of India. With her on these travels is a New Zealand farmer and social worker, A. C. Barrington, who attacks her views, condemns her as "the most obstinate woman I ever met," and altogether affords her the perfect foil.

All through India they argue about the various people they meet — leaders or social workers — and the things they see — cooperative farms, village schools, ashrams, and all the different aspects of the Gandhi-inspired work. Out of all this one finds an India with enormous problems still to face but a country in which the work has started, where people of a stronger or weaker fibre look for progressive solutions or for escapes. In short, India's problems are universal and its people are, after all, people (in itself a very important lesson). But there is one essential difference. To quote what might well be Miss Brittain's final conclusion: "Because of Gandhi's teaching, India remained the one great country in which reconciliation and nonviolence were regarded in high places as conceivable policies, and not the mere fantastic visions of a lunatic fringe."

Possibly the most courageous and interesting part of *Search After Sunrise* is the last short section in which Vera Brittain undertakes a trip to Pakistan merely in order to find the answer to a question: "Why had Pakistan boycotted a Conference dedicated to

the memorial of Gandhi?" To give her answers would deprive the reader of the pleasure of journeying through India and Pakistan with the same sense of adventure which Vera Brittain evokes with such skill. This is in the end an adventure book; its delights as a travelogue and a record of impressions of thoughtful and useful information are subsidiary to the discovery of a new and complex country by a remarkable woman.

♦ SANTHA RAMA RAU, daughter of the former Indian Ambassador to the United States, is the author of *East of Home*.

## ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

*Israel: The Beginning and Tomorrow*, by Hal Lehrman. New York: William Sloane, 1951. 358 pages. \$3.75.

*Reviewed by Paul L. Hanna*

Many of the books on Israel, whether written by journalists or by reputed scholars, have been superficial, partisan, or both. Mr. Lehrman, however, who is both a journalist and a scholar, has done an excellent job of careful reporting and keen analysis of economic, political, and social conditions in Israel. The only recent work on the contemporary scene which has approached his in objectivity, clarity, and insight is Kenneth Bilby's *New Star in the Near East*, and the Lehrman book is now more current and in some respects more penetrating.

*Israel: The Beginning and Tomorrow* does not attempt to deal with all aspects of Israel life. Attention is given to the structure of government and administrative procedures; Israel's unprecedented immigration; the issue of a religious versus a secular state; the party struggle for control of the educational institutions of the country; the interrelated problems of industrialization, foreign investment, and a mixed socialist-capitalist economy; and the Arab-Israel friction with regard to the Arab minority, Arab refugees, and interstate relations. Although Mr. Lehrman is sympathetic to Israel, he shows the dark as well as the bright side of things. In doing this the author relies upon his expressed belief that world Jewish opinion is maturing and that

straight information and constructive criticism of Israel are no longer equated with treason. Governmental red tape and the pervasive force of "influence" in administration, the sometimes restrictive policies of Histadrut, the "tough" attitude of the Israel troops toward Arab noncombatants and property during the war in 1948 — these and many other like matters receive attention.

The selective and topical technique can be very effective in the hands of a skilled writer, and Mr. Lehrman has the necessary qualifications. A picture of the complex, struggling society of contemporary Israel emerges; nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the author has so largely neglected the problems of agriculture and the possibilities of development in the Negev. The survival of Israel may depend in the next few years upon the increased ability of its people to feed themselves and to supply from within their state a greater part of their needed raw materials. No survey of Israel today can afford to ignore this aspect of the economy.

Mr. Lehrman devotes nearly a third of his book to Israel's external relations as they have impinged upon United States foreign policy and to Israel's contacts with American Jewry. There is detailed treatment of Jewish fundraising and of the disagreement between the Israelis and most American Zionists over the nature of the Jewish community in the United States. For non-American readers or for those seeking information on Israel rather than on the vagaries of American foreign policy in the Middle East or the internal conflicts within the American Jewish community, this may seem a flaw and a serious error in perspective and emphasis. It is, however, the conscious result of Mr. Lehrman's concept of his task. He has knowingly written from an American viewpoint and for American readers.

♦ PAUL L. HANNA, author of *British Policy in Palestine*, is Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Florida.

*The Revolt: Story of the Irgun*, by Menachem Begin. New York: Schuman, 1951. \$4.00.

*Reviewed by Judd L. Teller*

In the days when the British had put a price on Menachem Begin's head, some people

in Palestine, including British police officials, were inclined to believe "Begin" was merely a collective *nom de plume* for the Irgun's high command. There was a rumor that he was a fiction shrewdly perpetrated by the Irgun to rivet upon a living symbol loyalties which the movement could not otherwise command, for indeed many who dissented from the Irgun's tactics were disarmed by the dedication and inordinate courage of Begin, the man. However, the legend had put him at an unfair disadvantage. It dwarfed the unimpressive tense little man — an unprepossessing admixture of insecurity, awkward self-consciousness, hysteria, and bull-headedness. Even greater men could not hope to survive such legends about themselves. *The Revolt*, Begin's book of his underground activities, further deflates the man.

It is a nervous, hasty volume of self-justification — a fabric of recriminations against Begin's political foes in Zionism and Israel. The presentation is thoroughly partisan, and the worldwide Jewish struggle for Israel's sovereignty is disproportionately reduced to map scale, on which the Irgun is the overriding factor. Here and there one gets glimpses of Begin, the man — as the youngster in anti-Semitic Poland and the adolescent follower of Jabotinsky, founder of Zionist Revisionism, which gave rise to the Irgun, and of him as the adult prisoner of the Soviets. Were Begin a man of stature apart from his skill as an underground tactician, this would have emerged in the chapters in which he relates his debates with his Soviet interrogators. But these are not coruscating debates.

From almost the very first chapter, the distinction between Begin and traditional Zionism is evident although perhaps not in the light in which Mr. Begin hoped it would be. Mr. Begin, who was born in Poland, is indubitably a patriot, in the best Eastern European tradition. He concedes that he was aware, when he took the greatest risks for himself and for a people that had delegated no such authority to him, that his struggle might only be "a tragic episode." He was, however, impatient with time, precipitous in his conduct, because he saw nothing beyond the goal of statehood, and it was only the combination of ineffable catastrophe in Europe

and harsh British policy in Palestine that forced orthodox Zionist leadership to graft onto its traditional patterns some of the more violent modern methods of a Begin.

The mission-conscious leadership, however, could not shed a tradition of passive martyrdom whose victory is attained by exhausting the enemy's capacity for repression and mutilation. Even Mr. Begin concedes that in sending shiploads of refugees to mandated Palestine which were certain to be transhipped to Cyprus, the orthodox Zionist leadership contributed to victory. Yet, in the end, Begin again concedes nothing — his tactics and nothing else brought about Israeli sovereignty.

That Begin often felt called upon by his conscience to square himself with the older Zionist tradition is evident from such inadvertent passages as this statement on the philosophy of underground warfare: "What is most necessary is the inner consciousness that makes what is 'legal' illegal and the 'illegal' legal and justified." This rationale is accepted by all peoples in their struggle for sovereignty, or in civil wars, and the Irgunists cannot be condemned as reprehensible terrorists for having subscribed to it.

Menachem Begin dismisses the role of the collective settlements in the process culminating in Israeli sovereignty. "Had we settled on the land in those days, no real underground would have arisen in the peculiar topographical conditions of Eretz Israel. The British Government would have known exactly where to find us just as they knew where to find the Palmach (Haganah) men." However, Mr. Begin misses the point. These settlements provided the economic and psychological base for Jewish resettlement in Palestine. Besieged Israel would have starved had they not produced food. From a strictly military viewpoint, it was these settlements, fighting from entrenched positions, that helped contain the invading Arabs.

In challenging recently the Israel Parliament's decision for direct negotiations with Germany for a settlement of Jewish material claims, Begin alternated between threats of violent resistance and civil disobedience. This would indicate that he is yet to emerge from the underground psychologically.

The English translation of the book is deplorable. At times it degenerates into a ridiculous jargon. The story of the Irgun's underground campaign against the British forces could make absorbing reading had the book been better edited.

♦ JUDD L. TELLER, a specialist on Middle Eastern affairs, has written many magazine articles on the state of Israel.

## TURKEY

*Die Türkei*, by Karl Krüger. Berlin: Safari Verlag, 1951. 392 pages. DM 12.50.

*Reviewed by Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr.*

This is a useful compendium of miscellaneous information about modern Turkey. The author often goes into present-day problems much more thoroughly than Thornburg,<sup>1</sup> whom he has obviously read with great attention.

Although Dr. Krüger is at his best in such more or less technical fields as economics, transportation, and agriculture, at the outset he informs his readers that modern Turkey can be fully comprehended "only in the framework of historical retrospect." He then proceeds to devote nearly half of the book to putting Turkey into the proper perspective. Although no historian can question his dictum, it is regrettable that he has spent so much time in a field in which he is not so well qualified.

Starting as far back as the Ice Age, Dr. Krüger comes down to the Byzantine Empire, Islam in general (and the Caliphate in particular), the early Turks of Central Asia, and so on. An attempt is made to characterize the mental outlook of the modern Turk and to explain it by means of geographical, climatic, and historical factors. Chapter III deals on the whole rather well with the Turkish language; Chapter IV concerns the Capitulations; Chapters V and VI are headed "Abdul Hamid II: Panislamism" and "Enver Pasha: Panturanism" respectively. There is an

<sup>1</sup> *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal*, by Max Thornburg, Graham Spry, and George Soule (New York, 1949).

account of the Kemalist revolution, and the author describes the concept of the state in the Ottoman Empire and the present Republic. On page 182 Dr. Krüger finally launches into an analysis of Turkey's transportation system and from there goes on to chapters on agriculture, mining, power, banking, industrialization, cultural life, and tourism.

After wading through this long historical approach one gets the impression that Krüger has read a great deal but has not had time to digest it properly. He goes into quite unnecessary detail on ancient history for a work of this sort, often inserting quotations of a page or more from other secondary works where a passing reference would have sufficed. The chapter on Abdul Hamid is full of minor mistakes, not to mention what this reviewer considers a fundamental overestimation of Abdul Hamid himself. Enver, the subject of the next chapter, is characterized (quite conflictingly) in two lengthy quotations from the works of others, and Panislamism and Pan-turanianism do not emerge as clear pictures at all.

Beginning with the chapter on Atatürk and the founding of the Turkish Republic, the book gets much better, although even here there are many small errors. Where, for ex-

ample, does Krüger get the idea that one of the chief reasons for shifting the capital to Ankara was the "enervating" climate of the Bosphorus?

Krüger's fondness for Turkey is evident throughout the book; in his last chapter he comes out strongly for the development of Turkey as a tourist center. He admits that it is a little optimistic to expect this development to take place in the near future, but he makes a very strong case for the encouragement of tourism. Most people who know Turkey will agree with him. It would be wrong to leave the impression that this is not a good book. It is a book written for the general reader, and as such it provides a good introduction to Turkey. For the expert the book has, on the other hand, little to offer save a convenient collection of statistical tables of all sorts. The bibliography, although limited and confined chiefly to works in German, is valuable for its inclusion of a number of works, including periodical material, which came out during the war.

✦ ERNEST E. RAMSAUR, JR. a U.S. Foreign Service Officer stationed in Turkey during the years 1948-1950, secured his doctorate at the University of California for his dissertation on the Young Turk Revolution.

## ALSO NOTED

### General

*Avicenna: Scientist & Philosopher*, edited by G. M. Wickens. London: Luzac, 1952. 128 pages. 21s. A millenary symposium consisting of essays by authorities on the subject.

\**Al-Biruni: A Life Sketch*, by V. Courtois. Calcutta: Iran Society, 1952. Rs.1.

*Al-Biruni Commemoration Volume*. Calcutta: Iran Society, 1951. xxviii + 303 pages. Rs.40. Authorities from 8 countries contributed essays on the life and work of al-Biruni.

*Byzance avant l'Islam*, by P. Goubert. Paris: A. & J. Picard, 1952. 335 pages. 2000 fr. Volume I of a series to be entitled *Byzance et l'Orient*.

\**The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-east Asia*. Cmd. 8529. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1952. 75 pages. 65¢. A progress report issued by the Consultative Committee at Karachi, March 1952.

\* Pamphlets and documentary material marked with an asterisk are not covered by the Middle East Journal Book Purchase Service.

*Le Guide Arabe*. Beirut: Immeuble Hamouié, 1952. 2800 fr. A directory of commercial and industrial organizations in Arab countries, including information on members of the professions.

*Historia de la Política Árabe*, by R. G. Benumeña. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1951. 221 pages.

*Introduction to Africa: A Selective Guide to Background Reading*. Washington: University Press, 1952. ix + 237 pages. \$1.75. A bibliography compiled for the layman.

*The Middle East in World Affairs*, by George Lenczowski. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952. xx + 459 pages. \$6.00. A political history of the Middle East since World War I.

*Nationalism in the Middle East*. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1952. 68 pages. \$1.00. Addresses presented at the Sixth Annual Conference on Middle East affairs, sponsored by the Middle East Institute.

*Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. 99 pages. \$1.00. A report prepared for the 14th session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.



*The Travels of Ibn Jubayr*. Translated and edited by Ronald Broadhurst. London: Jonathan Cape, 1952. Maps. 42s. An account of trips made by a Spanish Moor to Mecca, Madina, Baghdad, and the kingdom of the Crusaders in the 12th century.

### Afghanistan

*Arayana*, by Rahman Pazhwak. London: Embassy of Afghanistan, 1951. 144 pages. A brief account of the cultural and political history of Afghanistan.

### Algeria

\**L'Algérie en 1951*. Algiers: Service d'Information, 1951. 12 pages.

*Françaises du Désert*, by Yvonne Pagniez. Paris: Plon, 1952. 251 pages. 390 fr. A first-hand account of the work of French doctors, nurses, and nuns in the oases of the Sahara Desert.

### Arabian Peninsula

*Kabel durch Rote Meer: Erzählung um Werner von Siemens*, by Julius Moshage. Munich: Andermann, 1951. 125 pages.

\**The Persian Gulf States*. New York: British Information Services, 1951. 5 pages.

\**Report on Aden for the Years 1949 & 1950*. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1951. 86 pages, bibliography, illustrations, tables, map. A biennial report of the Colonial Office. 4s.

### Egypt

\**Muzakharat fi al-siyyasat al-misriyyat*, by Muhammad Husayn Haykal. Cairo, 1951. 443 pages. £E .60. Reminiscences of a senior Egyptian statesman who is also well-known for his writings.

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## Readers' Commentary

*The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages.*

### Quantitative Importance of the MESC Operation

Following publication of his article "The Middle East Supply Center—A Reappraisal" in the Spring issue of the *Middle East Journal*, the writer has been requested to furnish a few figures indicating the quantitative importance of the MESC operation. In complying with this request, he must point out that the official records pertaining to this agency, both on the British and the American side, are not available as yet to private researchers. As to the interested governments themselves, they have not issued any comprehensive performance report on the Center, nor are they contemplating such in the near future, despite the keen interest of students of the Middle East in such material. Whatever information is available today is secondary or derivative; however, these sources include the valuable recollections of former officials of the Center.

The size of the operations of the Middle East Supply Center can be measured by the following indicators:

1. The jurisdiction of the Center comprised an area territorially twice as large as Europe, although of course with a much smaller population. During most of the war years it carried supreme responsibility vis-à-vis the Allied governments for the economic solvency of this huge area, a task which included the control of all its trade outside the region and the close supervision of trade within. By comparison with "Festung Europa," the discharge of this assignment was enormously complicated by the lack of administrative maturity in most parts of the Middle East. For instance, it was extremely difficult to obtain from the constituent countries reliable estimates of their requirements and resources, because of the lack of adequate statistical services. As a result, the determination of the essential quantum of imports and the equitable distribution of supplies taxed the facilities of the Center far more than it did in the case of control centers in administratively more developed sectors of the world at war.

2. The volume of goods and transactions handled by MESC can be estimated from the foreign trade

statistics for its ward area for the years 1943 and 1944. It was during these two years that MESC control over foreign trade was nearly complete (1941 and 1942 were break-in years for the organization; 1945 marked the rapid removal of controls). According to the Statistical Yearbook of the United Nations (1951 issue), the combined exports and imports for the MESC jurisdiction (excluding Turkey) during 1943 and 1944 approximated \$2,000 million. Of these, imports amounted to \$1,250 million; since by 1943 one-third of the foreign trade was intra-regional (United Nations, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East*, New York, 1951), and since all extra-regional trade was subject to MESC licensing, an estimated \$800-million worth of foreign trade transactions can be assumed to have been licensed by MESC during the two peak years of its stewardship, in addition to the discharge of indirect controls over the remainder of the area's foreign trade.

3. As to the number of merchandise items controlled, the *Journal of the Board of Trade*, London (No. 12, Oct. 21, 1944) lists around 300 classifications as requiring the approval of the Middle East Supply Center for import into the Middle East.

4. Acting through the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, an agency set up by the British Government for commercial operations in the Middle East, the Center effected substantial purchases of goods on behalf of Middle Eastern countries, particularly foodstuffs. By 1943, the Food Supplies Section of MESC handled bulk cargoes of food items at the rate of nearly 80,000 (value \$8 million) a month. Typical for such transactions were:

- a. The purchase of 250,000 tons of Iraq barley and its distribution to various Middle Eastern countries and India.

- b. The purchase of 25,000 tons of Ethiopian flour and mixed cereals for distribution in Aden, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, and to troops in East Africa.

- c. The purchase of 7,000 tons of Syrian barley for sale in Palestine and Cyprus.

- d. The acquisition of 45,000 tons of millet and 46,000 tons of wheat from the Egyptian Government for distribution in Palestine, Aden, Cyprus, and Saudi Arabia.



e. Buying from the British Ministry of Food, in the twelve months ended mid-year 1944, of 125,600 tons of Canadian wheat, 169,000 tons of Canadian flour, 74,000 tons of Australian wheat, 52,000 tons of Australian flour, and 62,000 tons of wheat from India.

The purchasing program of the Supply Center was significant for more than just the prevention of famine and other civilian hardships. It played an important role in the Center's drive for increased production. One of the principal spark plugs of productive expansion in the Middle East during the war was—in addition to the existence of a secure market propped by military orders and freed from foreign competition—the incentive of high profits and high wages (one of the reasons, incidentally, why inflation had to be allowed a certain elbow room). These incentives would have been ineffective in the total absence of goods to buy with the inflated purchasing power received by entrepreneurs and laborers. Similar considerations were at least in part responsible for the much-criticized re-exportation by the United Kingdom of lend-lease goods to the Middle East and other areas.

5. The staff of the Supply Center numbered about 500. The majority were of British and Commonwealth nationality. The maximum number of Americans on the staff was 50, and according to Mr. Frederick Winant, one of the principal officers on the American side, never exceeded 10% of the total personnel.

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### "Pakhtunistan" and the Indus River

In comparing the map of Pakistan and the Afghan Border facing page 1 (Winter 1952) with the official maps of the Army Map Service and with maps in Frazer-Tytler's *Afghanistan*, I discovered that the cartographer has slipped up on the drawing of the rivers. This would be a minor matter if it were not for the political and economic significance of the location of the rivers in relation to the existing and proposed boundaries of the disputed areas. The point is illustrated by the first sentence in the second paragraph on page 49, wherein it is stated that independent "Pakhtunistan" should be bordered "on the south and east by the Indus River."

The *Journal* map shows the course of the Indus accurately up to the point where it swings away from the south-north course (going upstream) and veers toward the northeast. This course is actually the course of the Sohan River. The Indus continues its northerly course and comes as close as 35 miles (air distance) to Peshawar. It then follows a more easterly course, perhaps coinciding with the words "TIER PROVINCE" on the map. The important geographical fact is that from the letter "T" in "FRONTIER" the river stays on the western side of the dotted line, which is the political border of the North-West Frontier Province; and from the letter "P" in "PROVINCE" it coincides with the British Administrative Border for some 50 miles. In other words, the North-West Frontier Province includes a cis-Indus district.

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# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress.

*With contributions from:* Elizabeth Bacon, Richard Ettinghausen, Sidney Glazer, Harold W. Glidden, Harvey P. Hall, Louis E. Leopold, Jr., George C. Miles, Leon Nemoy, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin, Mohammed Rashti, and Andreas Tietze.

*Note:* It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East generally since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography in this field: *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

Greater completeness of the Bibliography would be ensured if authors would be kind enough to mail offprints of their articles, especially when published in the less accessible journals, to the following address: Dr. Sidney Glazer, 147-22 Village Road (Apt. B), Jamaica 2, New York, U.S.A.

For list of abbreviations, see page 379.

## GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

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- 4906 FOSTER, GEORGE M. "The feixes of Ibiza." *Geog. Rev.* 42 (Ap '52) 227-37. One of the most interesting portions of the cultural legacy left to Spain by the Arabs is an ingenious system of agriculture practiced on reclaimed lands (feixes). Ibiza is one of the Balearic Islands.
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- 4908 ISSAWI, CHARLES. "Arab geography and the circumnavigation of Africa." *Osiris* 10 (1952).

- 4909 LEES, G. M. and FALCON, N. L. "The geographical history of the Mesopotamian plains." *Geog. Rev.* 118 (Mr '52) 24-39.
- 4910 MOORE, W. ROBERT. "The spotlight swings to Suez." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 101 (Ja '52) 105-15.
- 4911 MURRAY, G. W. "The Egyptian climate." *Geog. J.* 117 (D '51) 422-34. A broad outline of the history of the Egyptian climate during the past 750,000 years.

See also: 4931

## HISTORY

(Ancient, medieval)

- 4912 BABINGER, F. "Ja'qūb Pascha: ein leibarzt Mehmed's II." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 26, no. 1-4 (1951) 87-113. An Italian physician involved in Venetian attempts to poison the sultan.
- 4913 BURIAN, ORHAN. "The first years of Anglo-Turkish relations." (in Turkish) *Ankara Üniv. Dil . . . Fak. Dergisi* 9 (Mr '51) 1-17. The first English merchants in Turkey (16th cent.); the earliest official contacts were in the time of Elizabeth.
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- 4916 DAĞTEKİN, HÜSEYİN. "Mobile towers used in the siege and capture of Constantinople." (in Turkish) *Ankara Üniv. Dil . . . Fak. Dergisi* 9 (Mr '51) 153-63. Summary of available information about these medieval war machines.
- 4917 GÖKBİLGİN, M. TAYYİB. "Akkoyunlu princes at the Ottoman court." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 35-46. Documents from the Başbakanlık archives concerning members of the ruling Akkoyunlu dynasty who had taken refuge at the Ottoman court in the late 15th and 16th centuries.
- 4918 MOSCATTI, SABATINO. "Il "tradimento" di Wāsiṭ." *Muséon* (Louvain) no. 1-2 (1951) 176-89. Wāsiṭ in Iraq was the last Umayyad city to succumb to the conquering Abbasid forces and then only as a result of fifth-column action.
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- 4922 RYCKMANS, J. "Yarım 'Aymān II, roi de Saba?" *Muséon*, no. 1-2 (1951) 133-50.
- 4923 SÜMER, FARUK. "The Oghuzian tribe Yiva." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-1951) 151-66. The Yiva, one of the 24 branches of the Oğuz, played an important role during the period of Seljuk occupation of Anatolia. They are frequently mentioned during Ottoman times in documents dealing with the military organizations of Anatolia.
- 4924 TURAN, ŞERAFETTİN. "The treaty of Edirne, 1829." (in Turkish) *Ankara Üniv. Dil . . . Fak. Dergisi* 9 (Mr '51) 111-51. The course of Ottoman-Russian peace negotiations, as recorded in Turkish archival sources.
- 4925 VECCIA VAGLIERI, LAURA. "Sulla denominazione *Ḥawāriğ*." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.*, no. 1-4 (1951) 41-6.
- See also: 4909, 4988, 5000, 5002, 5009, 5017, 5021

## HISTORY AND POLITICS

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- 4926 "The composition of the Jordanian Parliament." (in Hebrew) *Ḥamizrah Heḥadash* (Jerusalem) 3 (Winter '52) 196-7. List of members of both houses, by localities.
- 4927 "Islam in the United Nations." *Round Table* 165 (D '51) 30-6. The ten Islamic states now in the U.N. regard their membership in the organization as conferring solid advantages, particularly in serving to make them better known to each other and thus to promote Muslim solidarity.
- 4928 "Some problems in the history of the peoples of Central Asia." (in Russian) *Poprosy Ist.* (Ap '51) 3-15. Official instructions. There was no one Islamic civilization. Tajik is not to be identified with Persian. Against the "monsters" of Pan-Turkism, nationalism, and Marxism.
- 4929 "Syria is not yet a democracy." *Fortnightly* 1022 (Mr '52) 158-63. Despite present gloomy indications, Syria will in the long run return to the modified form of democracy envisioned by the 1950 Constitution.
- 4930 K., D. J. "Greece, Turkey and N.A.T.O." *World Today* 8 (Ap '52) 162-9. The author approves of the inclusion of Greece and Turkey within the Atlantic defense system, although he is critical of the way in which it was done.
- 4931 Barkov, A. "The problem of the Sahara." *New Times* (Moscow) 13 (Mr '26 '52) 22-7. Some geographical notes. Reclaiming the desert cannot be accomplished except under a socialist system.
- 4932 BARTON, WILLIAM. "Islam and the Middle East." *Quart. Rev.* 591 (Ja '52) 56-67. Interesting examination of the Middle East, especially the Arab countries' attitudes in the East-West conflict. Egypt is the main danger; the second is the enmity between India and Pakistan; the third is the collapse of Iran. Suggestions for solving the problems.
- 4933 BAYSUN, M. CAVID. "The historian Rāsid Efendi's embassy to Iran." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-1951) 145-50. Based on an unpublished contemporary source in the author's possession.

- 4934 BECKETT, P. H. T. "Persia's need for land reform." *Fortnightly* 1022 (F '52) 100-4. Unless drastic changes are made soon, the Communists will have an easy time of it in taking over whenever they wish.
- 4935 BECKINGHAM, C. F. "Dutch travellers in Arabia in the seventeenth century, II." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.*, no. 3-4 (O '51) 170-81. Deals with Van den Broecke and the history of the Dutch factory at Mocha.
- 4936 BENTWICH, NORMAN. "The Arab refugees." *Contemp. Rev.* 1037 (My '52) 270-4. Reviews the various U.N. proposals to solve the problem.
- 4937 BILAINKIN, GEORGE. "Realities in Egypt." *Contemp. Rev.* 1036 (Ap '52) 202-7. The Egyptian Green Book throws a "ruthless light on the stature, knowledge, temper and skill of the sundry negotiators, British and Egyptian." Sir Ralph Stevenson was outshone by Salāh Eddin Pasha who demonstrated a high order of skill in marshalling facts and great deftness in presenting Egypt's case against the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty.
- 4938 BOEHM, Y. "Two years of Wafd rule in Egypt." (Hebrew, English summary). *Hamizrah Hehadash* 3 (Winter '52) 109-20. Valuable study of the causes of the Wafd's increasing extremism in foreign politics. The author explains it primarily on the basis of social tension within the party.
- 4939 BOCHKARYOV, Y. "American diplomacy and Iranian oil." *New Times* 17 (Ap '23 '52). Ventures to answer Henry Grady's article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, "What Went Wrong in Iran?"
- 4940 BROWN, C. A. "The Egyptian impasse." *Fortnightly* 1022 (F '52) 81-6. Large scale social revolution in Egypt would seem to be out of the question for a long time to come. The underprivileged will do nothing except riot on occasions until they have a clearer set of aims, methods, and sense of organization.
- 4941 BULLARD, READER. "Persian oil." *Fortnightly* 1024 (Ap '52) 219-25. Re-examines the British case and the factors on the Iranian side that worked against a settlement.
- 4942 DATKIN, S. "The events in Tunisia." *New Times* 16 (Ap '16 '52) 23-7.
- 4943 DE LA SOUCHÈRE, ELENA. "L'Espagne franquiste et le monde arabe." *Mondes d'Orient* 1 (F '52) 7-14. Detailed analysis of Franco's North African policy.
- 4944 EBAN, ABBA. "The Middle East in world affairs." *J. Internat. Aff.* (New York) 6 (Winter '52) 25-7. The tensions within the area are due to nationalist exclusiveness, contrast between political freedom and economic inertia, and the reluctance to acknowledge the claims of the international order.
- 4945 FAWZI, M. "In defense of peace." *J. Internat. Aff.* 6 (Winter '52) 29-31. The people of the Middle East will become a source of strength once they become "morally and politically satisfied through the elimination of unjust, antiquated, and glaringly harmful treaties and agreements."
- 4946 GRIGORIANZ, Z. "Participation of Armenians in the Russo-Persian wars of the early 19th century" (in Russian) *Voprosy Ist.* (Ap '51) 16-25. The Armenian working classes helped the Russians to liberate Eastern Armenia from the Iranian yoke. Soon, however, peasant discontent and revolutionary propaganda began to spread as a result of the harsh Czarist rule.
- 4947 HARARI, MAURICE. "A challenge for American diplomacy." *J. Internat. Aff.* 6 (Winter '52) 51-6. Like many others who more or less eloquently criticize American foreign policy, the present author fails to come up with suggestions more concrete and practicable than urging "a high degree of cultural understanding" and "constant Anglo-American cooperation."
- 4948 HARRIS, PERCY. "Snapshots in Morocco." *Contemp. Rev.* 1036 (Ap '52) 213-7. Some superficial impressions.
- 4949 IVANOV, M. "The crisis of January-February 1907 in Iran." (in Russian) *Voprosy Ist.* (Ap '51) 64-73. Based on archival material.
- 4950 KAPELIUK, M. "King Abdullah's personality." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 3 (Winter '52) 127-33. Translated extracts from the second volume of Abdullah's autobiography illustrating his hatred of "Nejd" (Saudi Arabia), Egypt, and Shishakli's Syria, as well as his Western sympathies.
- 4951 KHADDURI, MAJID. "Governments of the Arab East." *J. Internat. Aff.* 6 (Winter '52) 37-50. These governments reflect the legacy of the old Islamic traditions as well as the impact of modern European ideas.
- 4952 LEOPOLD, LOUIS E., JR. "The Cyprus bastion." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 78 (Mr '52) 257-63. An analysis of the strategic importance of the island in the defense of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.
- 4953 MALEC, CHAFIC. "Étude critique de la théorie parlementaire dans son application au Liban." *Rev. de Droit Internat. pour le Moyen-Orient* (Paris) 1 (Je '51). Reaches rather pessimistic conclusions about the nature of the Lebanese regime. The people are ruled by a tiny group of rich and influential families.
- 4954 MALEC, CHAFIC. "Les tendances internationales des peuples arabes du Moyen-



- Orient et le problème de la paix." *Rev. de Droit Internat. pour le Moyen-Orient* 1 (Je '51) 4-23. Federation might be the answer to Arab difficulties and aspirations.
- 4955 MALIK, CHARLES. "The meaning of the Near East." *J. Internat. Aff.* 6 (Winter '52) 32-6. The present crisis of Western culture results from its "habit of dissolving everything, including the Near East, into oil and strategy and politics." The Near East is essentially a "cultural-genetic" concept.
- 4956 MARMORSTEIN, EMILE. "Conquering faiths." *Hibbert J.* (London) 50 (Ja '52) 113-23. An engrossing study of the striking parallels (in form only, not in substance) between the growth of Islam and the rise of Communism. Projecting his analysis into the future, the author foresees Communism losing its "aggressive, Messianic tendencies" and using more primitive peoples to do their fighting (cf. the present role of the Chinese with that of the Seljuk and Ottoman Turks) or alternatively following another trend and disintegrating into small independent entities (cf. Yugoslavia).
- 4957 MAZOUR, ANATOLE G. "Russia, the Middle East, and oil." *World Aff. Interpreter* 22 (Winter '52) 415-23. Advocates support for the International Cooperative Alliance proposal to the U.S. in 1947 regarding international regulation of the Middle East oil fields as a solution to the problem of Russian penetration.
- 4958 MILLER, A. "The events in Egypt." *New Times* 9 (F '27 '52) 10-3. Prof. Miller offers another of his standard interpretations of how the Anglo-Egypto-American reactionaries succeeded in having Nakhhas Pasha ousted from power.
- 4959 MILLER, A. "The Middle East command — weapon of colonial oppression." *New Times* 3 (Ja '16 '52) 7-10.
- 4960 RICHARDSON, CHANNING B. "880,000 Arab refugees." *J. Internat. Aff.* 6 (Winter '52) 21-4. A brief review.
- 4961 RIVLIN, BENJAMIN. "The Tunisian nationalist movement: four decades of evolution." *Middle East J.* (Spring '52) 167-93. The movement historically has been moderate in character, professing a desire for cooperation with France. Prolonged tension, however, may bring more extreme elements to the fore.
- 4962 TANSEL, SALĀHATTIN. "Study on the Turkish-Russian war of 1768." (in Turkish) *Ankara Üniv. Dil . . . Fak. Dergisi* 8 (D '50) 477-536. The relations between the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Poland prior to the war. The study is based exclusively on Turkish sources, especially Mustafa Kesbi's *İbretnümâ-yi devlet* (cf. Babinger, GOW, p. 298), where an account of the 1768 campaign is given *in extenso*.
- 4963 WECHSBERG, JOSEPH. "Anything goes." *New Yorker* (Ap '12 '52) 62-70. Describes economic and political conditions in Tangier.
- 4964 WECHSBERG, JOSEPH. "The hot wind from the desert." *New Yorker* (Mr '15 '52) 92-103. Describes a visit to Morocco and interviews with Moroccan nationalists.
- 4965 WRIGHT, EDWIN. "The Middle East in the global pattern." *World Aff. Interpreter* (Los Angeles) 22 (Winter '52) 362-73. Discusses the state of Islamic culture today.
- 4966 YOUNG, T. CUYLER. "The social support of current Iranian policy." *Middle East J.* 6 (Spring '52) 125-43. The backbone of Prime Minister Mosaddeq's support is to be found in a newly emerged third social force composed of a variety of "middle" classes.
- See also: 4994

## ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation, and communications)

- 4967 "A.I.O.C. workers' terms bettered Iran's labor law." *Oil Forum* 6 (F '52) 51-3.
- 4968 "Iran presents its case for nationalization." *Oil Forum* 6 (Mr '52) 79-94. An Iranian government official is the spokesman.
- 4969 BAER, G. "Economic affairs — a quarterly report." *Hamizrah Hehadesh* 3 (Winter '52) 136-41. Covers the Arab countries, Turkey, and Iran.
- 4970 BECKETT, PHILIP. "Qanûts in Persia." *J. of the Iran Soc.* (Ja '52) 125-33.
- 4971 HUTH, ARNO G. "The problem of communications." *J. Internat. Aff.* 6 (Winter '52) 65-74. Sketchy survey of the press, cinema, radio, and propaganda in the Middle East.
- 4972 JONES, K. WESTCOTT. "The romance of Saudi Arabia's oilfields — changes in Arab way of life." *Gt. Brit. and the East* (F '52) 21-3. Describes Aramco's impact on Saudi Arabia's economic and social structure.
- 4973 JULIEN, RAYMOND C. "Le pétrole dans l'économie du Moyen-Orient." *Rev. de Droit Internat. pour le Moyen-Orient* 1 (Je '51) 51-65. Fresh analysis, combining technical and socio-economic approaches.
- 4974 EL-SERAFY, MOHAMMED FAYEK. *Les relations commerciales franco-égyptiennes. Mondes d'Orient* (Paris) 1 (Ag-S '51) 37-41. France has always occupied an important place in Egyptian foreign trade.

- 4975 TASHMAN, MEHLIKA I. "Observations on Turkey's Ramandagh field." *Oil Forum* 6 (F '52) 54-6.
- 4976 WILMINGTON, MARTIN W. "The Middle East Supply Center: a reappraisal." *Middle East J.* 6 (Spring '52) 144-66. Despite the MESC's success in achieving its immediate purpose of saving critical shipping, its efforts at working out economic cooperation in the area produced no lasting results. Some of the reasons were: failure to provide for native participation, economic rivalry among the Western powers, and organization exclusively in terms of military emergency.
- 4977 YEGANEH, MOHAMMED. "Investment in the petroleum industry of the Middle East." *Middle East J.* 6 (Spring '52) 241-6. Discussion of methods of analysis, with tables showing, among other figures, a total of \$1,850 million as the gross capital investment.
- SOCIAL AFFAIRS**
- (General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law)
- 4978 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "Recent developments in *shari'ah* law, VII." *Muslim World* 42 (Ap '52) 124-40. Analysis primarily of the Egyptian Law of 1943 and several earlier Sudanese innovations relating to intestate succession.
- 4979 BECK, EDMUND. "Die dogmatisch religiöse einstellung des grammatikers al-Farrā'." *Muséon*, no. 1-2 (1951) 187-202.
- 4980 BECK, EDMUND. "Studien zur geschichte der Kufischen koranlesung, III." *Orientalia* (Rome) 20, no. 3 (1951) 316-28. Chiefly about Abū 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī.
- 4981 BRAUN, FERNAND. "La nouvelle loi égyptienne sur la nationalité." *Rev. de Droit Internat.* 1 (Je '51) 99-103. It compares favorably with the law of 1929 on the same subject.
- 4982 BRAVMANN, M. M. "On the spiritual background of early Islam and the history of its principal concepts." *Muséon* 64, no. 3-4 (1951) 317-56. Elucidation of *murāwah* and *dīn*, *islām*, *imān*, *ad-dunyā wad-dīn*, which are illustrative of the ideological and psychological background of early Islam.
- 4983 CLELAND, W. WENDELL. "Social conditions and social change." *J. Internat. Aff.* 6 (Winter '52) 23-36. General first-hand observations on the present condition of the indigenous populations of Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, with incidental references to other countries.
- 4984 CRAGG, KENNETH. "The Christian church and Islam today, II." *Muslim World* 42 (Ap '52) 112-23. Analysis of recent Muslim criticism and interpretation of Islam.
- 4985 DE SCHWEINITZ, KARL. "Today in the land of Egypt." *Survey* (Mr '52) 103-7. Enthusiastic description of current efforts to improve social conditions, particularly through the Technical Cooperation Administration and the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation.
- 4986 DONATO, JOSEPH. "Lebanon and its labour legislation." *Internat. Labour Rev.* 65 (Ja '52) 64-92.
- 4987 GAILLARD, JEAN. "La minorité zoroastrienne en Iran." *Mondes d'Orient* 1 (F '52) 16-7. Relations between the 12-14,000 Zoroastrians now in Iran and the Muslims are good, especially in Tehran.
- 4988 KAPLAN, MEHMED. "The woman in *Dede Korkut's Book*." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 9 (1946-1951) 99-112. Morality and the social status of women in the heroic past of the Turks.
- 4989 KHALIDI, ISMAIL R. "Constitution of the United Kingdom of Libya: background and summary." *Middle East J.* 6 (Spring '52) 221-8.
- 4990 LEVONIAN, LOOTFY. *Muslim World* 42 (Ap '52) 90-6. "The millet system in the Middle East." As a result of its being given millet status in Turkey, the Protestant church began to function more like a semi-political and national body than like a church. Rev. Levonian concludes that this development has not been a "pure blessing."
- 4991 LATRABE, JACQUES. "La constitution récente de la Syrie." *Rev. de Droit Internat.* 1 (Je '51) 88-98.
- 4992 MOGANNAM, E. THEODORE. "Developments in the legal system of Jordan." *Middle East J.* 6 (Spring '52) 194-206. The annexation of eastern Palestine and the absorption of many Palestinians has presented Jordan with a multiplicity of legal problems. Progress in ironing them out is reviewed and evaluated.
- 4993 SERJEANT, R. B. "Two tribal law cases, II." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* no. 304 (O '51) 156-69. Documents in a dispute over a runaway wife: text, translation, notes, glossary. Appendix contains the appointment of a *manṣab* of the *mashā'ikh*.
- 4994 TCHIRKOVITCH, STEVAN. "La question des minorités dans le Moyen-Orient." *Rev. de Droit Internat.* 1 (Je '51) 24-32. Cases in the League and U.N., with particular reference to Iraq.

See also: 4907, 4936, 4966

## SCIENCE

## (General, history)

- 4995 BAYKAL, B. S. and GÜNALTAŞ, Ş. "Two lectures on al-Fārābī." (in Turkish) *Ankara Üniv. Dil . . . Fak. Dergisi* 8 (D '50) 417-36.
- 4996 SAYILI, AYDIN. "Farabi and science." (in Turkish) *Ankara Üniv. Dil . . . Fak. Dergisi* 8 (D '50) 437-40. Al-Fārābī's treatise on the vacuum. His importance as a forerunner of scholasticism.

## ART

## (Archaeology, epigraphy, manuscripts and papyri, minor arts, numismatics and philately, painting and music)

- 4997 "The Margaret McMillan Webber bequest of Persian paintings." *Bull. Minneapolis Inst. of Arts* 40 (N '51) 134-43. Illust. Discussion of a notable collection of miniatures and illuminations covering the entire range of this art; characteristic examples are illustrated. 1 Arabic miniature of the 13th cent.; 8 Persian miniatures and drawings from the 14th to the 17th cent.; 1 pages of Persian Kufic writing of the 10th cent.; and 1 page of Egyptian *thulth* writing of the 14th cent. A.D.
- 4998 "Masterpiece of the month." *William Rockhill Nelson Gallery . . . News* 19 (Ja '52) 5-6. Discusses Iranian metal work of the 12th and 13th centuries, in particular a 12th cent. Seljuk bronze incense burner in the form of a lion. Illust.
- 4999 "A thirteenth century Arabic enamelled beaker." *Toledo Museum News* (Ap '51) 12. Announcement of the acquisition of an early Syrian glass beaker from the Bachstiltz collection in the Hague; the piece is dated ca. 1230 A.D.
- 5000 BEESTON, A. F. L. "A Sabaean penal law." *Muséon*, no. 3-4 (1951) 305-15. Reconstruction of a text based on the facsimile of Glaser's copy.
- 5001 BIAVATI, EROS. "Bacini' di Pisa." *Faenza* 37, no. 5-6 (1951) 96-7. Publication of 12 more of these glazed earthenware vessels imbedded in the northern wall of San Piero a Grado's church in Pisa. They show a Byzantine or Muslim pattern and are of the 11-12th centuries.
- 5002 BONESCHI, PAULO. "L'inscription lihyanite d'anciennes monnaies tenues pour sabéennes." *Riv. degli Stud. Orient.* 26, no. 1-4 (1951) 1-15. Attempt to show that a certain type of coin is to be dated as of the 1st cent. B.C.
- 5003 DIGBY, GEORGE WINSFIELD. "Persian and Turkish rugs at the Fitzwilliam museum." *Connoisseur* 128 (N '51) 96-103. Discussion of Anatolian, Caucasian, and Persian rugs mostly from the 19th century, and a few from the 18th. An Anatolian runner with a geometric field and a floral border is dated 1746 A.D. Illust.
- 5004 DIMAND, MAURICE S. "A Saljuk incense burner." *Met. Museum of Art Bull.* 10 (Ja '52). Discusses the largest piece of Seljuk bronze sculpture from Iran thus far found, an incense burner in the shape of a feline with bull's legs, made in 577 H. (A.D. 1181-2) for the Emir Saif ad-Dunyā wad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Mawardi. The name of the artist is not given.
- 5005 JAMME, A. "Pièces anépigraques sud-arabes d'Aden." *Muséon*, no. 1-2 (1951) 157-76.
- 5006 KÜHNEL, ERNST. "Der lautenspieler in der islamischen kunst des 8. bis 13. jahrhunderts." *Berliner Mus.* 1, no. 3-4 (1951) 29-35. Discusses characteristic examples found on silver, pottery, stone, ivory, and textiles; 11 such objects are illustrated.
- 5007 LACAM, JEAN. "La céramique mameluque au Musée des Arts Decoratifs." *Faenza* 37, no. 5-6 (1951) 98-104. Analysis and classification into three groups of Egyptian pottery from the 13th till the 16th centuries. Illust.
- 5008 MUNNÉ, LUIS M. A LLUBIÁ. "Cerámica de reflejo metálico, fabricada en España." *Faenza* 37, no. 5-6 (1951) 105-7. Based on A. W. Frothingham's *Lusterware of Spain* (published by the Hispanic Society of America in 1951) with some additions to the last chapter of the book.
- 5009 PHILBY, H. ST. J. B. "The lost ruins of Qurayya." *Geog. Rev.* 117 (D '51) 448-58. The author conjectures that Qurayya ("the little village"), about 45 mi. n.w. of Tabuk on the Saudi Arabian section of the Hijaz railway, was a prosperous center in late Nabataean times.
- 5010 POTRATZ, HANNS. "Das 'kampfmotiv' in der Luristankunst." *Orientalia* (Rome) 21, no. 1 (1952) 13-6. Illust.
- 5011 ROBINSON, B. W. "Persian painting: a loan exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum." *Connoisseur* 128 (Ja '52) 176-81. A survey of Persian painting from the 14th to 19th centuries as represented in British collections. None of the 12 illustrations has been previously published; they come, in part, from hitherto unknown Mss. Introduces a "Turkman style" (second half of 15th cent.) and "Qazwin style" (after 1570).
- 5012 ROBINSON, B. W. "Some illustrated Persian

- manuscripts in the John Rylands library." *Bull. John Rylands Lib.* 34 (S '51) 69-80. A critical analysis of the paintings in 22 Persian Mss., several of which are above average quality. The author offers several excellent attributions. 2 plates.
- 5013 ROLLAND, F. HUESO. "Residencias hispanoárabes en Tetuán." *Arte Español* 18, no. 1 (1951) 144-57. Deals with the Tetuán examples of the North African type of houses belonging to well-to-do people. Illust.
- 5014 RYCKMANS, G. "Inscriptions Şafaïtiques au British Museum et au Musée de Damas." *Muséon*, no. 1-2 (1951) 83-91.
- 5015 RYCKMANS, G. "Inscriptions sud-arabes." *Muséon*, no. 1-2 (1951) 93-126. Sabaeen inscriptions discovered by Philby.
- 5016 SHEPHERD, DOROTHY G. "An Egyptian textile from the early Christian period." *Bull. Cleveland Mus. of Art* 39 (Ap '52) 66-8. Discusses and illustrates a resist-dyed linen with scenes from the Old and New Testament made in Egypt and attributed to the Byzantine period, first half of the 16th cent.
- 5017 VAN BERCHEM, MARGUÉRITE. "La découverte de Sedrata." *La Nouvelle Cléo* 3, no. 9-10 (1951) 389-96. Short historical account of the deserted Ibādite capital in the Algerian Sahara which flourished in the 10th-11th centuries and was soon afterwards given up; followed by a report of the first excavations in January and February 1951 conducted by Mlle. van Berchem. Illust.
- 5018 WALKER, JOHN. "Six Kufic inscriptions." *Muséon*, no. 1-2 (1951) 151-6. Datable; funerary in character.
- author offers new explanations of the Turkish words *balçık* "clay" and *sanduvaç* "nightingale."
- 5023 EREN, HASAN. "On the Turkish word *garman*." *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 97-8. The author establishes the relations between this Altaic Turkish word and its congeners *qalmar* and *qanmar*.
- 5024 ERGIN, MUHARREM. "A grammatical analysis of Kadi Burhaneddin's *divan*." (in Turkish) *Istanbul Üniv. Edebiyat Fak. . . Dergisi* 4 (Je '51) 287-327. A detailed analysis of the language of Kadi Burhaneddin's poems, with special attention to its relations to the Azeri dialect. Burhaneddin (1344-99) was the ruler of a small state with its center in Sivas, and a powerful poet. He is important as an early representative of Anatolian Turkish.
- 5025 HELLMANN, L. "Metrica sanscrita in al-Birūnī." *Riv. degli Stud. Orient.* 26, no. 1-4 (1951) 57-66.
- 5026 INAN, ABDÜLKADIR. "Son-in-law." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 139-44. The author derives the Turkish word *güvey*, "son-in-law," from an earlier meaning, "shepherd." Description of a nomadic social institution resembling that described in Genesis 31.
- 5027 MANSUROĞLU, MECDUT. "Beginning and development of the Turkish literary language in Anatolia." (in Turkish) *Istanbul Üniv. Edebiyat Fak. . . Dergisi* 4 (Je '51) 215-229. A survey of the sources and character of the early Ottoman language, especially that of the 13th cent.
- 5028 MORAG, SHELOMO. "Wiyyā in modern Arabic dialects and its Hebrew parallels." *Tarbiut* 22 (Ja '51) 120-3. Study of the extension of the use of *wiyyā* for "with," and five Biblical Hebrew parallels.
- 5029 ROSSI, E. "Un inedito lessico rimato turco-albanese composto a Scutari nel 1835." *Riv. degli Stud. Orient.* 26, no. 1-4 (1951) 114-23. An anonymous *Dürre-i manzume*.
- 5030 TIETZE, A. "Nautical terms in 16th century Turkish poetry." *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 113-38. Agehī wrote a *qasidah* full of imagery based on nautical experience. He was frequently imitated. His poems present many terminological problems.

See also: 5000, 5002, 5005, 5014, 5015, 5018.

## LANGUAGE

- 5019 ARAT, R. RAHMETI. "Concerning the letters 'g' and 'ğ' in *Atebetü 'l-hakaik*." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 65-72. Detailed studies on the development of sounds in early Turkish texts will be the first step toward a history of the Turkic languages.
- 5020 BEESTON, A. F. L. "Notes on old South Arabian lexicography, III." *Muséon*, no. 1-2 (1951) 127-34. (9) m' šrt (10) mšwr (11) šqr (12) fz(h).
- 5021 CAFEROĞLU, A. "The 3rd international congress for toponymy and anthroponymy (July 15-19, 1949)." (in Turkish) *Istanbul Üniv. Edebiyat Fak. . . Dergisi* 4 (Je '51) 275-85. Comments on the Brussels conference. Caferoğlu's paper dealt with the toponymy of nomad and settled Turkish tribes.
- 5022 EREN, HASAN. "Etymological studies." *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 95-6. The

## LITERATURE

- 5031 ABDULLAH, FEVZIYE. "Ahmed Hikmet Müftüoğlu; his life and art." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 1-34. The works of this poet (1870-1927) are noted less for their literary value than for their patriotic fervor.



- 5032 ANHEGGER, ROBERT. "The story of the ant and the lazy cricket in Turkish literature." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 73-94. The author rounds up all the variants of a Greek fable in Turkish literature. Apart from a more loosely connected line of tradition of Islamic origin, there seems to have been an earlier influence possibly exerted by the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire, and a later one derived from European sources.
- 5033 BERTELS, E. "Ali Sher Nevai's *Leyli* and *Mejnun*." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 47-64. This very instructive analysis and comparison with its predecessors is taken from Bertel's introduction to S. Lipkin's Russian translation of the famous Chagatay epic of 1483, printed in Tashkent in 1943.
- 5034 BROCKELMANN, CARL. "Autobiography in Arabic literature." *Pakistan Quart.* 1 (Ag '51) 21-5. The second and final article of a series in which the author analyzes the autobiographies of Usāma b. Munqidh, Umara of Yemen, Abū 'l-Fidā, Ibn Khaldūn, and Ṭāhā Ḥusayn.
- 5035 BURIAN, O. "Two poets complaining of bad government." (in Turkish) *Ankara Üniv. Dil . . . Fak. Dergisi* 8 (D '50) 675-81. Three 16th cent. Turkish poems, two by Gazi Giray and one by Abdi.
- 5036 DEMIRTAŞ, FARUK KADRI. "Cemali, a poet of the time of Mohammed II, and his work." (in Turkish) *Istanbul Üniv. Edebiyat Fak . . . Dergisi* 4 (Je '51) 189-213. Little is known of the life of this minor poet. 17 *ghazals* and extracts from other poems.
- 5037 DIRİÖZ, HAYDAR ALI. "Kutb ül-Alevi's commentary on the *Barak Baba Risalesi*." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 167-70. The author identifies the author of this commentary written in 1355 with the translator of Nizami's *Khosraw u Shirin*.
- 5038 KAPLAN, MEHMED. "Abdulhak Hamid and nature." (in Turkish) *Istanbul Üniv. Edebiyat . . . Dergisi* 4 (Je '51) 167-87.
- 5039 KÖPRÜLÜ, ORHAN F. "Some remarks on a critical review." (in Turkish) *Türkiyat Mec.* 9 (1946-51) 171-8. On B. Spuler's review of the first five volumes of the *Islam Ansiklopedisi*.
- 5040 SADUN, AIDE. "Cemil Sidki al-Zahāvi and his poem 'Revolt in Hell'." (in Turkish) *Istanbul Üniv. Edebiyat Fak . . . Dergisi* 4 (Je '51) 231-55. Life and letters of this Iraqi poet (1863-1936). Condensed extracts (in Turkish translation) from his *Revolt in Hell* which describes his adventures after death, his irreverent dispute with the two questioning angels, damnation, and final successful revolt of Hell against Heaven.
- 5041 SCHIMMEL, ANNEMARIE. "Where east meets west." *Pakistan Quart.* 1 (Ag '51) 18-20. A survey of Eastern elements in Western writing, especially in Germany. Emphasis on Goethe and Rückert and the East's response to their poetry, Muhammad Iqbal's "Message of the East."
- 5042 SHAMOSH, Y. "Translations of fiction in modern Arabic literature." (in Hebrew, English summary). *Hamizrah Hehdash* 3 (Winter '52) 133-5. Some statistics, names of translators, and remarks on the style and quality of the translations.
- 5043 SILVERSTEIN, THEODORE. "Dante and the legend of the *Mirāj*." *J. Near East. Stud.* (Chicago) 11 (Ap '52) 89-110. Surveys the traditional Christian otherworld literature, critically reviewing Asin's claims of Islamic origin and noting, in particular, Cerulli's *Libro della Scala*.
- 5044 TARLAN, ALI NIHAD. "Fuzuli's unknown Persian *qasidas*." (in Turkish) *Istanbul Üniv. Edebiyat Fak . . . Dergisi* 4 (Je '51) 257-64.
- 5045 WYSHAM, WILLIAM N. "Jesus in the poetry of Iran." *Muslim World* 42 (Ap '52) 104-11. The Iranians have been more susceptible to evangelization than other Muslims owing to the fact that Jesus and his teachings are often cited in their poetry. Translated excerpts from Firdausi, Nezami, Rudaki, Hafiz, and others.

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